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Abstract
This thesis outlines an idea of world politics as a distinct activity of thinking and speaking 
about the overall conditions of world order in terms of their desirability. World order is 
understood not as an arrangement of entities, be they humans, states or civilizations, but a 
complex of variously situated activities conducted by individuals as members of diverse 
associations of their own. This idea is advanced from within one such association, or context, 
contemporary International Relations, wherein it entails a metatheoretical position, 
neotraditionalism, as a rectification of the initial, ‘traditionalist’ or ‘classical’, approach after 
the advance of rationalism and subsequent reflectivist critique. Since loose talk about 
traditions does not constitute a tradition, neotraditionalism is presented by drawing on the 
resources of a well-trimmed manner of thinking and speaking about human associations, 
political philosophy, again, understood not as a body of doctrine but a context-specific human 
activity which can be experienced only through concrete exhibitions of individual 
intelligence. Therefore, throughout the thesis, a conversation on the place of politics in human 
experience is re-enacted. Its major participants are R.G. Collingwood and Michael Oakeshott. 
Its major achievement is the conditional unity of understanding and conduct, tradition and 
individuality, the subject of inquiry and the manner in which it is conducted. As such, this 
conversation is neither an antiquarian item nor a timeless ideal, but an instance of an 
association to be desired, and thus an example which, once comprehended, that is, both 
understood and included into one’s own context, becomes a historically enacted disposition 
for the activity of politics.
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Notes on usage
International Relations is capitalized when referring to the academic field of study. Once in 
lower case, it refers to the practices of the relations between human associations, not 
necessarily states.
Realism, Rationalism and Idealism are capitalized when referring to the schools of thought in 
philosophy. When in inverted commas, ‘realism’ and ‘rationalism’ refer to the ‘traditions of 
thought’ identified by the English school in International Relations. Otherwise, the terms refer 
to political doctrines and political theories associated with them.
Since neither Collingwood nor Oakeshott used the gender-neutral language, I refrain from 
using it as well.
Throughout the text, abbreviated references to Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s works are 
given in parentheses, whereas works by other authors are referenced in full in the footnotes.
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Prologue
Responding to the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 in New York, British Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair, diagnosed the situation: ‘This is a moment to seize. The kaleidoscope 
has been shaken. The pieces are in flux. Soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us re­
order this world around us’.1 Despite all the talk about the ‘new war of the new millennium’, 
which, at least on the level of technology and military strategy this war soon turned out to be, 
the metaphor itself was familiar. Almost a century earlier, while preparing for the Peace 
Conference to be held in Paris so as to seize yet another opportunity provided by yet another 
disaster, Jan Smuts described the outcome of the Great War in similar terms: ‘The very 
foundations have been shakened and loosened, and things are again fluid. The tents have been 
struck, and the great caravan of humanity is once more on the march’.2
There is, however, what seems to be an important difference. By the end of the Paris 
Conference, Smuts had to admit: ‘I am grieved beyond words that such should be the result of 
our statesmanship’.3 In the immediate aftermath of September 11, Blair, invoking the ‘power 
of community’ as a remedy, came close to admitting that re-ordering the world may, on 
occasion, be beyond the power of the institution of statesmanship as such:
1 Speech by Tony Blair, Labour Party conference, Brighton, 2 October 2001. Accessed at 
http://politics.guardian.co.Uk/labourconference2001/storv/0.1220.561988.00.html. October 2003.
2 Cited in Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers: The Paris Conference o f 1919 and Its Attempt to End 
War (London: John Murray, 2001): 98.
3 Ibid.: 479.
Around the edge of the room, strangers making small talk, trying to be normal people in an 
abnormal situation. And as you crossed the room, you felt the longing and sadness; hands 
clutching photos of sons and daughters, wives and husbands; imploring you to believe 
them when they said there was still an outside chance of their loved ones being found 
alive, when you knew in truth that all hope was gone. And then a middle aged mother 
looks you in the eyes and tells you her only son has died, and asks you: why? I tell you: 
you do not feel like the most powerful person in the country at times like that.4
The gap between the ambition (re-ordering the world) and the means for its fulfilment (the 
state) points beyond isolated rhetorical gestures towards what Hannah Arendt described as 
‘one of the outstanding properties of the human condition’ in her discussion of violence, 
where politics was placed into the context of a story of the transformation of impotence into 
omnipotence:
Death, whether faced in actual dying or in the inner awareness of one’s own mortality, is 
perhaps the most antipolitical experience there is. It signifies that we shall disappear from 
the world of appearances and shall leave the company of our fellow men, which are the 
conditions of all politics. As far as human experience is concerned, death indicates an 
extreme of loneliness and impotence. But faced collectively and in action, death changes 
its countenance; now nothing seems more likely to intensify our vitality than its proximity. 
Something we are usually hardly aware of, namely, that our own death is accompanied by 
the potential immortality of the group we belong to and, in the final analysis, of the 
species, moves into the centre of our experience. It is as though life itself, the immortal life 
of the species, nourished, as it were, by the sempiternal dying of its individual members, is 
‘surging upward’, is actualized in the practice of violence.5
In Arendt’s interpretation, it was ‘the certainty of death that made men seek immortal fame in 
deed and word and that prompted them to establish a body politic which was potentially 
immortal. Hence, politics was precisely a means by which to escape from the equality before 
death into a distinction assuring some measure of deathlessness’.6
This story has its counterpart in International Relations where the potential deathlessness 
of the state is often presented as a reason behind the recurrence and repetition of the condition 
of international anarchy. States have no incentive to pursue absolute gains, be it perpetual 
peace or assured cooperation.7 What is puzzling is that the word ‘politics’ is still used in this 
context, albeit inconsistently. There are references to ‘geopolitics’, ‘international politics’, 
‘world politics’ or ‘politics among nations’, as there are studies of ‘order in world politics’ 
and attempts to escape from this theoretical confusion of tongues by introducing ‘the 
political’. What matters, of course, is not the word but rather the availability of ‘a means by 
which to escape from the equality before death’ in a world divided into sovereign states; for it 
was this equality to which thousands of individuals were exposed on September 11 regardless
4 Speech by Blair.
5 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1969): 67-8.
6 Ibid.: 68.
7 The argument runs, with various modifications, at least from Hobbes’ initial formulation to Kenneth 
Waltz’s brief response to September 11, ‘The Continuity of International Politics’, in Worlds in 
Collision: Terror and the Future o f  Global Order, eds Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (London: Palgrave, 
2002): 348-53.
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of their nationality and also in blatant disregard of their own words or deeds. If ‘politics’ no
longer offers this kind of refuge, then what does?
What I want to argue is that, in the words of R.G. Collingwood, we still have ‘the means of
living well in a disordered world’ (EPP 174); that is, the means for being normal people in a
somewhat abnormal situation, and that this resource is still ‘politics’, an activity once roughly
defined by Michael Oakeshott as that of ‘private persons (that is, persons without authority)
negotiating with holders of offices of authority’ (OHC 163). As such, this activity is different
from diplomacy (the holders of offices of authority negotiating with each other under the
conditions of diluted authority), balance of power, great-power management, war or
international law.8 Nor can it be defined by a simple reference to something else:
Politics is not religion, ethics, law, science, history or economics; it neither solves 
everything, nor is it present everywhere; and it is not any one political doctrine, such as 
conservatism, liberalism, socialism, communism, or nationalism, though it can contain 
elements of most of these things. Politics is politics, to be valued as itself, not because it is 
‘like’ or ‘really is’ something else more respectable or peculiar. Politics is politics.... Why 
call, for instance, a struggle for power ‘politics’ when it is only a struggle for power?9
What I also want to argue, is that there is a human activity which can be legitimately 
described as ‘world politics’ even in the absence of a cosmopolis comparable to the state. Like 
any human activity, it has its conditions of possibility and limitations. The former are to be 
found in the interplay of ‘international society’ and ‘world society’, the latter are set by the 
operation of ‘international system’. Although these three concepts have their origins in the 
English school of International Relations, my understanding of each of them and of the 
complex of activities constituted by the interplay of human relationships to which they refer, 
world order, is different from that of the ‘pluralist’ or ‘classical’ approach developed within 
this school. The main difference, however, concerns not so much the nature, or the 
‘constitution’, of world order, as the route by which I intend to arrive at its understanding, 
namely, by way of focusing on the activity of politics the character of which will be explored 
by drawing on Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s ideas about it. These choices themselves have 
to be accounted for prior to the main characters’ appearance on the scene. To appreciate the 
difference that their appearance makes, a brief preliminary sketch of the scene itself, or 
context, is needed.
Despite the important variations within the classical approach, it can be roughly described 
as advocating a view of international relations in which the diversity of sovereign states is 
established, maintained and protected by the unity of international society as a manifold of 
customary legal and diplomatic practices the authorship of which belongs to states 
represented by a class of individuals, ‘statespeople’. International society is distinguished 
from, and often opposed to, both international system composed of states as unscrupulous
81 am referring here to the institutions of international society identified by Hedley Bull in his The 
Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977).
9 Bernard Crick, In Defence Of Politics (London: Continuum, 2000): 15-6, 20.
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power-bargainers and world society which purports to embrace the whole of humanity in a
single political entity. This view of the practice of statecraft is grounded in the understanding
of theorizing which is firmly opposed both to the naturalism of positivism and to the
‘criticism’ of ‘post-modern theories of an anti-foundational kind’.10 Both on the level of
theory and practice, the classical approach is characterized by certain aversion to metaphysics
exemplified by the following contention:
The rapid global expansion of international law and diplomatic practice in the twentieth 
century is an indication of the ease with which and extent to which the society of states can 
accommodate the numerous and various political systems of a large and highly diverse 
planetary population. But that does not require that statespeople must necessarily share 
deeper assumptions regarding social morality or political culture that are characteristic of 
particular civilizations.... On the contrary, the existence and success of their international 
statecraft requires that all such particular norms be set aside in favour of the global 
covenant. Civilization used to be a barrier to the political conversation of humankind. That 
is no longer so. The global covenant has made it possible for political people the world 
over to rise above their own civilizational parochialism in dealing with each other.11
The problem with this argument is that it in fact relies on a set of strong metaphysical 
premises, not always recognized as such, that one way or another grant to states the 
unquestioned, and unquestionable, right to decide what form of good life is to be pursued 
within their boundaries. One such premise, to begin with, is that states exist for the pursuit of 
good life, and this is what makes them valuable. Another admits of the variety of the possible 
conceptions of good life, and this is what endows the diversity of states, and thus international 
society, with a value of its own. Yet it is difficult to see why statespeople, accustomed to 
putting aside their civilizational allegiances and capable of managing the diversity of vast 
political systems, should not attempt to extend the operation of a tool allegedly as valuable as 
the state to the whole of mankind. Why, in other words, should it be a global covenant of 
statesl
As Collingwood, whom the classical approach often claims to itself, once wrote, states, 
each purporting to represent ‘a complete system of law and thus a complete organization of 
human life’, necessarily belong to a broader social context: ‘The two states are not in fact two 
complete and independent systems of life; they are partners in a common life, sharing in a 
tradition which is wider than each of them or both together’ (EPP 121). This context cannot 
be limited to the tradition of statecraft and presupposes that all human activities that may 
possibly comprise it can be brought into coherent relationship with each other so that the 
principle of non-contradiction could serve as a standard for the evaluation of the individual 
sets of rules which govern the conduct of the various institutions (122). This kind of global
10 Robert Jackson, ‘Is There a Classical International Theory?’ in International Theory: Positivism and 
Beyond, eds Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996): 213.
11 Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World o f States (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000). An earlier achievement of the classical approach is Terry Nardin, Law, Morality and the 
Relations o f States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).
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context either denies to the state its exclusive right to order the relations among human beings 
or requires that a global state serves as a ‘weapon’ with which to order them: ‘the external, 
historical fact which we call the state’, perhaps different in shape from the one we are familiar 
with, just as this familiar state is itself different from the ancientpolis, but still ‘an incarnation 
of political action; no more, and no less’ (109).
This dilemma becomes even more acute if it is acknowledged, following Oakeshott, on 
whose thinking the classical approach relies even more strongly, that the overall context to 
which the conduct of statespeople belongs may be at once organized in a number of 
categorially distinct ways, so that political, or more generally, ‘practical’, organization is but 
one universe of discourse in the overall conversation that does not need a chairman, has 
neither predetermined course nor conclusion but is always put by for another day: ‘Its 
integration is not superimposed but springs from the quality of the voices which speak, and its 
value lies in the relics it leaves behind in the minds of those who participate’ (V 109-10). 
Such positioning of ‘practice’ or ‘human conduct’ alongside other modes of experience 
allows for the variety of the ‘measures of deathlessness’, as it were, and thus for the variety of 
expressions of human freedom, including that of escape from the dominance of ‘practice’ 
generally or the claims of politics in particular. It also questions the capacity of the state, at 
least in the West, where it has by and large lost its theological foundations that at the time of 
its emergence on the scene still put it beyond any need for ethical justification, to represent ‘a 
complete organization of human life’.
In the absence of other stable forms of political organization, the state at best finds itself in 
a paradoxical position: it is forced to accept its limited place among other realms within 
which important human goods are pursued yet it cannot abandon its holistic ambition, perhaps 
even its duty, to provide the ‘higher good’ of the overall adjudication between these realms. 
The negotiation of this paradox is further complicated by the dualistic character of the state 
itself. On the one hand, it may be understood as constituted by individuals through the 
authoritative, non-violent, self-authenticating practice of living together in a manner different 
from that of the inhabitants of all other states; on the other, its capacity for action and survival 
depends on the practices of violence and domination in which not only natural resources but 
individuals themselves are treated as things. The ability to negotiate, rather than resolve, these 
paradoxes is among the achievements of the modem state, but this mediation has never been 
easy, nor has it ever been secure. And when, in times of crises, like that of September 11, 
statespeople appeal to the ‘power of community’, they appeal, knowingly or not, to subjects 
capable of recognizing their own responsibility for a kind of life which has no solid 
foundations, for ‘the object of responsibility can be only that the stability of which cannot be 
guaranteed under any circumstances’.12
12 Paul Ricoeur, ‘Morality, Ethics, Politics’, in Hermeneutics, Ethics, Politics: Moscow Lectures and 
Interviews (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 1995): 57; my translation. This lecture, the 
argument of which is summarized in the last paragraph, is based on an earlier essay published in
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This view is closer to the ‘critical’, rather than ‘classical’, approach insofar as it refuses to
repeat the ‘a state is a state is a state’ mantra and takes the following advice seriously: Took at
the problems of world order in the whole, but beware of reifying a world system. Beware of
under-rating state power, but in addition give proper attention to social forces and processes
and see how they relate to the development of states and world orders’.13 Taking this advice
seriously, however, means recognizing its own paradoxical character. Is it possible to address
the problem of world order as a whole without any reification? ‘And can one avoid making of
res publica the “thing”, the identificatory substance of a community? Our entire history seems
to answer that this is not possible’; or so some ‘critics’ claim.14 What is at stake in such claims
is, again, the availability of the subject capable of re-ordering the world that has gone fluid,
capable of inhabiting politically a world without foundations.
Of all the post-positivist approaches ‘of an anti-foundational kind’, the one which
consistently attempts to respond to this challenge without abandoning the pluralist position
remains the least developed in contemporary International Relations. The approach I have in
mind is ‘philosophical hermeneutics’ in its post-Heideggerian, ‘ontological’, form: not a
theory of interpretation concerned with the epistemological travails of the knowing subject,
but a theoretical engagement that raises the question: ‘what is the mode of being of that being
that exists only in understanding?’15 The answer this approach gives goes as follows: ‘To
recognize oneself (or one’s own) in the other and find a home abroad -  this is the basic
movement of spirit whose being consists in this return to itself from otherness’.16 That this
neither entails ‘the secret return of the sovereign subject’ nor abandons subjectivity altogether
is central for this mode of inquiry:
if it remains true that hermeneutics terminates in self-understanding, then the subjectivism 
of this proposition must be rectified by saying that to understand oneself is to understand 
oneself in front o f the text. Consequently, what is appropriation from one point of view is 
disappropriation from another. To appropriate is to make what was alien become one’s 
own. What is appropriated is indeed the matter of the text. But the matter of the text
English as ‘Ethics and Politics’, in From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1991): 325-37. The Moscow lecture, however, contains an important, 
and characteristically Ricoeurian, attempt at mediating between the arguments normally believed to be 
irreconcilable, namely, those of John Rawls, A Theory o f Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1971), and Michael Walzer, Spheres o f Justice: A Defence o f Pluralism and Equality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
13 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: beyond International Relations Theory’, in 
Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986): 206.
14 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense o f the World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993): 108.
15 Ricoeur, ‘The Task of Hermeneutics’, in Text: 64.
16 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Sheed & Ward, 1993): 15. For a more precise 
positioning of philosophical hermeneutics vis-a-vis other post-positivist approaches, see Diane 
Michelfelder and Richard Palmer, eds, Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida 
Encounter (Albany: State University of New York, 1989): 76.; Richard Bernstein, ‘What is the 
Difference that Makes a Difference? Gadamer, Habermas, and Rorty’, in Philosophical Profiles: 
Essays in Pragmatic Mode (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986); Hans Herbert Kogler, The Power o f  
Dialogue: Critical Hermeneutics after Gadamer and Foucault (London: The MIT Press, 1999); Ingrid 
Scheibler, Gadamer: Between Heidegger and Habermas (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).
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becomes my own only if I disappropriate myself, in order to make the matter of the text
be. So I exchange the me, master of itself, for the self, disciple of the text.17
Yet this response ought not to be mistaken for an answer of the ‘what-had-to-be- 
demonstrated’ kind. Rather, it relates the paradoxes of the state referred to earlier to the 
possibility of looking at the problem of world order as a whole. It is possible to understand 
world order as a text in which various boundaries and practices are seen as neither more nor 
less than inscriptions that, unlike more fleeting utterances of the face-to-face dialogical 
encounters, are potentially open for the investigation by anyone and not just the immediately 
present others. Consequently, the overall conditions of such order become open for 
deliberation despite the differences in one’s situatedness vis-a-vis this or that practice or 
boundary.18 However, a subject whose identity is asserted in front of the world confronts the 
world and thus appears as estranged from the world. This distinctively modem subject 
acquires the possibility of having a world-view at the expense of the experience of inhabiting 
a world thus viewed politically, at least in the sense in which the ancients practised the arts of 
their politics within the bounds of the polis: what used to be an arena for action becomes an 
object of contemplation and technological exploitation.19 Nor is it possible to bring the 
‘world’ and ‘politics’ together the way the modems brought together politics and the state, for 
their interpretation was predicated on the state’s monopoly on politics enjoyed in separation 
from society and became problematic the moment state and society began to penetrate each 
other: ‘What had been up to that point affairs of state became thereby social matters, and, vice 
versa, what had been purely social matters became affairs of state -  as must necessarily occur 
in a democratically organized unit’.20
It can be argued, in fact, was argued by Arendt in her study of totalitarianism, that what 
caused the grief of General Smuts in the closing days of the Paris Conference was not the 
ineptitude of a particular set of statesmen, even less so the incompetence of the new great 
power, but the rise of what Heidegger described as the decisively modem ‘gigantic’ which 
manifested itself through the appearance on the scene, in quick succession, of total war, the 
totalitarian state and weapons of potentially total destruction. In general, it transformed the 
localized contests of the past into the battle of world-views and, as far as politics was 
concerned, revealed itself in what Carl Schmitt still referred to in the late 1920s as only a 
polemical concept: the ‘total state’ which attempted to restore its monopoly on politics by
17 Ricoeur, ‘Phenomenology and Hermeneutics’, in Text: 37.
18 The emphasis on the potentially universal intelligibility of inscriptions is what, according to Ricoeur, 
differentiates his version of hermeneutics from that of Gadamer and also endows it with greater 
methodological precision and, once applied to social action, the possibility of the critique of ideology. 
See his ‘Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology’, in Text: 270-307. Among ‘deconstructivists’,
Nancy recognizes the requirement of ‘any-oneness’ by differentiating ‘politics’, as ‘the place of being- 
together', from intimate experiences of ‘being-with’, such as love; a distinction, again, rather similar to 
the one made by Oakeshott. Sense: 88-9.
19 Cf.: Martin Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1977): 115-54.
20 Carl Schmitt, The Concept o f the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996): 22.
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denying any autonomy to such ostensibly neutral realms as religion, culture, education or
economy.21 Now, in the aftermath of September 11, we still ‘do not think at all if we believe
we have explained this phenomenon of the gigantic with the catchword “Americanism”’.22
Insofar as the age of the world picture is also the age of science, it is hardly surprizing that
among its immediate reactions to the crises of the two world wars was the establishment of
academic departments meant to provide a systematic account of the world order. This
engagement, however, soon brought about more frustrations than achievements. The mere
scale of the subject involved assumptions even less warranted and abstractions even more
violent than those that, already once applied to the state, proved to be incompatible with the
standards of good science, either natural or social. The gap between the ambition (‘planning
and calculating and adjusting and making secure’23 on the global scale, that is, ordering the
world picture) and the means for its fulfilment (science) only grew wider with the end of yet
another battle of world-views, the Cold War.24 The debates that followed saw a revival of
interest both in Heidegger’s reorientation of philosophy towards the question of the modality
of being and also in a similar gesture attempted by Schmitt in political theory:
It may be left open what the state is in its essence -  a machine or an organism, a person or 
an institution, a society or a community, an enterprise or a beehive, or perhaps even a basic 
procedural order. These definitions and images anticipate too much meaning, 
interpretation, illustration, and construction, and therefore cannot constitute any 
appropriate point of departure for a simple and elementary statement.... All characteristics 
of [the state] receive their meaning from the further distinctive trait of the political and 
become incomprehensible when the nature of the political is misunderstood.25
‘Revival’ may seem to be too strong a word in this context. In fact, the founders of the 
discipline, so-called ‘traditionalists’, were castigated by the ‘critics’ for their philosophical 
ineptitude and the discipline itself was presented as in need of re-introduction.26 This criticism 
is itself disputable, if one concentrates not on the traditionalists’ conclusions but rather on
21 Ibid.: 22. Richard Wolin developed Arendt’s brief remark about Schmitt in his ‘Carl Schmitt,
Political Existentialism, and the Total State’, Theory and Society, 1990,4: 389-416. His thesis, 
however, is grounded in a very non-Arendtian suggestion that Schmitt’s endorsement of Nazism was 
inevitable in view of his Weimar writings. It is disputed in Chantal Mouffe’s The Return o f the 
Political (London: Verso, 1993). For a different from Wolin’s assessment of Heidegger, see Mark 
Blitz, ‘Heidegger and the Political’, Political Theory, 2000, 2: 167-96. Also, what can be described as a 
Heideggerian critique of later Schmitt can be found in Nancy, Sense; and a Heideggerian critique of 
Heidegger himself -  in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction o f the 
Political (London: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
22 Heidegger, ‘World Picture’: 135 and note 12, 153.
23 Ibid.: 135.
24 Cf.: Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘The Embarrassment of Changes: Neorealism as the Science of Realpolitik 
Without Politics’, Review o f International Studies, 1993, 19: 63-80.
25 Schmitt, Political: 19-20. In contemporary International Relations see Michael Dillon, Politics o f  
Security: Towards a Political Philosophy o f Continental Thought (London : Routledge, 1996); R.B.J. 
Walker, ‘International Relations and the Concept of the Political’, in International Relations Theory 
Today, eds Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Polity, 1995): 306-27; Louiza Odysseos, 
‘Dangerous Ontologies: The Ethos of Survival and Ethical Theorizing in International Relations’, 
Review o f International Studies, 2002, 28: 403-418.
26 Cf.: Jim George, Discourses o f Global Politics: A Critical (Re)introduction to International 
Relations (Boulder: LynnReinner, 1994).
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what was once described as their disposition to combine happily ‘traditions and theories 
normally not able to relate to each other’.27 It is possible to argue that this eclecticism resulted 
not so much from their theoretical unscrupulousness but from a rather desperate search for 
theoretical alternatives, which at least some of them believed to be ‘the justification for 
entering into the business of political philosophy to begin with’ but which they also believed 
to be almost an impossibility ‘in a hopeless political situation’.28 Making such an argument 
properly would be a separate engagement in the history of ideas, partly already undertaken, 
chiefly with the aim of (re)drawing a distinction between the traditionalists and the 
rationalists who succeeded them.29 What I want to indicate is another distinction, less obvious 
perhaps and certainly more ambiguous, between the classical approach and traditionalism.
At the heart of this distinction is the difference between the traditionalist concern with the 
‘autonomy of politics’ and the classical focus on the ‘nature of international society’.30 The 
distinction is not watertight and one would be hard pressed if asked to box individual thinkers 
into one category or the other, not least because the two questions -  What is politics? and 
What is political order? -  are difficult to separate. Yet drawing this distinction may be a 
worthwhile engagement precisely when the order in question is that of a world turned into 
picture and thus made hostile to political action and therefore political theorizing. It will 
further gain in importance if viewed in the context of established theoretical traditions 
transcending the confines of a separate discipline. On the one side of this conditional divide, it 
is possible to locate thinkers, heavily indebted to the Continental tradition of political 
theorizing, for whom politics (often under the name of ‘diplomacy’) was a means by which to 
respond to the claims of ‘absolute war’ (Raymond Aron), revolutionary drive for ‘absolute 
security’ (Henry Kissinger) or the hegemonic subordination of politics to ethics already 
conflated with economics (E.H. Carr). On the other, one is likely to find those who, in line 
with the British tradition of pluralism, which never placed much stress on the state/society 
distinction to begin with, tended to understand the state as one association among others and 
did not assign to politics any special status.31 Characteristically, the latter are especially 
concerned with distinguishing themselves from the ‘realism’ of Hobbes for which purpose
27 Ole Waever, ‘International Society -  Theoretical Promises Unfulfilled?’, Cooperation and Conflict, 
1992, 27: 121.
28 Hans Morgenthau, ‘Hannah Arendt on Totalitarianism and Democracy’, Social Research, 1977, 44: 
131.
29 Cf. Alastair Murray, Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics 
(Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997); Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History o f 
the English School (London: Macmillan, 1998).
30 The classic statement of the ‘traditionalist’ position, in this view, is Morgenthau, Politics Among 
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: A. Knopf, 1973); the ‘classical’ questions are 
articulated in Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, eds Brian Porter and Gabriele 
Wight (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991).
31 Perhaps exemplary statement along these lines is Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and 
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).
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Grotian ‘rationalism’ (conspicuously similar to Humean empiricism) is postulated as an 
alternative.32
This is where Collingwood and Oakeshott enter the picture. Unmistakeably English in 
their theorizing, both are open to ‘foreign’ influences; both reach out to Hobbes and his 
‘absolutist’ vision of politics which they then place into the context of a radically pluralist 
conception of human experience generally. What emerges out of such bringing together of 
‘traditions and theories normally not able to relate to each other’ is an idea of mediation short 
of which, according to Collingwood, there are ‘not so many independent political agents, as 
the pluralist thinks, but so many warring factions, whose mutual hostility only serves to show 
that none of them has risen to the level of political action’ (EPP 108).
Unlike Schmitt, who, having defined the political, mapped it back, as it were, onto 
actually-existing states, Collingwood, having raised the question of the location of the 
‘absolute state’, whose duty it is to mediate between the conflicting interests of the various 
associations, responded as follows: ‘On earth, certainly; yet not visible in the outward form of 
parliaments and kings’ (106). Like Schmitt, Oakeshott was interested in disentangling Hobbes 
the natural scientist from Hobbes the artist.33 But whereas Schmitt’s aesthetization of politics 
culminates in the decision on exception/exclusion so that Hobbesian ‘silence of the law’ 
emerges as a rupture in the rule-governed ‘everydayness’ of the bureaucratic routine, 
Oakeshottian ‘poetry’ appears as the critical ideal intrinsic to the day-to-day customary 
conduct. It is true that ‘a rule of life (unless the life has been simplified by the drastic 
reduction of the variety of situations which are allowed to appear) will always be found 
wanting unless it is supplemented with an elaborate casuistry or hermeneutic’ (R 473). It is 
also true that such casuistry alienates one from ‘a world dizzy with moral ideals’ in which the 
more one thinks about conduct the less one knows ‘how to behave in public or in private’ 
(481), so that the dominant disposition of the age becomes that of prosaic regularity (479). 
Yet all this calls not for the denial of rules, ideals or criticism in favour of ‘organic’ custom, 
but rather for the critical elucidation of ideals appropriate for the rule-governed customary 
moral conduct. The choice is not between thinking and acting, nor even between knowing- 
what and knowing-how, but rather between knowing in advance what ought to be done in any 
conceivable situation and knowing how to think when acting.
Thus, although the traditionalism I have in mind may indeed be distinguished from the 
classical approach by its stronger emphasis on the manner of ordering the world, as opposed 
to the ‘classical’ concern with the world’s order, the two cannot be separated unconditionally.
32 For a recent critique of this classification, see Jens Bartelson, ‘Short Circuits: Society and Tradition 
in International Relations Theory’, Review o f International Studies, 1996, 22: 339-60 and Richard 
Tuck, The Rights o f War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to 
Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
33 See John McCormick, ‘Fear, Technology, and the State: Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss, and the Revival 
of Hobbes in Weimar and National Socialist Germany’, Political Theory, 1994, 22: 619-52; and 
Oakeshotfs review of Strauss (HCA 141-58). Symptomatically, Oakeshott's study of the ideologies of 
the inter-war Europe was followed up by his famous introduction to Hobbes.
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But if some confrontation with the world indeed constitutes, at least in part, the reality in
which we live, then ‘all efforts to escape from the grimness of the present into nostalgia for a
still intact past, or into the anticipated oblivion of a better future, are vain’.34 And in this
sense, ‘neotraditionalism’, meaningful, to be sure, only within a highly localized context of
International Relations, is different from the classical (or ‘neo-classical’) approach with its
tacit by-passing of the present by way of projecting a distant medieval past, for example, into
an uncertain ‘neo-medieval’ future.35
If this is a negative outline of ‘neotraditionalism’, then positively it asserts the availability
of tradition as a modality of experience which brings together custom and criticism, action
and contemplation, in which the distinctively modem ‘conviction that everything that happens
on earth must be comprehensible to man’ capable of re-ordering the world is transformed into
comprehension proper, as a decision on inclusion, ‘the unpremeditated, attentive facing up to,
and resisting of, reality -  whatever it may be’.36 Or, following Paul Ricoeur, it can be
understood as the ‘dialectic of the recollection of tradition and the anticipation of freedom’,
which, in the final analysis, remain irreducible to each other:
Each has a privileged place and... different regional preferences: on the one hand, an 
attention to cultural heritages, focused most decidedly perhaps on the theory of the text; on 
the other hand, a theory of institutions and of phenomena of domination, focused on the 
analysis of reifications and alienations. Insofar as each must always be regionalized in 
order to endow their claims to universality with a concrete character, their differences must 
be preserved against any conflationist tendency. But it is the task of philosophical 
reflection to eliminate deceptive antinomies that would oppose the interest in the 
reinterpretation of cultural heritages received from the past and the interest in the futuristic 
projections of a liberated humanity.37
Some such dialectics is at play in, and between, the texts of Collingwood and Oakeshott. 
Insofar as it reflects the predicament of the subject making sense of the world by facing up to 
it the best he can, it is possible to put by the ‘world picture’ and to concentrate instead on the 
exploration of one localized attempt to do just that. To be sure, this locality is only one piece 
in the kaleidoscopic picture of political theory which at the moment seems to be settling into a 
new pattern, ‘international political theory’. Similar movement is occurring in International 
Relations. In this situation, the task, as I see it, consists not in making sure that all the right 
pieces fall into the right places (for how can one ever be sure of that?) but in finding free 
spaces amidst mutually obtrusive discourses; that is, in finding alternatives in what may seem
34 Arendt, The Origins o f Totalitarianism (London: Harcourt, 1976): ix.
35 The immediate reference here is to the ‘neo-classical constructivism’ of John Ruggie which develops 
the ‘neo-medievalism’ theme of Bull (Cf.: Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing 
Modernity in International Relations’, International Organization, 1993, 47: 139-74; Bull, Anarchical 
Society: 254-94). More generally, it concerns the pervasive ‘second-best’ character of the ‘classical’ 
conception of international society in its pluralist version (Chris Brown, ‘International Theory and 
International Society: The Viability of the Middle Way?’ Review o f International Studies, 1995, 21: 
183-96) which, in my view, is only a reflection of the second-best character of the ‘classical’ present 
judged by comparison with a better past and, hopefully, a brighter future.
36 Arendt, Totalitarianism: viii.
37 Ricoeur, ‘Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology’, in Text: 306-7.
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to be an exceedingly cluttered situation. Thus the modality of my argument, as far as 
Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s texts are concerned, is not so much ‘criticism’ or 
‘commentary’ as ‘re-arrangement’, while its individuality is not the starting point but, 
hopefully, the outcome of this re-arrangement: its ‘fit’ into yet another pattern, already 
cultivated by others, namely, that of international political theory.38
38 To be more precise, a ‘free space’ I am looking for within international political theory can be 
delineated as follows. The analysis of Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s texts helps to bridge the 
unnecessary schism which exists between such ‘classical’ applications of them as those of Jackson and 
Nardin on the one hand and the ‘critical’ work of David Boucher, Political Theories o f International 
Relations: From Thucydides to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) and N.J. Rengger, 
International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem o f Order: Beyond International Relations 
Theory? London: Routledge, 2000) on the other. This is possible insofar as this analysis provides a 
‘political’ companion to the ‘constitutional’ analysis of international society of Bull in his Anarchical 
Society. At the same time, it is a ‘conservative’, and also ‘English’, counterpart to the ‘revolutionary’ 
and ‘Continental’ development of Heidegger’s critique in Dillon’s Politics o f Security where 
‘philosophical hermeneutics’ appears not as an engagement in self-understanding but as an outward 
looking and mostly other-regarding encounter with alterity.
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Another Case for the ‘Classical Approach’
This thesis outlines an idea of world politics as a distinct activity of thinking and speaking 
about the overall conditions of world order in terms of their desirability. World order is 
understood not as an arrangement of entities, be they humans, states or civilizations, but a 
complex of variously situated activities conducted by individuals as members of diverse 
associations of their own. This idea is advanced from within one such association, or context, 
contemporary International Relations, wherein it entails a metatheoretical position, 
neotraditionalism, as a rectification of the initial, ‘traditionalist’ or ‘classical’, approach after 
the advance of rationalism and subsequent reflectivist critique. Since loose talk about 
traditions does not constitute a tradition, neotraditionalism is presented by drawing on the 
resources of a well-trimmed manner of thinking and speaking about human associations, 
political philosophy, again, understood not as a body of doctrine but a context-specific human 
activity which can be experienced only through concrete exhibitions of individual 
intelligence. Therefore, throughout the thesis, a conversation on the place of politics in human 
experience is re-enacted. Its major participants are R.G. Collingwood and Michael Oakeshott. 
Its major achievement is the conditional unity of understanding and conduct, tradition and 
individuality, the subject of inquiry and the manner in which it is conducted. As such, this 
conversation is neither an antiquarian item nor a timeless ideal, but an instance of an 
association to be desired, and thus an example which, once comprehended, that is, both 
understood and included into one’s own context, becomes a historically enacted disposition 
for the activity of politics.
Before considering what Collingwood and Oakeshott had to say on this subject, the 
reasons for turning to their work should be outlined. In fact, there is only one such reason: a 
lot can be learnt from their style of thinking about politics, yet the matter of style itself, 
especially in relation to politics, is also the subject of inquiry and has to be looked into in 
some detail. The first three characteristics of this style are fairly general. First, although the 
manner of Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s theorizing is in many respects identical, it still 
yields different conclusions as far as the subject-matter is concerned. This difference, rather 
than being a sign of some deficiency in the course, or in the manner, of reasoning, is the 
strongest possible vindication of this particular way of theorizing, best appreciated through an 
example given by Collingwood: ‘If Hegel’s influence on nineteenth-century historiography 
was on the whole an influence for good, it was because historical study for him was first and 
foremost a study of internal strains, and this is why he opened the way to such brilliant feats 
as that analysis of internal strains in nineteenth-century economic society which entitles Karl 
Marx to the name of a great historian’ (EM 75).
Oakeshott, despite his dislike for Marxian conclusions, would have almost certainly 
agreed. Yet it was not just the conclusions of Marx that mattered, nor even such premises as 
the inversion of the Hegelian dialectics of matter and spirit or the substitution of the sociology 
of economics for the philosophy of right. The latter point, for example, was explored by 
Kenneth Waltz when he proposed a ‘theory of international politics’ which he wanted to be as 
systemic as Marxian theory, but political rather than economic and international rather than 
internationalist.1 However, Waltz never tells us what international politics is, except that it is 
not economics and certainly not ‘international relations’. He also insists that this theory has to 
meet the standards of the philosophy of science while explaining the operation of causal laws, 
and this is what distinguishes ‘theoretical explanation’ from ‘philosophic interpretation’.2 
Oakeshott’s major objection to Marx puts Waltz into the same category as Marxists: 
‘Explanatory “laws” of social change cannot generate political deliberation capable of 
reaching “correct” political decisions, or political discourse capable of proving decisions to be 
“correct” of “incorrect”’ (R 92). A theory of politics construed in the idiom of causal 
explanations cannot grasp the character of its subject-matter and thus fails both as an 
interpretation and an explanation.
So the second point about Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s style of theorizing concerns 
their continuous insistence on the Aristotelian point that the manner in which an inquiry is 
conducted should be congruent with its subject-matter. It would be wrong to say that this 
point was lost on the ‘scientists’ in International Relations. In the course of the second debate, 
the ‘scientist’ Morton Kaplan agreed on it with the ‘traditionalist’ Hedley Bull, but with a
1 Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979): 20-29.
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follow-up: ‘Even if some matters of concern to international politics are profoundly 
philosophical, not all are’.3
For Collingwood, this, at best, condemns one to a very limited view of politics and, at 
worst, represents a brand of reactionary ‘anti-metaphysics’, again, best understood through a 
historical example. The nineteenth century conducted its international politics in accordance 
with political theories developed on the basis of the ‘absolute presuppositions’ of the 
eighteenth century, presuppositions which the eighteenth century itself could neither question 
nor even articulate. What it could not theorize was ‘nationality’, which was conceived as 
‘natural’, exempt from change and therefore from philosophical questioning. The nineteenth- 
century came to understand ‘nationality’ as something which was making history ‘because 
history has made nationality and is constantly destroying and remaking it’. That was a piece 
of metaphysics, the continuous engagement of uncovering historically the absolute 
presuppositions of different ages and peoples, and those, in the nineteenth century, who 
‘wanted to go on practising the political arts of the eighteenth century’ were sheltering 
themselves ‘behind the cry “No More Metaphysics” in order to kill and destroy with good 
conscience as the obsolete metaphysics of the eighteenth century bade them’ (EM 99).
Thus the first two points, once taken together, amount to this: to understand politics in the 
manner appropriate to it is to understand politics philosophically, which also means 
dialectically. Yet, since the dialectical philosophy in question is always in question indeed, 
driven by its intrinsic strains and contradictions, talking politics in this manner involves one 
further, paradoxical, twist. The one who wishes to understand politics has to ‘forswear 
metaphysics’ (Oakeshott OHC 25). Now the individuality of Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s 
approaches becomes more visible while method begins to thicken into style proper. The 
starting point here is Collingwood’s reform of metaphysics and related threefold taxonomy of 
anti-metaphysics.
According to Collingwood, while being engaged with a particular subject-matter, one can 
reject the presuppositions currently held in philosophy because these are thrown into question, 
and thus can no longer be taken as absolute, by the investigation of this particular subject- 
matter; this would be the case of ‘progressive anti-metaphysics’ (EM 84-90). One can reject a 
philosophy because its presuppositions embarrassingly throw into question one’s own, 
dogmatic, understanding of the subject-matter; ‘reactionary anti-metaphysics’ (90-100). One 
can reject metaphysics because one rejects any systematic engagement with any subject- 
matter thus rejecting ‘science’, as Collingwood understands it in his later work, and with it the
2 Ibid.: 1-6
3 Morton A. Kaplan, ‘The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations’, in 
Contending Approaches to International Politics, eds Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1969): 60.
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idea of progress; ‘irrational anti-metaphysics’ which, in some cases, may be ‘a confused
mixture’ of the other two kinds (83-4).
To some, not entirely unsympathetic, observers, irrational anti-metaphysics seemed to be a
peculiar English malaise:
We have the same respect for Blake’s philosophy (and perhaps for that of Samuel Butler) 
that we have for an ingenious piece of home-made furniture: we admire the man who has 
put it together out of the odds and ends about the house. England has produced a fair 
number of these resourceful Robinson Crusoes; but we are not really so remote from the 
Continent, or from our own past, as to be deprived of the advantages of culture if we wish 
them.4
It is one thing to acquire one’s artificial environment from a decent shop, whether its 
preferred brand is ‘rationalism’ or ‘metaphysics’, it is quite another to stick to the ‘odds and 
ends about the house’. As T.S. Eliot, to whom the observation just quoted belongs, argued 
further, Blake was not to blame for following the latter habit. The habit itself was rooted in 
English history, in the way in which the Reformation and Romanticism severed the link 
between tradition and individual talent. In the absence of this link, Blake could ‘only’ become 
a poet of genius, whereas Dante, having the resources of tradition at his disposal, was a 
classic.5 As always, there are exceptions, and, in another essay, Eliot claims Shakespeare to be 
a ‘finer instrument’ than Dante for the transformation of the body of philosophical thought 
available to him into poetic images: ‘He also needed less contact in order to be able to absorb 
all that he required’.6
This echoes Oakeshott’s appraisal of Burke’s political philosophy as one that ‘touches, but 
lightly, upon principle’ (PF 81). However, what once emerged as a peculiar meeting point of 
British political practice and philosophical reflection was not immune from change and 
required continuous adjustment. This is one of Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s major 
achievements: a fine balance between the appreciation of tradition and criticism, and also 
between the undeniable Englishness of their style and the openness of their thinking to the 
wide range of various ‘foreign’ influences, not necessarily discussed in detail, but thoroughly 
‘absorbed’ and thus at once transformed and made available for the transformation of one’s 
native discourse.
4 T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays (London: Faber & Faber, 1951): 321.
5 Ibid.: 322.
6 Ibid.: 139. The appearance of Eliot in this context is not accidental, for he is part of that context which 
shaped the thinking of both Collingwood and Oakeshott. Shortly before the outbreak of World War I, 
he completed his doctoral dissertation on the philosophy of F.H. Bradley, the leading figure within the 
British Idealist movement and also the major influence on Collingwood and Oakeshott. 
Characteristically, it is Eliot’s work that Collingwood presents as the prime example of art proper 
which underpins his own theory of imagination. The connection between Eliot, on the one hand, and 
Collingwood and Oakeshott, on the other, is only beginning to attract the attention of political theorists. 
Cf.: Corey Abel, ‘Oakeshott and Eliot on the Relation of Poetry, Philosophy, and Practice’, a paper 
presented at the APSA annual meeting in Boston, 2002.
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Thus the question of style gets related to that of universalism and particularism in one of 
its specific expressions, exploration and cultivation, be it the exploration and cultivation of a 
political practice or a ‘dialect of the tribe’.7 It also brings in the issue of the relation between 
politics and language, or politics and poetics. The two were tentatively brought together by 
Oakeshott in a footnote to ‘The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind’ where he 
suggested that the Machiavellian longing for ‘greatness’ in politics was a transformation of 
the Aristotelian understanding of politics in terms of ‘glory’ appropriate for poetry, 
transformation which had something to do with the changing relationship between ‘truth’ and 
‘beauty’ in European languages and eventually resulted in ‘the eristic tones of the voice of 
science in conference with that modulation of the voice of practical activity we call “politics’” 
(R 493). Later, this suggestion grew into a political philosophy which did not attempt 
anything as impractical or ahistorical as the restoration of the Aristotelian vocabulary, but 
amounted to the reinvigoration of the discursive and practical resources available to us, and 
thus distinguished the individuality of the activity of modem European politics by 
dissociating it from both power and poetry while keeping in sight its relation to both.
Whether that was the case of exploration or cultivation is hard to tell. Perhaps, the two can 
be neither separated nor blended completely without severing those internal strains that move 
both inquiry and conduct. Perhaps, this is why Oakeshott dismisses all sorts of political 
oppositions, such as ‘left’ and ‘right’ or ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’, but only for the sake of 
another distinction, between the ‘intelligent explorers on foot’ and those who ‘prefer to go by 
air and at night, reaching their destinations in sleep’ (OHC 318). The difference between these 
two modes of travelling is reducible neither to the issue of technology nor to the direction of 
movement, backward or forward. It hinges on the willingness to observe and remember the 
route by which one travels and to value it no less than any possible destinations or ports of 
call. Being itself a matter of style, it is of particular significance in the context of 
contemporary International Relations.
The timing of the emergence of the new academic discipline contributed to the shape it has 
acquired just as much as the peculiarities of the Anglo-American social milieu in which the 
first departments of International Relations were established. Since then, complaints about the 
shape of the discipline have never been in short supply and various adjacent provinces have 
been explored in view of seeking refuge or staging an escape. Far from dismissing all these 
explorations, I want to explore a somewhat different possibility: to return to the point, in place 
and time, where and when it all started ‘and know the place for the first time’, for what was 
once said about the world in which all of us are situated may well be true about the world of
7 The terms ‘exploration’ and ‘cultivation’ appear in Oakeshott’s Harvard lectures, delivered in 1958, 
to denote two dispositions evident in both conduct and understanding (HL 30). The ‘dialect of the tribe’ 
is Eliot’s expression in ‘Little Gidding’, Collected Poems (London: Faber & Faber, 1962): 218.
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International Relations: ‘There are other places which also are the world’s end... but this is the 
nearest, in place and time, now and in England’.8
Reflection, however subversive, may still draw on the intrinsic resources of a given 
practice; anti-metaphysics, however progressive, does not need to invalidate every single 
judgement within the framework it questions, provided this framework still possesses within 
itself a standard for the evaluation of various judgements. Here, I believe, lies the most 
interesting, and distinctively Oakeshottian, way of forswearing metaphysics by turning to 
poetry as an instance of the unity of style and subject. So, in what follows, I shall, first, 
examine Oakeshottian forswearing of metaphysics in relation to Collingwood’s understanding 
of science and progress, then against the background of the various modes of anti­
metaphysics practiced in contemporary International Relations, and, finally, arrange the 
questions arising from this twofold examination in that order in which they will be addressed 
in more detail throughout the thesis.
Politics at the edge of history
From the Prologue to his first major book, Speculum Mentis, published in 1924, to the Preface 
to the New Leviathan written, in 1942, shortly before his death, Collingwood maintained that 
the sole task of philosophy consisted in helping individuals to conduct a vigorous practical 
life by becoming ‘whole of heart and secure in their grasp on life’ (SM 35), under conditions 
hardly propitious, when, forced to ‘blow away the mists of [the interwar] sentimentalism’, 
they found themselves with little guidelines or guidance as to what to live for (NL lx). The 
task of philosophy was to provide ‘the means of living well in a disordered world’ (EPP 174) 
which made philosophy not only thoroughly political but also ‘world-political’. Oakeshott 
suggested the same: ‘Probably there has been no theory of the nature of the world, of the 
activity of man, of the destiny of mankind, no theology or cosmology, perhaps even no 
metaphysics, that has not sought a reflection of itself in the mirror of political philosophy; 
certainly there has been no fully considered politics that has not looked for its reflection in 
eternity’ (HCA 5).
Yet there is a puzzle here. Although Oakeshott’s thinking was more explicitly focused on 
politics than that of Collingwood and, as he admitted on a number of occasions, this theme 
was with him nearly as long as he could remember (OHC vii), his first major contribution to 
political philosophy came only in 1946, when he was already in his mid-forties, in the form of 
the introduction to Leviathan, followed up by Rationalism in Politics only sixteen years later. 
Perhaps this prolonged silence was not without significance, for, in the introduction to 
Leviathan Oakeshott pauses to discuss the similar riddle of Hobbes’ late start and 
distinguishes between those philosophers who ‘allow us to see the workings of their minds’
g
Eliot, ‘Little Gidding’: 215; line-breaks are removed.
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and those, like Hobbes, in whose writing ‘nothing is in progress; there is no promise, only
fulfilment’, suggesting that this assertive finality was due not only to Hobbes’ personality but
also his context, the ‘tradition of Will and Artifice’ (HCA 8-10).
Insofar as Oakeshott himself belonged to the ‘tradition of Rational Will’, with Hegel as its
figure-head, such absence of progress in his own thinking would have been out of character.
Still it is interesting to note his admission that, for the most part, he had ‘gone slowly in order
to avoid being flustered’ (OHC vii), and to compare it to Henry Jones’ report on
Collingwood’s manuscript reviewed for Macmillan, in 1918:
I do not know any writer more frank. He cares not one whit to what extent he exposes his 
flanks to his critics, and makes statements which, taken by themselves, look either purely 
absurd or preposterously untrue. But that is only one side: on the other is the fact that these 
statements are stages or steps in the development of his main argument, half truths or sheer 
errors in which it is not possible to rest and which just compel a movement onwards to a 
wider truth.9
This comparison leads farther than just to the difference between Collingwood’s and 
Oakeshott’s personalities or the identity of their attempts at approximating their style of 
writing to the character of their enquiries. It points at the difference between Collingwood’s 
and Oakeshott’s situatedness within the Hegelian tradition, in fact, raises questions as to their 
belonging to this particular tradition. This difference is not to be likened to a tiny initial crack 
which, once found, can be worked out, through a series of deductive inferences, into an 
unbridgeable gap. It may rather be seen as an ineliminable mark of personality revealing itself 
at every new turn in the argument, every time from a new angle, being that internal strain that 
moves the overall conversation; what Hannah Arendt described as ‘the distance which the 
space of the world puts between us’, or what Eliot thus expressed in an imaginary 
conversation with a fellow-poet: ‘compliant to the common wind, too strange to each other 
for misunderstanding’.10
In both of these images, some notion of sameness is conjoined with that of difference. 
Similarly, in Collingwood’s account of the evolution of political theory, the Platonic polis is 
different from the Hobbesian state, and yet, in some respect, they are the same. The sameness 
is not that of a ‘universal’ of which both entities are instances but of a ‘historical process, and 
the difference is the difference between one thing which in the course of that process has 
turned into something else, and the other thing into which it has turned’ (A 61-2). At the same 
time, Collingwood’s understanding of historical process puts to one side the possibility, still 
present in Hegel, of locating the driving force of history, either in the form of God, Nature or 
Reason, outside human life (IH 116-7). History is the self-knowledge of the mind which can 
be experienced only through concrete exhibitions of human intelligence.
9 Jones’ text is available as an appendix to Collingwood’s Essays in Political Philosophy (EPP 232).
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The same move displaces the state, and politics in general, from the central position 
assigned to it by Hegel. On Collingwood’s reading, Hegel unwittingly accepted the Kantian 
contention that all history was political history. For Kant, it was grounded in his distinction 
between moral action, as the thing-in-itself, and political action, as its phenomenal 
manifestation. Having repudiated the underlying distinction between phenomena and things- 
in-themselves, Hegel, according to his own logic, should have arrived at the idea of history as 
‘the history of absolute mind, i.e. art, religion, and philosophy’ (121). Collingwood’s further 
reformulation of this logic suggests that all history is the history of thought and as such the 
highest form of the self-knowledge of the mind available at the moment. Accordingly, 
philosophy is not an attempt at knowing beyond the limits of experience but is ‘primarily at 
any given time an attempt to discover what the people of that time believe about the world’s 
general nature.... Secondarily, it is the attempt to discover the corresponding presuppositions 
of other peoples and other times, and to follow the historical process by which one set of 
presuppositions has turned into another’ (A 66).
In On Human Conduct, Oakeshott distances himself from Hegel on the same issue but in a 
different manner, starting with the point that, in his reading of Hegel, history is moved neither 
by an ‘impersonal “force” loose in the universe’ nor by Reason, but ‘a procedure of 
“criticism” (dialectic)’ which, ‘if it may be said to exist anywhere’, exists ‘in the characters, 
the adventures, the works, and the relations of human beings’ (OHC 257). Unlike 
Collingwood, he examines the overall system of Hegel’s thought through the prism of his 
Philosophy o f Right rather than Philosophy o f History. Here as well the adventures of free- 
willing persons overflow, as it were, the locality of their immediate field of action resulting in 
the recognition of an overall context to which all these localities belong. Only now it is not a 
historical process but a constellation of the considerations of right conduct recognized, first, 
as ‘a manifold of considerations instrumental to the satisfaction of wants, whatever they may 
be’, and further, as ‘a system of known, positive, self-authenticating, non-instrumental rules 
of law’ (261). The former of these understandings of the Hegelian Right Oakeshott presents 
as an ‘instrumental practice’, and human association in terms of such practices (Hegelian 
‘civil society’) as ‘enterprise association’. The latter understanding becomes ‘moral practice’, 
and association in its terms (Hegelian ‘state’) ‘civil association’.
The reason for such redefinition lay in Oakeshott’s intention to reinvigorate what he 
believed had become an increasingly stale discussion of the vocabulary of the modem 
European state, but also in the misgivings he had about Hegel’s interrelated understandings of 
the state and history. In accordance with Hegelian metaphysics, an association in terms of the 
recognition of the non-instrumental rules of law could not be deduced by thought from the
10 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958): 242; Eliot,
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mere existence of free-willing individuals ‘unless there existed in the world some actual 
intimation of it’ (262). This Hegel found in the European state emerging in the wake of the 
French Revolution. The emergence of such states also had to be part of a progressive 
historical development so that its recognition through a procedure of criticism could count for 
an advance in human self-understanding and thus an advance in human freedom. So Hegel’s 
account of history was an account of the development of European political institutions 
towards the idea of the state, and it ‘was based upon the belief that the human self-recognition 
implicit in this mode of association was an already recognizable (though yet incomplete) 
historic achievement’ (263).
Not that this belief was implausible, yet, according to Oakeshott, it appeared somewhat 
far-fetched when assessed against what evidence obliged us to believe. Further, this evidence, 
invariably located in the practical present, cannot possibly warrant the certainty of one’s 
conclusions about the past and the future, for the moment both are presented as being fixed, 
they become independent from the individual human intelligence by which the procedure of 
criticism is constituted, and the procedure itself is then bound to appear outside human life 
indeed. This danger was implied in the tension between Hegel’s philosophical assumption of 
the unity of experience and his attempt at understanding experience historically. History owes 
its basic presupposition to something beyond itself, and what is presupposed is history’s 
ability to separate its individuals/events from their environment/context. Without such 
presupposition no historical understanding would be possible. This presupposition, however, 
can be neither made nor questioned by history itself: ‘History begins with a world of 
presupposed individuals, but in the attempt to make it coherent, to make it more of a world, 
there is a constant temptation to abandon the terms of the presupposition.... Historical 
experience, like all abstract experience, is always on the verge of passing beyond itself (EIM 
122).
Thus Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s disagreements with Hegel, stated differently, amount 
to the same thing, both recognize a tendency for postulating some form of external reality 
implied in the Hegelian understanding of history. Yet, because this diagnosis is arrived at by 
different routes, suggestions as to the possible remedy differ. Whereas Collingwood calls for 
the enlargement of the scope of historical inquiry, Oakeshott attempts to establish its limits. 
For Collingwood, metaphysical inquiry conditionally culminates in establishing the identity 
of ‘the historical process by which one set of presuppositions has turned into another’. For 
Oakeshott, this is more than we can achieve but also more than we need: ‘For me the end of 
all experience is to distinguish individuality’ (EIM 151), which, again, can be done only 
conditionally. For Collingwood, philosophy is approximated to history, that of the absolute
‘Little Gidding’: 217.
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presuppositions, and historical understanding becomes the mode of inquiry appropriate not 
only for history or practice but also for science. For Oakeshott, understanding experience 
historically puts inverted commas around such words as ‘scientifically’, ‘practically’, but also 
‘historically’, to indicate the conditionality of each mode of inquiry without denying their 
individuality by suggesting that ‘all human utterance is in one mode’ (R 488).
Thus Oakeshott agrees with Collingwood that each mode of inquiry involves a scientia as 
a systematic attempt at knowing. But what one is trying to know by way of an inquiry which 
is ‘practical’ or ‘historical’ is different from what one attempts to know ‘scientifically’, 
precisely because, historically, mankind have acquired a plurality of voices in which to 
express the various images of the world. So ‘science’, in Collingwood’s own logic, is one 
particular thing into which scientia of a more monological primordial past has turned 
throughout history. Its method is not given or fixed once and for all, and its practitioners may 
well come to understand both the activity itself and its data as having histories. Yet, the way 
things stand, according to what evidence obliges us to believe here and now, this does not 
abrogate the character of ‘science’ as an activity concerned with a world in which, ideally, 
everything is independent from our practical desires and aversions and can be measured 
‘according to agreed scales’ so that all measurements can be unambiguously communicated to 
everyone who takes the trouble of entering into the nature of the agreement (504-8). In this 
manner, ‘science’, no less than ‘history’, is only a voice in the overall constellation of 
discourses, the ‘conversation of mankind’.
What Collingwood presents as historicism, which uniformly colours all forms of inquiry, 
Oakeshott identifies as conversability present in all the voices in this conversation: ‘Each 
voice is at once a manner of speaking and a determinate utterance’. The manner of speaking 
and the utterance made in this manner cannot be separated. An utterance taken on its own and 
presented as a conclusion valid independently of the manner in which it was reached becomes 
a dogma. A manner of speaking presented as being appropriate for everyone is appropriate for 
speaking only to oneself, and when an attempt is made to impose one such manner onto the 
conversation, ‘barbarism may be observed to have intervened’ (492).
Paradoxically, but not surprizingly, Oakeshott’s ‘conversation’ is as universal as 
Collingwood’s ‘historical process’, and the paradox invites understanding and thus a 
philosophy. Such a philosophy may be regarded as a ‘parasitic activity’ that ‘springs from the 
conversation,... but... makes no specific contribution to it’ (R 491), but this does not make it 
any less systematic or disciplined. In fact, it is nothing else but an investigation of the 
presuppositions of the various universes of discourse and the overall constellation of them, 
that is, metaphysics as Collingwood understood it. Now forswearing metaphysics consists not 
in abandoning systematic reflection, scientia, but in the recognition that the one ‘who swims 
too strongly in this sea is apt soon to find himself out of sight of his object’ (495) and in
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asking some very specific questions. For example: What do we mean by ‘politics’? Is it a 
process of historical conversion of one practical condition into another, fuelled by the 
interaction among individuals? Or is it a conversation among individuals conducted in 
accordance with certain conversational habits acquired historically? These two positions are 
not mutually exclusive, but nor are they wholly compatible, and the choice between them is 
itself a matter of systematic reflection.
World politics: science, prescription or poetry?
So Oakeshott’s forswearing of metaphysics has nothing to do with foreclosing on the 
possibility of systematic reflection. Insofar as it implies subjecting to a procedure of criticism 
anything that purports to be ‘absolute’, it has nothing to do with foreclosing on the possibility 
of subversive reflection. In this, it is not different from Collingwood’s understanding of 
metaphysics as an inquiry in which there is no place for asking, ‘how can you detect a 
presupposition in your neighbour’s eye if you have a whole faggot of them in your own’ (EM 
63). We know anything at all because our understanding is conditional, and far from being the 
ground for denying the possibility of a systematic inquiry, this, according to Collingwood, 
impels one to abandon the eighteenth-century conception of science and to adopt the 
historicist one. Although Oakeshott objects to the imposition of a single idiom, be it 
‘historicism’ or ‘rationalism’, onto all possible modes of inquiry, he does not reject the fact 
that both the subject-matter and the method of any inquiry are in the continuous process of 
becoming.
This, however, has implications for the understanding of ‘progress’, on which 
Collingwood’s classification of anti-metaphysics hinges just as much as it does on his 
conception of science. Oakeshottian conversation, although conducted not to discover any 
truths, is also believed to be an ‘achievement’. Thus, even if one chooses to forswear 
metaphysics by focusing on the meaning of ‘politics’, it is still important to decide whether 
the activity of politics involves a ‘progression’ or an ‘achievement’, and whether any of these 
are present in world politics. The latter question only gains in importance once naturalistic 
understanding of politics is ruled out. As Collingwood put it shortly before the outbreak of 
World War II:
If we want to abolish capitalism or war, and in doing so not only to destroy them but to 
bring into existence something better, we must begin by understanding them: seeing what 
the problems are which our economic or international system succeeds in solving, and how 
the solution of these is related to the other problems which it fails to solve.... It may be 
impossible to do this; our hatred of the thing we are destroying may prevent us from 
understanding it, and we may love it so much that we cannot destroy it unless we are 
blinded by such hatred. But if that is so, there will once more, as so often in the past, be 
change but no progress; we shall have lost our hold on one group of problems in our 
anxiety to solve the next. And we ought by now to realize that no kindly law of nature will 
save us from the fruits of our ignorance (IH 334).
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In other words, some measure of conduct is needed. Collingwood’s conception of it is 
closely related to his reform of metaphysics: ‘Whether a given proposition is true or false, 
significant or meaningless, depends on what question it was meant to answer; and any one 
who wishes to know whether a given proposition is true or false, significant or meaningless, 
must find out what question it was meant to answer’ (EM 39). From this an idea of scientific 
progress follows directly: ‘Progress in science would consist in the suppression of one theory 
by another which served both to explain all that the first theory explained, and also to explain 
types or classes of events or “phenomena” which the first ought to have explained but could 
not’ (M 332).
This view, however, holds only with regard to a narrower view of science, not different 
from that of Oakeshott, so that progress is due to the existence of an agreement on the 
procedures for measurement. As Collingwood himself recognizes, the issue gets more 
complicated in the case of historical research, for example, for historians often cannot agree 
on, and sometimes remain ignorant of, the questions that various ages were facing. The 
distinction between ‘enlightened’ and ‘dark’ periods in history is only a distinction between 
historical periods illuminated by our own understanding of them through re-enactment and 
those that are not. While assessing social progress, one is confronted with the same difficulty. 
It is impossible to measure progress by the increase in the production of certain goods, for 
example, without knowing how this increase affected the whole way of life of a given 
community, and entering into an understanding of such a whole is beyond re-enactment, 
however rigorous (324-7).
So, already after the outbreak of World War n, Collingwood retracted some of his 
previously stated views without abandoning the major thread of his thinking. Now his 
formulation of the question-answer complex acquires an explicitly social form. Societies are 
held together by the practice of civility, so that anyone who seeks to better his or her 
condition can be sure of receiving a civil answer to a civil question as to how to do that. They 
are also in contact with their natural environment and their neighbours. Within this triadic 
pattern of interrelated activities appears a paradox. Particular societies, upheld by the 
recognition of their intrinsic diversity, happen to be incapable of recognizing otherness once 
confronted by nature or foreigners. In the former case, they are driven towards mindless 
technological exploitation. In the latter, strangers and metics are ‘often treated with the utmost 
incivility; often, for example, murdered with impunity and a clear conscience even by peoples 
who enjoy a relatively high civilization’. In both cases, that which is not part of a society is 
treated as a thing to be dealt with by force (NL 35.25-35.66).
Collingwood’s response to this hinges upon the distinction he draws between the activities 
of ‘improving’ and ‘conserving’: ‘improving on what is handed down to us is far less 
important than conserving it’ (36.33), for the continuation of this practice of handing down,
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that is, tradition, is dependent upon, and also perpetuates, the spirit of agreement, this time 
social agreement. This contractual element is reflected in the image of the state. The state is a 
continuous polarized activity of interaction between two kinds of communities, the one within 
which social agreement is already achieved and the one where it still has to be brought about. 
Politics is the activity of conversion of the latter kind of community into the former, of non­
agreements into agreements, in which the element of coercion is ineliminable, although it can 
take different forms, not all of them violent (25.11-25.59). This is underpinned by 
Collingwood’s evolutionary conception of the self, grounded in his evolutionary conception 
of understanding as the self-knowledge of the mind. The mature self capable of entering into 
agreements with others evolves by learning to tame its desires through reason which, in turn, 
develops by learning to distinguish what is merely expedient from that which is right and 
these from that which is one’s duty. The knowledge of the latter can be achieved only through 
historical understanding (15.1-17.83).
Thus the completeness of agreement within the truly social pole of the state is a reflection 
of the exactness of one’s duty, itself a reflection of the relative completeness of historical self- 
understanding. Its counterpart in politics is the state conducting its relations with other states 
on the basis of its historical self-understanding as a community unified through the 
conversion of disagreements into agreements. Since such conversion is an impossibility 
among equals, and complete agreement is an impossibility among equals thus constituted, the 
best international politics can be is the conversion of disagreements into non-agreements 
(29.5-29.58).
All in all, a series of interrelated triads -  utility-right-duty, economics-politics-ethics, 
disagreements-non-agreements-agreement -  makes up the overarching one, man-society- 
civilization. Within each of them, the movement is progressive, according to the initial 
understanding of progression as comprehension in the double-meaning of understanding and 
inclusion. Knowing one’s duty is knowing what is expedient and right and more. This ‘more’, 
by dialectically reconciling the claims of utility and right, converts a desiring animal into a 
unified duty-bound human being. In the case of ‘civilization’, it calls for a civilization which 
is universal. This drive is arrested within yet another triad -  nature-society-foreigners -  and 
barbarism intervenes. Here Collingwood’s resort to tradition appears to be at odds not only 
with an idea of progress as an increasingly efficient exploitation of both nature and foreigners, 
but also with his own idea of progress in understanding.
Oakeshott did not write much about international relations. However, insofar as his overall 
argument was a continuation of Collingwood’s it offers a conceptual vocabulary which can be 
applied to this region of human experience. But, first one needs to see in what exactly does 
Oakeshott’s revision of Collingwood’s position consist.
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As far as the issue of social progress is concerned, Oakeshott shares with Collingwood the
view that it is impossible to know different social conditions comprehensively enough to be
able to draw comparisons on which to ground definitive practical prescriptions. He also
agrees with Collingwood that, to be understood at all, social arrangements have to be
understood historically. Yet, to be practically enjoyed, they need to be in constant competent
use and cannot be abandoned at will for the sake of the contemplative re-enactment of past
experiences, let alone the enactment of any radical plans for the future. What one has already
learnt to enjoy is more valuable than whatever may still be enjoyed in the yet unknown past or
in the unknowable future (R 407-37).
This, however, is only one disposition for attending to the world of practice. The other is
more concerned with deliberate change. In the preliminary discussion of these two
dispositions in European politics, Oakeshott labels them ‘the politics of scepticism’ and ‘the
politics of faith’ and presents the modem European view of politics as ‘the mean in action’ in-
between the two, suggesting also that it acquired its current shape in the ideological struggles
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when some of the most ambitious projects of the
politics of faith started running on empty:
Faith had knocked up an impressive score, and its inning ended characteristically in hit- 
wicket. (The scorers, unaware of what had happened, went on chalking up the runs; faith, 
particularly in France, was believed to have ‘a splendid future behind it’.) In the situation, 
however, it looked as if scepticism would take a mighty revenge. But not at all; the contest 
was adjourned for tea. And in the conversation that ensued, the political principle of the 
mean in action made its appearance (PF 122).
Later, Oakeshott presents the state as being a practical embodiment of the two historically 
acquired dispositions at once. This dualism is not due to the imperfections of the synthesizing 
process of civilization continuously off-set by the intervention of barbarism, as in 
Collingwood, but can be understood in terms of the dualistic character of rules, at once 
authoritative and prescriptive, or human utterances, characterized at once by the manner of 
speaking and by what is being said in this manner. As in Oakeshott’s account of the 
conversation of mankind, it is the separation of the two that leads to the intervention of 
barbarism or dogmatism. What is usually referred to as ‘politics’ or ‘government’, is an 
amalgamation of a number of theoretically distinct activities with an overarching dualism of 
their own: such activities as legislation, adjudication and ruling are meant to ensure the 
continuous recognition of the authority of practices, whereas politics proper consists in 
deliberating these practices in terms of their desirability.
This contains a hint at a theory of international relations which distinguishes between the 
patterns of world-ruling, which may be qualitatively different from those of state-ruling 
indeed, and world-politics, the individuality of which is yet to be distinguished. It can be 
suggested, and the task of this thesis is to develop this suggestion in some detail, that
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Oakeshott’s own political theory, as it is presented in On Human Conduct, is not only a theory 
of civil association but also a theory of politics (if only as its ‘secondary consideration’ (MHC 
356)) which stops short of discussing the character of world politics, although a lot of what is 
needed for such a discussion is outlined by Oakeshott in his account of the conversation of 
mankind.
The connection between the two discussions becomes clearer once it is noticed that, even
when in his most sceptical moods, as in the piece written at the peak of the Cold War,
Oakeshott never denies the existence, or the necessity, of meaningful criteria for the
evaluation of social practices:
If one looks around the world today, the overheated imagination can find dozens of 
reasons for dismay, but if anything is certain it is that the collapse of our civilization will 
not come from any of the things which get into the headlines -  not even from soil 
erosion.... When what a man can get from the use and control of the natural world and his 
fellow men is the sole criterion of what he thinks he needs, there is no hope that the major 
part of mankind will find anything but good in this exploitation until it has been carried far 
enough to reveal its bitterness to the full. This... is not an argument for doing nothing, but 
it is a ground for not allowing ourselves to be comforted by the prospect, or even the 
possibility, of a revolution. The voyager in these waters is ill advised to weigh himself 
down with such heavy baggage; what he needs are things that will float with him when he 
is shipwrecked (V 109-10).
Whereas the first part of this passage echoes Collingwood’s despair with conduct driven by
the criterion of use and control, the ending suggests the existence of the ‘right’ things to cling
to. It is also similar to a passage in Collingwood’s book written shortly before World War II:
We need not buy revolvers and rush off to do something drastic. What we are concerned 
with is the threatened death of civilization. That has nothing to do with my death or yours, 
or the deaths of any people we can shoot before they shoot us. It can be neither arrested 
nor hastened by violence. Civilizations die and are bom not with waving of flags or the 
noise of machine-guns in the streets, but in the dark, in the stillness, when no one is aware 
of it. It never gets into the papers. Long afterwards, a few people, looking back, begin to 
see that it has happened.
Then let us get back to our business.... Here’s our garden. It seems to need cultivating 
(PA 103-4).
The ‘garden’ Collingwood was referring to was art, and it is to ‘poetry’ that Oakeshott 
later assigns a special position in the conversation of mankind: ‘a dream within the dream of 
life; a wild flower planted among our wheat’ (R 541). What matters in this characterization is 
not only the difference between the ‘flower’ and the ‘wheat’ but also the inclusion suggested 
by ‘among’. Poetry is characterized by Oakeshott as a performance, not limited to verse, in 
which it is impossible to separate the manner of speaking from what is being said. As an 
example of such unity, it plays the same role in his theory as the state did for Hegel: an 
actually existing intimation of a mode of human experience which is not really a ‘mode’ 
because the unity of the poetic image is not distorted, modified through theoretical 
abstraction. Unlike the Hegelian unity of experience which is, first, philosophically assumed 
and then shown to be brought into existence through historical progress, Oakeshottian poetry
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is always in place as a historic achievement, and what is intimated in this achievement is not a 
future absolute redemption but a possibility of the current enjoyment of the ideal of absolute 
conversability.
Yet, although poetry is absolutely conversable, because its manner of speaking is 
inseparable from what is being said, it is also absolutely untranslatable because what is being 
said, poetic images, stop being poetic once put into constant use through imitation. Every 
translation, just as every new ‘reading’, if successful, results in a new instance of poetry, as 
unique as the ‘original’ was. In this sense, poetry represents what Eliot described as ‘unity, 
but not universality’ and posed as an alternative to the ongoing, and futile, philosophical 
attempts at ‘identifying oneself with the Universe’ or ‘identifying the Universe with oneself, 
between which there is not much difference anyway.11
This paradoxical character of poetry has its counterpart in Oakeshott’s understanding of 
human conduct. Genuinely human conduct, as a reciprocal activity of questioning and 
answering, is situated in-between two modes of ‘fabrication’, the extraction of wished-for 
outcomes by force and the ‘higher morality’ of self-enactment in which the substantive 
wished-for outcome is not a response from one’s fellow-beings but one’s own character. In 
the former case, an attempt is being made to address everything and everyone in one manner, 
and that is barbarism. In the latter, one speaks, as it were, to oneself, attempting to achieve the 
unity of one’s character. Such achievements involve a certain dogmatism but, insofar as they 
can only be intermittent and their intrinsic value is inseparable from the ongoing conversation 
to which one has to return, they can be likened to poetic images. Now their untranslatability is 
an invitation to others to take oneself on one’s own terms or to go on with the tiresome 
negotiation of these terms (OHC 31-54).
To forswear metaphysics is to recognize the existence of a shadow-line which separates, 
however conditionally, the world of poetic images from that of politics, as a ‘world inhabited 
by others besides ourselves who cannot be reduced to mere reflections of our own emotions’ 
(R 436-7); and poetry, while included into the practice of civility already enjoyed, also 
provides a standard for the deliberation of this practice in terms of its desirability, that is, a 
criterion for the activity of politics. Far from signifying a resort to intuitionism and rejection 
of scientia, Oakeshott’s ‘poetry’ is an expression of the same ideal of exactness as 
Collingwood’s ‘duty’. Only it is a kind of exactness which grants recognition to imperfection 
and calls for the plurality of utterance. Still, in virtue of its untranslatability, poetry points 
towards two specific experiences located outside genuinely political practices. The first is 
education. The second is tradition.
11 Eliot, Essays: 139-40.
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Neotraditionalism in International Relations
Without education there is no hope of ever recognizing the authoritative claims of poetry or 
any of the voices in the conversation of mankind. Thus, although Oakeshott’s understanding 
of politics is at odds with Collingwood’s contention that the ‘life of politics is the life of 
political education’ (NL 32.34), Oakeshottian civil association being possible only among 
persons already educated into the practice of civility, it nevertheless embraces Collingwood’s 
‘conversion’ as a precondition for its own ‘conversation’. Secondly, insofar as poetry 
intimates undistorted, unmodified conversability, it intimates the unity of the conversation 
and therefore a ‘procedure of criticism’ which can be provisionally described as the procedure 
of adjudication among the various voices in the conversation; adjudication conducted in 
accordance with custom rather than a universal statute, called upon only once an ‘intervention 
of barbarism’ is alleged to have been already observed and only in order to deliberate the 
weight of this allegation so as to, through deliberation itself, uphold the practice of 
conversability. Such adjudication can only reveal itself through ‘the characters, the 
adventures, the works, and the relations of human beings’ and it can only be backward- 
looking. Still it is necessary to give it another name in order to avoid direct associations with 
legal practices and thus with the notion of legislation inappropriate for the conversation.
But what is the most appropriate name? Collingwood’s later discussion suggests 
‘tradition’, and so do Oakeshott’s earlier works. However, towards the end of his career, 
Oakeshott abandoned the term (MHC 366). Further, there seems to be a number of specific 
reasons for rejecting ‘traditionalism’ when it comes to the conduct and understanding of 
international relations where it is marked with particular ambiguity. Thus, although Oakeshott 
refers to European state-conduct as a single, albeit multifaceted, historically identifiable 
practice, he is sceptical about its applicability to those societies outside Europe whose own 
practices of ruling are not touched by the genius of the Romans and the Normans and whose 
inhabitants are under no obligation to recognize such ‘touching’ as a blessing to begin with 
(OH 166). This points towards two possible attitudes to traditionalism in international 
relations, both of them negative. On the one hand, modem statecraft can be understood as 
threatening the practical artistry of traditional communities.12 On the other, the practice of 
state-conduct appears as nothing more than a ‘tradition’ which lacks the critical resources of 
its own.13
12 Cf.: Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need Virtues (Chicago: 
Four Court, 1999).
13 This view is shared across the variety otherwise different approaches. Cf.: John A. Vasquez, The 
Power o f Power Politics: A Critique (London: Pinter Publishers, 1983); James Der Derian, On 
Diplomacy: A Genealogy o f Western Estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); John Rawls, The Law 
o f Peoples: With The Idea o f Public Reason Revisited (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1999).
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In the context of International Relations theory, traditionalism may be seen as an example 
of irrational anti-metaphysics. Martin Wight, for instance, distinguished ‘tradition’ from 
‘theory’ by claiming that, while there was no international theory, there were identifiable 
‘traditions of thought’ in international relations. At the same time, international theory was 
distinguished from political theory, which constituted not only a tradition of speculation about 
the ‘good life’ but also a ‘theory’ proper, because the validity of its prescriptions could be 
assessed against the background of the continuous progressive change in domestic politics. In 
the realm of international relations, no such progress can be observed, therefore there is 
nothing to ‘theorize’.14 From this one could draw the conclusion that the study of one 
particular form of human experience, international relations, has revealed the inadequacy of 
that mode of political theorizing which, by separating domestic and international practices, 
failed to address human experience in its complexity and interrelatedness. One could then 
reject this mode of theorizing by exposing its presuppositions, including those based on a 
particular understanding of social progress. This is what Collingwood did by stating his case 
for ‘progressive anti-metaphysics’. Instead, Wight accepted the separation between the 
‘international’ and ‘political’ and condemned international theory to the idiom of historical 
interpretation which, after all, provided a foundation for a ‘theory’ by offering a ‘structure of 
hypothesis’, but a theory more modest than that of naturalistic approaches.15
On the latter point, Hedley Bull, while advocating his ‘case for the classical approach’, 
was moving in a direction opposite to Wight’s, insisting that ‘the play of international 
politics’ and ‘the moral dilemmas to which it gives rise’, that is, the subject-matter of 
International Relations, required an approach more comprehensive than anything that could be 
offered by the ‘scientists’ whose views of the discipline were too restrictive, so that whenever 
they succeeded ‘in casting light upon the substance of the subject’ it was by stepping beyond 
‘science’, into the realm of the classical school with its reliance on historical understanding.16 
However, the comprehensiveness of the classical approach culminated, for Bull, in the notion 
of judgement somewhat exempt from any systematic investigation on account of it being ‘a 
rough and ready observation, of a sort for which there is no room in logic or strict science, 
that things are this way and not that’.17
It is on this point, among others, that later reflectivist critics responded that, despite its 
awareness of the work of such thinkers as Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt, Collingwood or 
Oakeshott, International Relations traditionalism could not quite muster their language and
14 Martin Wight, ‘Why is there no International Theory?’ in Diplomatic Investigations, eds Herbert 
Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966).
15 Ibid.: 33.




turned it into its own ‘hidden, ignored, or marginalized discursive dimension that speaks it but 
which it cannot speak’.18 To put it in Collingwood’s terms, these were the absolute, that is, 
unarticulated and therefore unquestioned, presuppositions of International Relations 
traditionalism which prevented it from bringing its mode of inquiry in line with its 
understanding of the subject-matter, and while subject ‘without style is barbarism; style 
without subject is dilettantism’ (PA 299).
The disjunction between the style of theorizing and its subject is, again, visible in Wight’s 
conceptualization of the ‘three traditions’, or rather two quite different classifications of them. 
On the one hand, ‘realism’, ‘rationalism’ and ‘revolutionism’ are distinguished in accordance 
with their images of ‘international society’ premised on three different conceptions of the self 
attributed to the state. The ‘realist’ state is driven by considerations of utility, that of 
‘rationalism’ is constrained by existing conventions, the ‘revolutionist’ state is bound by 
universal moral law. On the other hand, traditions differ according to the way in which they 
approach the question, what is the nature of international society. The ‘realist’ is ‘answering 
the question “What is?” by a description and classification of experience, and brushes aside 
the other kinds of question: “What is the essence of the matter?”, and “What ought to be?”, 
the metaphysical and the ethical questions’.19
These two, ‘ontological’ and ‘methodological’, taxonomies were never quite brought 
together by the mainstream of the English school, which accounts for the ongoing polemics 
between two different streams within it. The methodological one understands international 
society as an amalgamation of three distinct realities, the ‘international system’ of ‘realism’, 
the ‘international society’ of ‘rationalism’, and the ‘world society’ of ‘revolutionism’. The 
ontological approach examines international society as a social fact which can be seen 
differently depending on the tradition, ‘realism’, ‘rationalism’ or ‘revolutionism’ in the 
second of Wight’s meanings of them, from within which one is looking at it. Yet, on the 
metatheoretical level, both these approaches address their realities or social facts by way of 
description and classification, brushing aside the questions, what is the essence of these 
triadic metatheoretical constellations, or what ought they to be.20
18 Jim George, Discourses o f Global Politics: 42.
19 Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, eds Brian Porter and Gabriele Wight (Leicester:
Leicester University Press, 1991): 20-1.
20 This distinction did not go unnoticed and was highlighted by Jennifer Welsh, for example, in her 
‘Edmund Burke and the Commonwealth of Europe: The Cultural Bases of International Order”, in 
Classical Theories o f International Relations, eds Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann (London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd., 1996): 173-92, especially n. 6. The methodological stream has received its most 
comprehensive treatment in a series of publications by Richard Little and Barry Buzan culminating in 
their joint paper ‘Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to do 
About it’, Millennium, 2001, 30: 19-39. The ontological investigations are continuously re-narrated by 
Tim Dunne; see, for example, ‘Sociological Investigations: Instrumental, Legitimist and Coercive 
Interpretations of International Society’, Millennium, 2001, 30: 67-91.
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This is not to say that these questions are not addressed elsewhere. Despite the variety of 
alternatives on offer, they too can be clustered according to Collingwood’s classification of 
anti-metaphysics. Thus metatheoretical rationalism ignores the challenge of historicism by 
committing itself to the view of reality unmodified by reflection (reactionary anti­
metaphysics). Reflectivism, far from being homogeneous in its reaction to historicism, is 
unified in its recognition of the limitations of that mode of theorizing which refuses to 
recognize the challenge in the first place (progressive anti-metaphysics). Both tend to discard 
International Relations traditionalism as a ‘confused mixture’ of their own positions.21
To these specific reasons for discouraging references to traditionalism in International 
Relations a more general point could be added:
In English writing we seldom speak of tradition, though we occasionally apply its name in 
deploring its absence.... Seldom, perhaps, does the word appear except in a phrase of 
censure. If otherwise, it is vaguely approbative, with the implication, as to the work 
approved, of some pleasing archaeological reconstruction. You can hardly make the word 
agreeable to English ears without this comfortable reference to the reassuring science of 
archaeology.... Yet if the only form of tradition, of handing down, consisted in following 
the ways of the immediate generation before us in a blind or timid adherence to its 
successes, ‘tradition’ should positively be discouraged.22
Still, on closer examination, is this point really general enough? As Collingwood put it in a
discussion of language, to apply a term theoretically is to speak ‘not so much English as the
common tongue of European peoples’ (PA 274), and to be able to ‘speak’ practically is to go
beyond the limited understanding of language as verbal expression and to accept the view that
‘the dance is the mother of all languages’, precisely as a rejection of an ‘a priori archaeology
which attempts to reconstruct man’s distant past without any archaeological data’ in favour of
the totality of human expression located in the present (246). Put differently, by limiting his
or her understanding of a term or a pattern of conduct to its familiar expression within one
particular context, be it ‘writing’, ‘English’, or ‘international society’, one confines oneself to
a description and classification the terms of which are set by the particularity in question,
instead of putting into question the particularity itself.
Similarly, a closer look at the reasons for rejecting traditionalism in International Relations
reveals a commitment to a particular shape of an association, when ‘tradition’ is either
opposed to or associated with the state or with a ‘school’ and thus defined by this opposition
or association. Those who assign positive value to ‘tradition’ may deny it to state-conduct, or
those who believe state-conduct to be ‘traditional’ may refuse to recognize the value of
‘tradition’, but both may do so either before defining what ‘tradition’ is or by defining it in a
way which disregards the particularity of the situations in which states and ‘traditional
21 Jim George’s charge against the ‘backward discipline’, cited in n. 19, is perfectly matched by 
Kaplan’s reprimand of ‘the traditionalist view of philosophy as elegant but undisciplined speculation’; 
in ‘Traditionalism vs. Science’: 61.
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communities’ may be interacting with each other. In the same manner, theoretical 
traditionalism does not need to be associated exclusively with one group of thinkers or 
another only because this group used the term more often than others.
Oakeshott’s abandonment of ‘tradition’ may be read as a move away from the shape of 
different practices towards ‘practice’ as a mode of human relationship.23 However, such 
reading would repeat what Oakeshott himself criticized in Collingwood’s expansion of the 
meaning of ‘science’. There is some form of phronesis in every human activity, but to 
distinguish the individualities of the practices of a ‘scientist’ and a ‘politician’, for example, 
one needs to distinguish between their dispositions towards that which is practical in their 
engagements. One such distinction is repeatedly invoked by Oakeshott, the difference 
between solving problems and abating mystery. Thus, Hobbes, on Oakeshott’s reading of 
him, while being a great philosopher, was not a scientist but rather an artist. As far as their 
relation to reality is concerned, both the artist and the scientist may be dreaming, but the 
genius of the former is to dream that he is dreaming, and ‘it is this that distinguishes him from 
the scientist, whose perverse genius is to dream that he is awake’ (HCA 160). One of 
Oakeshott’s contemporaries, Iris Murdoch, saw the same, scientific, streak in the worlds 
created by those Continental existentialists who, like Oakeshott, recognized the importance of 
poetry but, unlike Oakeshott, rejected the possibility of experiencing it amidst ‘our wheat’: ‘In 
these worlds there is ambiguity but there is no mystery.... This fact alone, that there is no 
mystery, would falsify their claim to be true pictures of the situation of man’.24 Which brings 
one back to International Relations where similar calls for inhuman wakefulness can be heard 
on both rationalist and reflectivist sides.
Further, in On Human Conduct, Oakeshott no longer needs ‘tradition’ because he 
introduces the distinction between instrumental and moral practices, the latter being enacted 
and attended to historically, which significantly clarifies the earlier opposition between 
rationalism and traditionalism in politics. However, the possibility of enjoying a civil 
association, that is, the possibility of being associated civilly, rests on the double-pillar of 
authority and obligation specific to the European understanding of morality which, through 
the activity of law-making, can be transfigured into civility. In the much more diverse, and 
much less authoritative, context of international relations, ‘civility’ gets much more 
ambiguous while a hasty retreat from ‘civil’ to ‘practical’ endangers most of the distinctions 
carefully drawn by Oakeshott on the way from ‘tradition’ to ‘civil association’. Last but not 
least, in the context of International Relations, traditionalism has a history, and thus a
22 Eliot, Selected Essays: 13.
23 In a sense, this is what Terry Nardin’s reworking of Oakeshott’s ‘civil association’ into the ‘practical 
association’ of states implies.
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meaning, of its own. It may be not the clearest of meanings, but taking the inadvertence of 
past utterances into one’s stride is part and parcel of what Oakeshott understands by ‘civility’.
What may be presented as an alternative, specific to the context of International Relations 
and capable of grasping the practical character of tradition while distinguishing practices that 
are traditional from those that are not, is an idea of tradition based on the distinction, made by 
the Romans in their discursive practices, between a city (civitas) and Rome (Urbs), of which 
every Roman city had to be a reflection, modified by the Oakeshottian shift of emphasis from 
a particular expression of an association (‘the state’) to the mode of association (‘civil 
association’). Tradition can be understood as an abstract idea of human association, itself the 
activity of being associated in a particular manner, which finds its concrete expressions in, 
and can be experienced only through, the variety of actually existing associations different in 
their content and context. Thus divorced from the foundational overtones present in the self- 
understanding of the Romans (‘you are what you are only within the bounds of the civitas’), 
tradition gets closer to a more peregrine idea of the Greekpolis (‘the polis is where you are’). 
On the other hand, whereas the abstract idea of polis predetermined the political self- 
understanding of its members, the polites, to partake of the idea of tradition one first has to 
learn the practice of civility, just as learning to be civis was anterior to becoming a citizen of a 
civitas. ‘Tradition... cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great 
labour’.25 But once it is obtained, one also acquires ‘not merely a model for a particular 
occasion, but the disposition to recognize everything as an occasion’ (Oakeshott V 62) and 
thus finds oneself ‘in the company of thinkers and statesmen who knew which way to turn 
their feet without knowing anything about a final destination’ (153). And this is one way of 
being ‘whole of heart and secure in [one’s] grasp on life’, that is, one way of living well.
So education and tradition are brought into view and related to the activity of world 
politics concerned not merely with inhabiting ‘a solid world’ of particular associations, ‘each 
with its fixed shape, each with its own point of balance’ (Oakeshott R 436), and yet each 
recognized as an occasion, but with living well in this world of our making. Accordingly, 
International Relations, as an association of those disposed to teach and learn how to live well 
in a thus ordered world, is a passage in the conversation of mankind, and its contribution to 
this conversation consists in the interpretative understanding of the global political order,
24 Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1997): 115.
25 Eliot, Selected Essays: 14. Actually, this distinction between the Greek and the Roman 
understandings of ‘civility’ is explored in connection to Eliot’s and Ezra Pound’s different conceptions 
of ‘tradition’ by Jean-Michel Rabate, ‘Tradition and T.S. Eliot’, in The Cambridge Companion to T.S. 
Eliot, ed. A. David Moody (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 215. A similar, although 
differently inspired, distinction is drawn by Arendt, ‘What Is Authority?’, in Between Past and Future 
(London: Penguin Books, 1977): 91-141.
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world order, as a shifting pattern of situated activities, each a contribution itself and not 
merely to the world order, thus understood, but to the overall conversation.
Needless to say, in such understanding, International Relations seems to be verging 
beyond itself in an attempt to transform both itself and the world into a pattern which is more 
coherent. This is an elusive quest. Absolute coherence is not to be found anywhere, not in any 
historical process, not in the conversation of mankind, not in some other, perhaps more 
fortunate, academic discipline such as political theory; except maybe for the occasions of 
poetry, as instances of the unity of subject and style, and also historic achievements, whose 
counterpart in political thought is ‘the still centre of a whirlpool of ideas which has drawn into 
itself numberless currents of thought, contemporary and historic, and by its centripetal force 
has shaped and compressed them into a momentary significance before they are flung off 
again into the future’ (Oakeshott HCA 8).
A place for poetry
The subject, then, is world politics, as approached from within International Relations as a 
way of thinking and speaking about world order. The style appropriate for such thinking and 
speaking is that of political philosophy, not as a body of doctrine, or an a priory ‘tradition’, 
immune from change or the possibility of subversion, but an ongoing activity that can be 
experienced and enjoyed only in its concrete exhibitions, of which the thinking of 
Collingwood and Oakeshott is but one. The task is to achieve the unity of style and subject or, 
more plausibly, to indicate a possibility of such unity, as a standard for the evaluation of both 
style and subject, within International Relations and what constitutes, in this view, its own 
subject-matter. Since such unity, ‘poetry’, is meaningful inasmuch as it offers the possibility 
of the deliberation of the conditions of world order in terms of their desirability, world 
politics, the task is to explore the connection between the two, to understand the activity of 
world politics in its relation to poetry. The point of this exploration is not to deny the 
connection between world politics and, say, ‘the struggle for power’, nor to imagine what 
happens or what might have happened once power is taken out of the picture. The point is to 
assert that there are spaces in the picture which are not dominated by power. Accordingly, the 
disposition is not to discourage, to escape, to transcend or to tame ‘power-politics’, for there 
is no such thing as power-politics. There is power, there is politics and there is much else. As 
there is poetry. So there ought to be some place for it. ‘Here is our garden. It seems to need 
cultivating’.
The cultivation will proceed through the following steps. First, the identity of the language 
of Oakeshott’s and Collingwood’s thought will be distinguished by way of outlining a 
definition of politics. The conclusion of this stage, however, will identify the difference in 
their thinking about human action and human experience in general. This will be approached,
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in the next step under the heading of ‘poetry’. The task here is to locate the ‘critical’ aspects 
in Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s theorizing and to see how these enable the critique of the 
modem European state. The latter theme will be in the focus of the third stage where 
Oakeshott’s and Collingwood’s discussions of ‘civilization’, or the practice of civility, will be 
examined so as to be to discussed further, in the next step, against the background of some 
contemporary accounts of world order. In this manner the vocabulary of contemporary 
International Relations will be integrated into the language of Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s 
conversation. Thus ‘world order’ will emerge as an embodiment of two historically acquired 
dispositions at once, towards a transactional association of states, as enterprise associations 
(‘international system’), and a polyverse of states, as genuinely political associations 
(‘international society’). These will be supplemented with an idea of ‘tradition’, as mode of 
existence of ‘world society’. Finally, neotraditionalism, as a metatheoretical position 
alternative to both rationalism and reflectivism, will be outlined, and the place of political 
theorizing within International Relations ascertained.
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Politics
Politics is a kind of human activity. Few, if any, would seriously quarrel with this. To understand 
any human activity, Oakeshott once told his students, is ‘to discern the character of the activity 
itself and not merely to classify its products’; that is, to establish the place of a given activity ‘on 
the map of human activity in general’ (HL 15). Here agreement is less likely, especially so once 
it comes to the possibility of world politics. The task of this chapter is to explore what is meant 
by politics as a human activity.
The place of politics, it is often believed, is within a bounded association known in modem 
history as the sovereign state. The modem state, Collingwood seems to agree, ‘established itself 
as par excellence the political organ of society’, and ‘those who would banish sovereignty as an 
outworn fiction are really only trying to shirk the whole problem of politics’. Sovereignty, 
however, ‘is merely a name for political activity’ and, as such, ‘does not belong to any 
determinate organization. It belongs only to that political life which is shared by all human 
beings’ (EPP 106). Now, it seems, all politics is world politics, ‘and not to recognize the claim of 
politics’ of this kind is to disclose, in Oakeshott’s words, ‘some defect of character or sensibility’ 
(RP 91). This was written with clear intention of setting a limit to the claims of politics; but also 
at a time, in 1939, when Oakeshott referred to politics as ‘a second-rate form of human activity... 
at once corrupting to the soul and fatiguing to the mind’.1 In On Human Conduct, it is an activity 
‘as rare as it is excellent’ (OHC 180).
1 This is how Oakeshott characterized politics in his introduction to Hobbes’ Leviathan (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1946): lxiv. The line was dropped from later editions.
This change of attitude had nothing to do with some sudden, inexplicable improvement in the
quality of political action in the years that separated the two statements. Rather, Oakeshott took
politics out of the context of the actually-existing European states and their analogues elsewhere
and placed it into a different one, that of civil association. In fact, ‘politics’ is one of the very few
words from the vocabulary of the modem European state for which Oakeshott did not substitute
some term of his own so as to distinguish them from their current counterparts too often
‘mistaken for the characteristics of historic and equivocal associations’ (109).
This does not mean that civil association or politics are treated in separation from any locale.
No human action can be understood this way:
The overt actions of men take on a certain intelligibility when we recognize them as the 
ingredients of a disposition to behave in a certain manner, the dispositions of conduct in turn 
become understandable when they are recognized as the idiosyncrasies of a certain human 
character, and the human character becomes less mysterious when we observe it, not as a 
general type or as a possibility, but in its place in a local context. And the process may be 
continued in the gradual expansion of this context in place and time (HL 3-4).
Once it comes to the understanding of politics, the limits to such gradual expansion are set by the 
circumstances to which a certain view of the office of government is appropriate:
And the chief feature of these circumstances is the appearance of subjects who desire to make 
choices for themselves, who find happiness in doing so and who are frustrated in having 
choices imposed upon them.... All that could make such a political theory unintelligible 
would be the demonstration that subjects of this disposition have never existed; and all that 
could make such a political theory of merely historic interest would be the recognition that 
subjects of this sort do not now exist (84).
Thus the theory of politics in question appears in the first instance as limited to the conditions 
of modernity as these took shape in Europe. However, these limits themselves are the proper 
subject of inquiry, and here, anticipating a great deal of what was to become the central concern 
of contemporary International Relations, Collingwood attributed them to the failure of liberalism 
‘to affect international relations’, so that the ‘unnatural union of internal liberalism with external 
illiberalism... led by way of international anarchy’ to the desuetude of liberalism as such and 
raised suspicions about the character of subjects disposed to understand human action in terms of 
their own individual choices. Yet this unnatural union was only an outward expression of the 
failure to affect the inner life of human associations. This was due to a more profound boundary, 
drawn both in theory and practice, ‘between the public affairs of the community as a whole and 
the private affairs of its members’ (EPP 185). Therefore political theory had to address itself to 
the conditions of international anarchy and not only domestic order, but to do so it had to begin 
not from the study of interstate relations but from its own first principles most of which ‘had 
been distilled from the body of Christian practice by a long chain of thinkers’ and then ‘bottled 
and labelled’ for further theoretical use (189).
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In other words, certain political practices do stop at certain manmade borders, but to 
understand why they do so, one has to take Hume’s advice and, ‘instead of taking here and there 
a castle or village on the frontier, march up to the capital or centre’ of all understanding, ‘to 
human nature itself.2 To be sure, as Collingwood once remarked, rather angrily, it will take ‘the 
most pedantic kind of imbecile’ to attempt to tackle comprehensively such questions as ‘What is 
man?’ or ‘What is society?’ as ‘a mere preliminary to a question in practical politics’ (227), and 
some such objection to metaphysics informs one of the recurrent themes of the classical approach 
where International Relations is seen as a ‘craft discipline’ which does not call ‘for knowledge of 
the philosophy of science’.3 Yet Collingwood made his remark in a state of emergency while 
recognizing any ‘permanent declaration of the state of emergency’ as a ‘genuine and absolute’ 
threat to the kind of practical politics he was advocating (179). For Oakeshott, the virtue of 
studying politics in a university, and thus of having an academic discipline dedicated to such 
study, lay in the possibility of moving away from the manner of thinking and speaking practised 
by political actors themselves: ‘If there is a manner of thinking and speaking that can properly be 
called “political”, the appropriate business of a university in respect of it is not to use it, or to 
teach the use of it, but to explain it -  that is, to bring to bear upon it one or more of the 
recognized modes of explanation’, such as philosophy, history, but also science or mathematics 
(R 212).4 It is true that Hobbes’ Leviathan or Hegel’s Philosophy o f Right may be more 
appropriate for the study of politics than Kant’s Critique o f Pure Reason, but their propriety 
consists not so much in their being dedicated to ‘politics’ as their subject but rather in their 
quality as the exemplars of the philosophical mode of thinking about this subject (213). And to 
be able to appreciate this quality, one has to know what it takes to think about politics in this 
manner.
Therefore before answering the main question of this chapter -  What is the place of politics 
on the map of human activity generally? -  it is necessary to address another one: What does it 
mean to think about politics philosophically? To be sure, the discussion of Collingwood’s and 
Oakeshott’s answers to both questions will be rather cursory, glossing over most of the 
differences which exist in their accounts of both philosophy and politics. The task, at this point, 
is to establish the identity of the language in which both thinkers speak, so as to see, in 
subsequent chapters, what difference this language makes once brought to bear upon the study of 
world politics.
2 David Hume, A Treatise o f Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. rev. by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978): xvi
3 Jackson, Covenant: 91.
4 See also note 5 on page 213, where Oakeshott explicitly states that an ‘opportunity may properly be taken’ 
to think and speak about politics in the language of science, for example, but expresses some doubts as to 
the availability of a study of this kind that is ‘even remotely suitable to be put before an undergraduate’.
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Contemplation
A lot in contemporary debates in International Relations revolves around naturalism and 
corresponding divisions between outsider’s and insider’s stories. To take one step backwards, 
Terry Nardin addressed the issue long before it got onto the mainstream agenda by outlining two 
ways of understanding the balance of power. On outsider’s view, the balance, as ‘the work of 
nature’, leads to an equilibrium as ‘the result of a process, not the outcome of choice’. For the 
insider, the balance of power ‘appears as a condition of international society that must be 
consciously pursued in order to be enjoyed’.5 In substance, in not in presentation, this was not a 
new idea particularly well-developed by the English school. Yet the key-word in Nardin, 
borrowed from Oakeshott, is ‘enjoyed’, and a key-word it is; with its help it is possible to unlock 
an interesting passage connecting the ‘ontological investigations’ of the English school with 
metaphysical inquiries of the British Idealism
Contemplation and its modes
Appeals to ‘enjoyment’ in the discussion of ‘reality’ is not Oakeshott’s invention. The most
immediate authority is F.H. Bradley’s Appearance and Reality.6 According to Bradley, reality as
the whole of experience immediately presents itself to the individual. However, immediacy, by
implying the separation of thought from perception, contradicts the requirement of totality. The
resulting dilemma is stated by Collingwood:
Either reality is the immediate flow of subjective life, in which case it is subjective but not 
objective, it is enjoyed but cannot be known; or else it is that which we know, in which case it 
is objective but not subjective, it is the world of real things outside the subjective life of our 
mind and outside each other (IH 141).
Note ‘subjective but not objective’ and ‘objective but not subjective’. For both Collingwood and 
Oakeshott, these two extremes are rooted in the same philosophical error, the antinomy of subject 
and object. An individual’s understandings of situations in which he finds himself are his and in 
this sense they are ‘subjective’; but as understandings they can be interrogated (successfully or 
not) both by the individual himself and by others, and in this sense they are ‘objective’ (OHC 51; 
EIM 48-69).
Still Oakeshott makes significant use of rejected extremes by identifying two kinds of 
responses to the world which bear some resemblance to the Bradlean dilemma as stated by 
Collingwood:
Either we may regard the world in a manner which does not allow us to consider anything but 
what is immediately before our eyes and does not provoke us to any conclusions; or we may
5 Nardin, Law, 30-31.
6 F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1897).
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look upon what is going on before us as evidence for what does not itself appear, considering,
for example, its causes and effects (R 157).
The first response is that of the artist whose reaction to the immediate flow of causeless images is 
best described as ‘delight’. The second is subdivided into ‘practical’ and ‘scientific’. In the 
former, particular situations are understood in respect of their relationship to ourselves; in the 
latter, the attitude to the world is ‘objective’, as the world is seen as independent of ourselves and 
the idiosyncrasies of our individual perception of it (158-9).
Thus initial enjoyment is worked out into aesthetic delight and practical enjoyment 
understood as competence in conduct resulting from the acquisition of skills of responding to the 
world. And if scientific ‘knowledge’ is added to this pair, the trinity of Science, Practice and 
Poetry as alternative modes of understanding is complete. The thing is, neither Oakeshott nor 
Collingwood is ready to grant science the sole possession of knowledge: ‘Science is the scene of 
remarkable triumphs; so is agriculture; that does not prove either that surgeons ought to perform 
their operations with a plough or that philosophers ought to attack their problems with the 
weapons of the scientist’ (SM 281). Knowledge is indivisible; it is present not only in the 
formulae of a scientist but in the contemplation of a poet as well. It varies in kind from one form 
of experience to another and this variation has to be explained. But to apply a single mode of 
inquiry to all provinces of experience is to commit the cardinal sin of theorizing: irrelevance, 
ignoratio elenchi. Appealing to ‘that love of moderation which has as frequently been fatal to 
English philosophy as it has been favourable to English politics’, irrelevance masquerading as a 
compromise increases, instead of mitigating, the errors of extremes (EIM 196-7).
The horns of the Bradlean dilemma can be escaped by a radical philosophical move re­
establishing the totality of experience. Reality is experience and nothing but experience. 
Experience is the world of ideas marked with unity and self-completeness. Thought is no longer 
separated from perception and thus stops performing the negative function of destroying the 
totality of experience but performs the positive one of bringing about its coherence as the world 
of ideas, since for any world of ideas coherence is the mark of its unity and self-completeness 
and therefore of it being a world.
The task of philosophy is akin to that of poetry insofar as both are contemplation, but unlike 
the artist the philosopher contemplates not delightful images but experience in its totality in order 
to make it intelligible. Not that it is impossible in principle. But a man ‘cannot be a philosopher 
and nothing else; to be so were either more or less than human’ (3). The mind ‘feels cold without 
an object other than itself and creates ‘a palace of art, a world of mythology, a cosmos of 
abstract conceptual machinery, and so forth’ (SM 291). This is as childish as to wish to get to 
heaven in order to want there a salmon-rod; but this is what all of us do, philosophers, when off- 
duty, included. And this is how the complex landscape of the world of knowledge is turned into
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an abstract map divided into the provinces of art, religion, science and history (Collingwood); or
the universal stream of experience is arrested into the backwaters of science, history and practice
(Oakeshott). There is no limit to the number of modes-because ‘modifications’-and the choice of
those to be investigated is, to an extent, arbitrary.
What matters is that once experience is thus divided opposition between its modes takes the
form of the ‘state of nature’ in its starkest version. At the point of arrest, construction work
begins: each mode creates its own world of ideas in accordance with its peculiar method and puts
forward a universal claim since every one of them is ‘not an island in the sea of experience, but a
limited view of the totality of experience’ (EIM 71). There is no one to arbitrate between these
competing claims; and philosophy is the least acceptable judge. As Collingwood puts it:
On this scene of international warfare the philosopher pictures himself as looking down 
calmly... seeing perhaps that it is God’s will for these deluded mortals to fly at one another’s 
throats, or perhaps, in a voice of authority, bidding them be still, with a result suggestive 
rather of Canute than of Christ. For they, poor things, do not recognize the philosopher’s 
superhuman status: they actually think he is one of the combatants.... And this is perfectly 
just; for the philosopher asserts philosophy as the only legitimate form of experience, and not 
only condemns the others as illusionary but adds insult to the injury by giving reasons for this 
condemnation, which goes against all maxims of civilized warfare. Philosophers are justly, 
therefore, the objects of universal dislike. They fight their own professional battle and claim 
to be defending the ark of God (SM 307-8).
In the same ironic vein Oakeshott retells the story of Plato’s cave-dwellers one of whom, 
driven by ‘philosophical’ curiosity, leaves a hollow in the earth and after prolonged travels 
returns to instruct his fellows that what they are taking for a horse is ‘a modification of the 
attributes of God’. At this stage, they ‘will applaud his performance even where they cannot quite 
follow it’; but were he to meddle into their practical affairs by insisting, for example, that a 
particular court-ruling should be postponed until the meaning of truth is elucidated, ‘the more 
perceptive of the cave-dwellers would begin to suspect that, after all, he was not an interesting 
theorist but a fuddled and pretentious ‘theoretician’ who should be sent on his travels again, or 
accommodated in a quiet home’ (OHC 30).
The problem is, philosophers cannot help it. Not dabbling in the affairs of practical, historic 
or scientific men; from these it is possible to abstain, although this is likely to invite accusations 
of treason. But philosophy should not be really troubled by what others think of it (and there is 
hardly any doubt as to what they think). What philosophy cannot do without betraying its own 
character, is, it cannot stop seeking reasons for its assertions. As such this reasoning may be quite 
instructive but: ‘We should listen to philosophers only when they talk philosophy’ (EIM 355).
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The scale o f  contemplation
But what does ‘talking philosophy’ mean? Defining philosophy as thinking about experience in 
its totality will put on one side all thinking that does not hold this view of experience with an 
implication that the view itself was reached by way of thinking other than philosophical. An 
approach that starts with a definition of philosophy’s subject-matter ‘would offer no hope of 
success except to a person convinced that he already possessed an adequate conception of this 
object; convinced, that is, that his philosophical thought had already reached its goal’ (EPM 2). 
Instead, philosophy can be understood as a procedure conducted in accordance with a method 
that, if philosophy is to be distinguished from other such engagements, has to have some peculiar 
features.
Thus, in On Human Conduct, Oakeshott returns to the story of Experience and Its Modes, 
inverting the flow of inquiry. In Experience the view of the all-embracing world of ideas was 
postulated, particular arrests in it identified, studied and recognized as philosophical errors. The 
questions of why and how these arrests come into being were put aside (EIM 72-3). Now he 
begins by stating that the gross total of whatever may be going on is incomprehensible until 
arrested. In error or not, this is how we make the world intelligible, and therefore habitable, by 
identifying a particular ‘going-on’ in terms of its ‘character’ which in turn is an arrangement of 
‘characteristics’ that we learn to notice, remember, recollect, recognize and select.7
Once any such character is identified, a ‘platform of understanding’ is reached and a verdict 
on a going-on, a ‘theorem’ (to distinguish this juncture in the adventure of understanding from 
the activity as such, that is theory) is passed. Any such platform is ‘conditional’ insofar as the 
intelligibility it offers is conditioned by postulates or assumptions on the basis of which a 
particular character is abstracted from whatever else may be going on. This conditionality cannot 
escape the theorist’s attention thus turning every theorem into a provisional juncture, not only an 
achievement in the adventure of understanding, but also an invitation to further travels: ‘The 
irony of all theorizing is its propensity to generate, not an understanding, but a not-yet- 
understood’ (OHC 11).
This saddles the theorist with a dilemma: either the engagement or enterprise of 
understanding; unconditional critical reflection whose only proper object is a going-on called
7 The exact timing of this reversal is a matter of some debate in Oakeshottian scholarship. At any rate, it 
happened prior to the publication of OHC. What is specific to OHC, is a related withdrawal of ‘practice’ as 
a name for the mode of experience. Thus, in ‘The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind’, where 
the hierarchical view of experience is already resolutely rejected, ‘practice’ still stands, alongside ‘science’ 
and ‘history’, for a particular voice in the conversation. In OHC, Oakeshott explicitly refuses to use the 
expression ‘practical understanding’ where he would have used it previously, mainly because subscription 
to specific practices is required both in ‘historical’ and in ‘scientific’ understanding otherwise released from 
the considerations of ‘practice’ as it was presented previously (57, n. 1). In other words, what was ‘practice’ 
in EIM or ‘The Voice of Poetry’, becomes ‘conduct’ in OHC.
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‘mind’, or rational investigation of specific ‘bodies’. Both commitments are valuable but the
propriety of each has its limits. To switch gears from one to another is to commit the sin of
irrelevance, Oakeshottian ignoratio elenchi presented by Collingwood as the ‘fallacy of
misplaced argument’ and the ‘fallacy of swapping horses’.
From a single going-on distinct identities predicating distinct ‘orders’ of inquiry can be
abstracted. The movement of a human eyelid can be identified as a wink or as a blink and there is
a possibility of misidentification; but once the theorist makes up his mind, he commits himself to
a certain order of inquiry. Now he cannot seek answers to the question: What is the meaning of
this blink? This would be the fallacy of misplaced argument since blinks do not have meanings
and the question does not arise. Nor can he claim that the same problem can be addressed in two
distinct stages or steps one of which will treat of ‘blinkness’ and another of ‘winkness’; or to
postulate some ‘rump blinkness’ in every wink in order to investigate the correlation between
‘blinkness’ and ‘winkness’ which will provide him with superior understanding of moving
eyelids. A problem identified at the first stage of such a dualistic enterprise will cease to be the
same problem at the second (OHC 15):
Here you are in the middle of a problem. The same horse that got you into it must get you out 
again. No amount of admiration for some other horse must betray you into the f a l l a c y  o f  
s w a p p in g  h o r s e s . If the wretched horse called Mental Science has stuck you in mid-stream 
you can flog him, or you can coax him, or you can get out and lead him; or you can drown, as 
better men than you have drowned before. But you must not swap him for the infinitely 
superior horse called Natural Science. For this is a magic journey, and if you do that the river 
will vanish and you will find yourself back where you started (NL 2.6-2.74).
Thus, not all platforms of understanding are related to each other, and of those that are, not all 
form a philosophical ladder leading to unconditionally satisfactory understanding. Cartesian and 
positivist projects ‘are to be deprecated not for what they have achieved (because, of course, they 
have achieved something), but for what they deny-the significance, or even the possibility, of 
radically subversive reflection’ (RP 142). They attempt to do so by postulating ‘facts’, a priori or 
empirical, that are independent of thought and therefore remain unmodified by reflection. By 
supplementing such ‘facts’ with reasons they produce what Collingwood describes as science of 
the second order the ultimate achievement of which is progression from a ‘this-is-so’ to a ‘this-is- 
so-assuming-that’. Achievement possibly it is, but not from the standpoint of philosophy, which 
recognizes assumptions and conclusions alike as abstractions to be got rid of since a ‘philosophic 
concept is not a... scientific concept plus the presuppositions which lie behind it, but is itself a 
concrete unity’ (128-9).
The definition of a concept, thus understood, begins with the question-What is going on 
here?-which contains not only an invitation for an answer but a recognition that an answer is 
giveable, a recognition that some specific going-on is identifiable, in fact already identified in a
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rudimentary form, otherwise the question would not have arisen. In other words, ‘in all
philosophical study we begin by knowing something... and on that basis go on to learn more; at
each step we re-defme our concept by way of recording our progress; and the process can end
only when the definition states all that the concept contains’ (EPM 97-8). Philosophy can be
understood as keeping a philosopher’s log on the never-ending voyage aimed not at discovering
any new worlds but at abating mystery in the one already inhabited. What formal logic condemns
as arguing in a circle, accusing those engaged in it of coming out at the same door as they went
in, and therefore coming out empty-handed, may be of utmost value. Philosophical exposition is
akin to empirical description, that is, aimed at collecting all attributes of a concept, but unlike
empirical science philosophy at any point seeks to understand logical connections between these
attributes, and this makes philosophical definition dependent upon the circumstances in which
the concept is considered (92-100; also RP 142,151):
To follow such an exposition means gradually building up in one’s mind the conception 
which is being expounded; coming to know it better and better as each new point is made, and 
at each new point summing up the whole exposition to that point.... [T]he phases through 
which the definition passes in its growth are not only new in degree, as we come to know the 
concept better, but new in kind, as we come to grasp new aspects of it. The various aspects 
will therefore constitute the scale of forms, beginning with a rudimentary or minimum 
definition and adding qualitatively new determinations which gradually alter the original 
definition so as to make it a better and better statement of the concept’s essence: a statement, 
at each step, complete as far as it goes, and expressing a real and necessary specification of 
the concept (EPM 100).
Adjacent forms on this scale are not merely alternative views of the same ‘thing’ or ‘fact’. By 
affirming only part of a concept, the lower form denies whatever else may be found in it, and by 
superseding this lower form the higher rejects this denial, thus subsuming the positive content of 
the lower form and denying the negative one. For instance, utilitarianism is not untrue; its error 
‘lies not in what it asserts but in what it denies; but it asserts so little and denies so much that the 
error in it is a great deal more conspicuous than the truth’ (SM 172; EPM 86-91). Or, as 
Oakeshott puts it, if philosophy rejects utilitarianism in favour of ‘self-realization’, ‘what it is 
asserting is not that happiness and self-realization are two possible ends... and that self- 
realization ought to be preferred, but that happiness is the false analysis of the end actually 
sought and that self-realization is a true analysis’ (RP 125; compare EPM 102-3).
To restate Collingwood’s idea of the scale of forms using Oakeshott’s metaphor, reflection 
may be likened to ascending a glass tower. It starts with a picture of the world as seen from the 
ground floor gradually altered by new scenes brought into view by further ascent. The 
philosopher may be inclined to climb higher than the rest since he is interested not in examining 
details or even general outlines of particular goings-on but in grasping the picture of the world in
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its totality. This, however, is not the primary ground of the distinction between philosophy and
other forms of reflection:
What at bottom distinguishes different forms of reflection is... the willingness or 
unwillingness of the thinker to carry with him to higher levels the fixed and remembered 
relics of the view as it appeared at a lower level, the willingness or unwillingness to allow 
what was once seen to determine a later vision. The important distinction is between the 
thinker for whom the different levels of observation provide views of ‘things’ already known, 
and the thinker who, as it were, uninfluenced by memory and carrying nothing with him as he 
climbs, knows at each level only the scene presented to his vision and the mediation by which 
it came into view.... Thus, philosophy may be thought of as unhindered reflective enterprise; 
we should all be philosophers were we not liable to be distracted by what we first saw (RP 
142-4).
If this view of philosophy, as an activity of keeping records in order to forget, appears 
paradoxical, one has to recall (with necessary caution) the postulates of psychoanalysis or, still 
better, an old wisdom, actually invoked by both Oakeshott and Collingwood, that the best way of 
redeeming one’s sorrows is to write them down as a story. In fact, this apparent paradox holds 
the clue to the one I have been concerned with so far. To restate, philosophy cannot begin with 
(or be contained to) a ‘purely philosophical’ form of experience, it springs from some practical 
concern; but having once set its sails to the wind of critical reflection it gets pulled farther and 
farther away from its mooring-place until it dissolves from view and the thread attaching 
philosophy to it is broken. It is here that the records kept secure ‘unbroken descent’ to the 
mooring-place in experience (152-3). This adventure of keeping the reflective impulse in one’s 
sails while trying to anchor the enterprise of theorizing in some particular point appears to be 
nonsensical unless it is remembered that the anchorage is sought not in a fixed foundation but in 
a going-on, which is in the process of becoming itself powered by the same reflective impulse.
In other words, philosophy, when understood in advance as merely contemplating the totality 
of experience, stays in opposition to particular modes of experience by virtue of their being 
arrests in this totality. When viewed the other way around, as springing from specific concern 
with particular forms of experience, it tends to subvert reflection overbalancing it into regions 
too far removed from the starting point. But there is a possibility of understanding the relation 
between particular forms of experience and philosophy as that of text and context, where the 
purpose of reflection is to determine the meaning that, in turn, ‘is not something which belongs 
to the text or to the context, neither of which is fixed independently of the other, but is properly 
assumed to be in the unity which text and context together compose’ (151). Both text and context 
are intelligible in terms of a ‘language’ which is philosopher’s records, understood not in terms 
of conclusions reached but problems or questions responded to. Particular philosophical 
doctrines may still hover in the background but they are not allowed to guide reflection towards 
predetermined conclusions. And if an objection arises that, following this mode of reflection, one
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would not see the wood for the trees, the answer is straightforward: Who wants to? ‘A tree is a 
thing to look at; but a wood is not a thing to look at, it is a thing to live in’ (A 53-76; R 184,218).
The business of a theorist is not to construct a ‘philosophy’ but to think philosophically. Once 
this skill is acquired it can be employed at any level on the ‘scale of forms’ or the ‘tower of 
reflection’. With this in mind it is possible to turn to politics philosophically conceived.
Action
What is needed now, is the definition of ‘politics’. This involves considering what politics is not;
first, because what is sought is the place of politics on the map of experience and not just the
ability to recognize the political when one sees it, second, because of what Collingwood and
Oakeshott describe as systemic ambiguity springing from the fact that what is being defined is a
concept in a living language (PA 7-9; PF 12-6):
The proper meaning of the word... is never something upon which the word sits perched like 
a gull on a stone; it is something over which the word hovers like a gull over a ship’s stem. 
Trying to fix the proper meaning in our minds is like coaxing the gull to settle in the rigging, 
with the rule that the gull must be alive when it settles.... The way to discover the proper 
meaning is to ask not, ‘What do we mean?’ but, ‘What are we trying to mean?’ And this 
involves the question ‘What is preventing us from meaning what we are trying to mean?’ (PA
7)
This ambiguity is not just an unfortunate outcome of the corruption or historical evolution of
language, nor is it merely a constant companion to the ambivalence of action; it is a reflection of
the heterogeneity and complexity of ‘this brittle world, so full of doubleness’; and in the case of
politics it is both a curse and a blessing:
Its merit is practical: like a veil which softens the edges and moderates the differences for 
what it at once hides and reveals, this ambiguity of language has served to conceal divisions 
which to display fully would invite violence and disaster. Its defect is mainly philosophical: 
the ambiguity makes it difficult for us to think clearly about our politics and stands in the way 
of any profound political self-knowledge. And it may be added that the opportunity it gives 
the disingenuous politician to spread confusion is a practical defect to set against its practical 
usefulness (PF 21).
What follows is a strategy to be pursued: to investigate the boundary of meaning in hope of 
locating there the character of extremes that shape the field of political activity and then to 
elucidate the manner in which this shaping goes on. This is what Oakeshott repeatedly does, 
identifying two poles between which both the activity of governing, and the understanding of it, 
oscillate in Europe. However, while defining politics in On Human Conduct, he makes little use 
of the offspring of the ‘politics of faith’, the ‘enterprise association’. Instead this mode of 
association is subsumed under the rudimentary definition of human conduct out of which the 
ideal character of the civil association is gradually built up. This later approach corresponds to 
what Collingwood identifies as the major insight of the ‘classical politics’:
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It... recognizes in the facts of political life... a polarized complex, a thing with two ends: a 
dialectic.... It has not only two ends like a bit of string, it has two ends like a mill-race, one 
where the water goes in and one where the water comes out. Politics is a process whereby one 
condition of human life is converted into another.... [S]uch a process could not happen of 
itself; it had to be brought about by hard work; and the hard work had to be done by persons 
who were already mature in mind, already possessed of free will, already members of a 
society.... So far as this process actually takes place there is no need to describe the non­
social element. If all the water that goes in at one end comes out at the other, we need not 
bother to measure it at both ends..., the social end of the process is not only the right one to 
begin at, it is the only one that need be thought about (NL 32.21-32-39).8
In what follows I shall trace the growth of the definition of politics, thus adding some flesh to 
this outline.
Utility, rightness, duty
Since what is sought is a philosophical definition of politics, in answering the question ‘What is 
preventing us from meaning what we are trying to mean?’ it is reasonable to begin with the 
ambiguity which springs from a special kind of duality: that between philosophical and non- 
philosophical concepts. The answer is implied in the understanding of philosophical thinking 
presented above: a concept in its non-philosophical phase ‘qualifies a limited part of reality, 
whereas in its philosophical, it leaks or escapes out of these limits and invades the neighbouring 
regions, tending at last to colour our thought of reality as a whole’ (EPM 34). Consequently: 
‘Philosophical thought is that which conceives its object as activity; empirical thought is that 
which conceives its object as substance or thing’ (EPP 58).
This means going beyond political theory conceived as the theory of the state. ‘Empirical’ 
understanding of politics in terms of substance (the state) and its attributes (sovereignty) has its 
merits, but its defect is grave: sooner or later it finds itself incapable of answering the questions 
concerning ‘the limits of the state, and its relations with other bodies, be they states, or churches, 
or trade unions, or municipalities’. One possible way-out is to start from the conception of 
political action, ‘and think of the state not as a thing but as a collective name for a certain 
complex of political actions’ (92-4; compare RP 119-26).
For Collingwood, action is specified in terms of its goodness. Absolutely, everything is good 
insofar as goodness, along with unity and reality, is assigned as a predicate to every being. But 
goodness is a matter of degree; something is called ‘bad’ when it falls short of satisfying a 
standard imposed for purposes arising out of particular practices or situations. Thus, to say that 
something is good is to say that it is chosen from a number of alternatives recognized by the
8 Collingwood’s understanding of ‘free will’ has nothing to do with caricature accounts of Idealism’s spirit 
creating reality. Rather, it is best summed up by Oakeshott’s rejection of the term in favour of the freedom 
of an agent in conduct where conduct is specified as ‘actions and utterance, wise or foolish, which have 
reasons, adequate or inadequate, but not causes’ (OHC 235).
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agent as open to him in a given situation. What seems to be an attribute of things can be properly 
defined in terms of a specific activity: choice or decision. Choosing falls into two categories: 
caprice, when the agent chooses without being conscious of any reasons for doing so; and 
rational choice, when such reasons are given as answers to the question, ‘Why do I choose this?’. 
Modem Europeans are accustomed to giving three such answers. Because it is useful. Because it 
is right. Because it is my duty (GRU 391-435; NL 13.1-14.69).
Now, utility, conformity to rules and performance of one’s duty are alternative standards for 
the evaluation of action. The relation between them, stated negatively, is that of the degree of 
capriciousness involved. Utilitarian analysis goes some way in understanding choices by stating a 
relation between ends and means, but fails to account for preferences given to specific means or 
for the choice of ends to be pursued. Analysis in terms of rules, by stating what kinds of action 
are right on particular occasions, goes farther than that but does not specify all possible occasions 
or the precise manner in which a rule should be followed; and further, it cannot account for 
actions that, while obeying one rule, violate another (NL 15.1-16.63; GRU 435-67). Next comes 
an important junction in the argument at which Collingwood introduces a distinction between 
right and duty, thus stating his disagreement with those for whom they are identical.
The contention that one’s duty should be identical with right is grounded in the belief that an 
action cannot be both right and wrong at the same time. For Collingwood, this is unsound. Since 
rightness is the form of goodness and goodness is not an attribute of things intrinsic to them, but 
conferred upon them by human choices made in specific situations, the propriety of both the 
agent’s situation and individuality should have some bearing on the goodness of the action and 
its relation to the standard of rightness. As far as situational propriety is concerned, no one is so 
fanatical a Kantian as to believe that the same set of rules is appropriate for a heathen Greek and 
a modem Christian. Individuality is a function of free will, understood as capacity for self­
liberation, not merely from the dictate of desire, which is the extreme form of capriciousness, but 
from capriciousness as such. Therefore a way out of the brain-twister introduced by Kant and 
Fichte -  whether one should tell the truth when that leads to murder -  depends on what kind of 
person one is or intends to be: ‘If your rule is to tell the truth at all costs,... you will tell the truth 
at the cost of human life.... If your rule is to save human life, tell a lie. Kant and Fichte will be 
very shocked; but need you care?’ (NL 16.72)
This emphasis on individuality allows Collingwood to articulate the highest (as devoid of 
caprice as possible) form of action: performance of one’s duty, which in the case of a concrete 
individual acting in a concrete situation (and now this is the only case conceivable) can be 
defined as ‘the act which for him is both possible and necessary: the act which at that moment 
character and circumstance combine to make it inevitable, if he has a free will, that he should 
freely will to do’ (NL 17.1-17.83; GRU 467-79).
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Thus action is specified in terms of its goodness. Goodness is conferred upon action by 
human choices. It changes in kind according to the change in the degree of rationality. In other 
words, utility, rightness and duty constitute a hierarchically linked scale of forms. Accordingly, 
moral philosophy, as the science of human conduct, is subdivided into economics, politics and 
ethics. Politics seems to belong exclusively to the sphere of the regularian analysis. But, as we 
shall see shortly, there are difficulties here.
To return to the Oakeshottian figure of the tower of reflection, for those occupying its ground 
floor, all action is capricious. From the next level (according to Collingwood, occupied by the 
Greeks with their teleological understanding of Nature) the view of the world of action is limited 
by the horizon of utility. Further ascent (to the level reached by the Romans and European 
Christians who understood both Nature and human artifice as governed by laws) brings into view 
the world of rules. The next step (intimated by the rise of historical consciousness in modem 
Europe) modifies the picture by awakening those who reach it to the idea of duty. Similarly in 
Oakeshott, there are three traditions of thinking about politics: Rational-Natural (Aristotle and 
Plato); Will and Artifice (Spinoza and Hobbes); Rational Will (Hegel), as an attempt to 
synthesize the first two while operating ‘on the analogy of human history’ (R 227).
Within the comers of this figure, while exploring the horizons of conduct from within the 
world of action, agents are guided by ‘practical reason’, whereas while contemplating this 
conduct from the tower they are engaged in ‘theoretical’ reasoning (NL 14.1-14.5, 18.1-18.92). 
The two forms of reason are inseparable not least because of our propensity to carry with us to 
higher levels ‘the fixed and remembered relics’ of the view as it appeared at a lower one; this is 
one expression of what Collingwood calls the ‘law of primitive survivals’ (9.5), in this case 
understood as the survival of practical reason into the theoretical reason that has developed out of 
it. As with all Collingwood’s concepts, it can be applied positively and negatively. Positively, it 
guards theoretical reason against degeneration into ‘academic thinking’ pursued by ‘practitioners 
of a fugitive and cloistered virtue peeping out of their hermitage windows to spy on the body 
politic’ (32.11). Negatively, it entails anthropomorphism, a relic of practical reason that cannot 
be eradicated, only rendered harmless by ‘our own laughter at the ridiculous figure we cut, 
incorrigibly anthropomorphic thinkers inhabiting a world where anthropomorphic thinking is a 
misfit’ (14.5-14.61).
One manifestation of such thinking is an understanding of social activity as a case of ‘we do 
this’ which substitutes this for me doing the ‘this’ and someone else responding by performing 
the ‘that’ (16.41). Once human conduct is thus reified, utilitarian thinking takes charge and 
embarks upon an activity for which its ends-means analysis is best suited-planning (15.73). This 
Collingwood recognizes as policy-making, distinct from politics proper. Where he fails, in my 
view, to laugh himself out of anthropomorphic thinking is when he suggests the possibility of
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‘the politics of duty’ as prescribed by the historically developed character of a society taken as a 
whole (28.85-28.89). The problem is not with the corporate identity as such but with the fact that 
any corporate identity is an abstraction, and abstractions do not sit particularly well with 
Collingwood’s understanding of duty.
So it is to Oakeshott’s understanding of associations that I now turn, making sure on the way 
that the thread attaching his analysis to Collingwood’s understanding of action remains 
unbroken.
Choices, practices, politics
Oakeshott starts his investigation of the character of human conduct by unpacking the we-do-this 
construct. Each agent is pursuing his individual satisfactions but, since no action is complete in 
itself, these are sought in the responses of others. There is a mode of action that can be 
understood without reference to any such responses, but it does not belong to the character of 
human conduct as conduct inter homines. This is an instance of ‘fabrication’, as opposed to 
‘performance’. Strictly speaking, there are two instances of fabrication which delimit the 
genuinely civil performance in human conduct. The first is the extraction of imagined and 
wished-for outcomes by force. The second is the pursuit of ‘moral excellence’, engagements of 
self-enactment, since here, as well, responses from others remain unrequited (OHC 31-54).
The difference between fabrication and performance is rooted in the ancient distinction 
between techne and phronesis. Collingwood invokes it in order to distinguish art proper from 
‘craft’ (PA 15-26), and Oakeshott, for reasons to be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, 
maintains a connection between self-enactment and artistic experience. However, when 
Oakeshott turns to the art/craft distinction, he questions the correspondent position of 
Collingwood (A 105-9; IH 204-31) that meaning is invariably conferred upon action by its 
purpose: some artefacts acquired the status of a work of art once their initial meanings, conceived 
in terms of practical purposes for which they had been ‘fabricated’, were lost as an outcome of 
their transport from one culture into another (HL 6-7). It is here that the difference between the 
two accounts can no longer be glossed over and has to be accentuated. The point to begin with is 
the question: If, in order to be understood properly, an action has to be understood historically, 
how do we know what a person’s purpose was when he performed this or that action in the past?
Collingwood’s answer is: when we know what happened, we already know why it happened 
(IH 214). One possible reading of this could be as follows. We know what happened from 
knowing the responses to this happening. Focusing on these responses (the ‘outside’ of the 
performer’s story) rather than on what he was thinking (its ‘inside’), we are driven in our 
investigation by a series of questions meant to clarify the overarching one: ‘ What was so-and-so 
really doing?’ And this does not contradict either Collingwood’s dictum that a proper
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explanation of action should be concerned with its ‘inside’, or his equally fundamental insistence 
on the importance of asking the right questions. Everywhere in his writings Collingwood insists 
that ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ form a unity and cannot be separated, let alone set against each other. 
It is true that the fundamental premise of Collingwood’s question-answer complex is that any 
performance can be understood only as an answer to a specific question. But it is equally true 
that in the case of intelligent performance this question-the ‘inside’-can only be reconstructed 
from the answer given plus its context, the ‘outside’ (A 29-42). Therefore, a satisfactory answer 
to the question, What really happened? is one that offers an understanding of why it happened. 
Knowing an agent’s purpose is an outcome of inquiry, not its starting-point.
Similarly in action itself. An agent begins not by setting a purpose for himself but by asking 
questions about his current situation and this involves the ‘acceptance of badness in oneself and 
weakness in relation to other things’ (NL 13.29); he then chooses a course of action aimed at his 
liberation from this condition; some of these actions are recognized as ‘questions’ addressed to 
other agents, to which they offer their own actions as ‘answers’. This continuous activity of 
questioning and answering is embedded into the fabric of social practices which-bringing one 
back to the point of choosing-delimit the scope of alternatives recognized as open. Hence 
Collingwood’s contention that all history is the history of thought: ‘the historian is not interested 
in the fact that men eat and sleep and make love and thus satisfy their natural appetites; but he is 
interested in the social customs which they create by their thought as a framework within which 
these appetites find satisfaction in ways sanctioned by convention and morality’ (IH 216).
Something similar is going on in Oakeshott’s analysis of human conduct with ‘self-disclosure’ 
being his term for the activity of questioning one’s current situation, ‘diagnosing’ it in terms of 
its unacceptability, responding by ‘prescribing’ to oneself the appropriate course of action, which 
is, in turn, an invitation for others to respond accordingly. Which they rarely do, because they 
often fail to read off one’s question-invitation correctly and have other invitations to respond to. 
This creates new situations marked with new unacceptabilities.
Conjoined with this activity of self-disclosure is an equally primordial one of learning. Once 
the activity of learning is institutionalized, however loosely, thus turning into education, it 
proceeds by offering abridgements. Their function is, as always, to abate mystery; what is being 
abridged in the first instance is the multiplicity of all conceivable choices and a by-product of 
these abridgements are ‘practices’ (OHC 55). Practices endow the activity of self-disclosure with 
order, in like manner language orders human self-expression without obliging everyone to say the 
same thing, still less to do so in chorus. As subscription to the practice of speaking requires 
saying something substantive, practice and performance are inseparable. But they are not 
indistinguishable, and according to this distinction practices fall into two categories: instrumental 
and moral. The former provide prudential guidelines for better performances and can be invented
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or subscribed to by agents that are either not really associated with each other or joined in the
pursuit of common purpose. The latter are concerned with acting as such and only in terms of its
impact on other agents. Both can be abridged further to make action still more determinate. Thus,
in the case of instrumental practices, we end up with all sorts of ‘texts’, all the way down to
cookery-books, and, in the case of moral practices, with vernacular moral ‘languages’ that
acquire their shape from the nodal points of moral rules and duties (66-7).
For Oakeshott, like for Collingwood, the difference between moral rules and duties is in the
degree of strictness imposed by them upon human conduct:
What a moral practice intimates as, in general, proper to be said or done, a moral rule makes 
more explicit in declaring what it is right to do.... Where it is recognized as a rule, the conduct 
which will be taken to subscribe to it is more exactly determined, there may be circumstantial 
‘exceptions’ to be taken into account, and the requirements of this rule may have to be 
reconciled with those of another. But where... it is recognized to be a duty, what is due relates 
to assigned persons; it is spelled out to leave little room for honest hesitation, and utterance is 
both required and required to be exact subscription (67).
Yet the two accounts are not identical. One important difference is that in Oakeshott the 
exactness of duty is not derived from individuality as such, as in Collingwood, but from further 
specification of the fabric of human association in terms of ‘offices’ and corresponding roles 
performed by the occupants of those (67). In a way, ‘duty’ makes sense for Oakeshott only in 
relation to one particular moral practice, that of civility. Another difference concerns Oakeshott’s 
understanding of rules more generally.
To return to the Kantian example of being tom between the dictates of two contradictory 
rules, for Oakeshott, it hinges upon the misconception of the character of rules. Rules are neither 
prescriptive nor proscriptive. Like practices, they are the considerations of conduct to be 
subscribed to in choosing particular actions, only stated more strictly. Further, rules cannot be 
stated categorically, like ‘never (or always) do this or that’. A better clue to the understanding of 
rules may be found in games. For example, in chess, pawns always move in a number of clearly 
defined ways. Yet, although certainly a rule, in itself it does not tell the chess-player which pawn 
to move and when. Moreover, the game of chess, if one chooses to theorize rather than to play it, 
requires an elaborate system of rules which is not limited to that cluster of rules which describe 
the movement of the pieces on the board but includes those of setting the time limits, awarding 
the titles, such as the Grossmeister or the world champion, organizing major tournaments or, on a 
less formal level, even inviting someone to play a game after dinner or over the Internet. In this 
manner every individual rule receives its authority from its place in the wider context, which in 
turn is intrinsically expansive and may often be constituted by a number of practices.
Thus, importantly for. the understanding of the difference between Oakeshott’s and 
Collingwood’s conceptions of law (to be discussed in detail later), whereas in Collingwood the
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performance of one’s duty has about it an air of release from the entanglement of rules, 
Oakeshottian ‘duty’ is firmly placed in the context of practice, in fact, requires uncommon 
exactness in subscription to practice. Still, there is one further step in Oakeshott which brings 
him closer to Collingwood, that from self-disclosure to ‘self-enactment’.
The transition is made by what Oakeshott believes to be the only route available-justification 
of action, when the moral discourse is concerned with excuse for an action already performed 
and reacted to (78). When responding to allegations of non-performance of duty or violation of 
rule, an agent may appeal not only to his understanding of his situation but also to the motivation 
for his performance. By doing so he escapes, as it were, the court where he can be pronounced 
guilty to stand in front of another, where his conduct can be condemned as shameful. At this 
point diagnosis of one’s situation includes the acceptance of not only ‘weakness in relation to 
other things’, but also ‘badness in oneself, and what matters is not the severity or exactness of 
penalty, but the very appropriateness of ‘judging’. Self-enactment is an assertion of concrete 
individuality, and by insisting on being a concrete individual and not merely an agency of self­
disclosure one invites his fellows to take him as they find him, not to ‘judge’ but to contemplate 
‘with admiration, with reserve, or with indulgence’ (77).
So, it is self-enactment that correlates in Oakeshott’s analysis to Collingwood’s duty, but 
again, not without a problem as far as understanding of conduct is concerned. Once an agent is 
recognized as a concrete individual and his action as truly individual action, nothing is left 
outside this totality. Unlike utilitarian or regularian explanations where action is polarized into 
ends-means or authority-obligation and one pole is explained by reference to another, this is a 
one-one relationship for which philosophical contemplation is the only form of understanding 
appropriate. For Collingwood, philosophy, in our own time and place, is equated with history as 
the highest form of theoretical reason available and as such offers the highest degree of 
comprehensiveness of understanding. However, for Oakeshott, at this stage in the development of 
individuality even human conduct, as a reciprocal activity, disappears; and with it-the authority 
of moral practices which shape human choices while being shaped by them. Oakeshott’s 
discussion of this problem introduces what may be taken as the nucleus of his conception of 
politics.
If self-disclosure and self-enactment are two ways of speaking the moral language, then the 
difference between them is in the degree of competence: self-enactment is an attempt at 
‘speaking this language as it should be spoken’ (75). However, by the rules of this language there 
can be no self-appointed custodians of it since the finesse of the connoisseurs’ style gradually 
chisels out the rut of practice excavated by human choices as much as the inadvertence of less 
competent speakers. These outbursts of personal style occur at numerous points of arrest in the 
flow of self-disclosure, when an agent recognizes the actions of others not merely as questions
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(invitations to act) addressed to himself but also as answers (responses) to his own past actions. 
If he takes this seriously he, as far as self-enactment is concerned, suspends his transactions with 
others and concentrates on negotiations with himself in which case the wished-for satisfaction is 
not something extrinsic but his own character. Insofar as his expectations with regard to his own 
character cannot be spoiled by any unintended consequences of continuous self-disclosure, in 
self-enactment ‘doing is delivered, at least in part, from the deadliness of doing’ (74). Now, the 
second of these characteristics of self-enactment introduces ineliminable ‘play’ into the overall 
conditions of practice, while the first obliges agents not to lose sight of its authority. Taken 
together, they intimate a distinct activity of the deliberation of practice in terms other than its 
authority, in terms of its desirability, while not questioning the authority itself. This specific 
activity is intimated by any moral practice and in the case of the practice of civility becomes 
‘politics’.
Politics is unique to civil association where self-enacted agents are neither ‘partners or 
colleagues in an enterprise with a common purpose’ nor ‘individual enterprisers related to one 
another as bargainers for the satisfaction of their individual wants’, but related solely in terms of 
their subscription to a moral practice (122). As a practice civil association is composed entirely 
of rules, and an understanding of civil association is built up from that. First, Oakeshott identifies 
one particular type of rules as being specific to civil association, laws, and then makes the picture 
still more precise by defining ‘offices’ appropriate for the maintenance of the system of law 
{lex): adjudication, legislation and ruling. An important point, on which Oakeshott insists 
throughout, follows from his understanding of practice as a historic development: lex cannot be 
either established once and for all or deduced from any abstract principle. Therefore it cannot be 
evaluated either through backward-looking reference to any such principle, or ‘original 
constitution’, or forward-looking estimation of its efficiency. The only criterion is its coherence, 
but not merely logical coherence, as was the case with the modes of experience, but coherence 
‘historical’, understood as a quest for coherence unfolding within limits established by the 
authority of civil practice as a whole.
The activities of adjudicating, legislating and ruling ensure just this: a piecemeal maintenance 
of the overall coherence of practice from within. The springs of this intrinsic movement are to be 
found in the rule-like nature of laws. As such they are indeterminate, not capable of describing 
every possible situation. Adjudication, understood as the elucidation of the meaning of lex in 
relation to particular situations, inevitably leads to the growth of lex and then legislators and 
rulers have to re-establish the overall coherence of that specific practice, taken in its totality, the 
authority of which is shaped by lex: civility. That in the practice of civility which is the public 
concern of all cives is respublica, whose intimate relation to lex limits the legitimate scope of all
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three activities. Adjudicating, legislating and ruling can be related to respublica exclusively in 
terms of authority.
Something, however, has to be done about respublica in terms of desirability, not least
because existing societies are ‘wantonly productivist’ and technological advances require
continuous adjustment of lex to the new patterns of production and distribution (R 384-406). But
if the authority of respublica is to be preserved, change has to be introduced only via lex and only
by those authorized to do so. Thus deliberation of conditions specified in respublica in terms of
their desirability is an activity distinct from legislation, adjudication or ruling and in the first
instance it is deliberation and nothing else. But since the substantive wished-for outcome of this
activity is an act of legislation, its other facet, persuasion, reveals itself. And this is politics, the
activity of deliberation and persuasion meant to bring about change, or to resist projected change,
in the conditions of respublica:
Politics is thinking and speaking about a rule of civil intercourse which has been notionally 
resolved from being an authoritative prescription into a conclusion in order that what it 
prescribes may be distinguished from its authority and thus be made available to be 
considered in terms of its desirability; or it is thinking and speaking in order to reach a 
conclusion which may then be translated into a rule by an authoritative act (165).
Since respublica does not specify substantive performances of the agents who subscribe to its 
conditions, its overall coherence cannot be brought about by any single act of legislation. At any 
given moment only a limited number of components of practice can be chosen for examination 
and then put back into place in amended form so as to increase (or not to decrease) the overall 
coherence of the whole. Since this whole is a vernacular moral language, ‘there are etymological 
decencies and syntactical proprieties to be taken account of even if they are themselves indirectly 
modified in the new expressions proposed for use’. Therefore politics, although far from being a 
necessary engagement of all the cives, when practiced requires the mastery of the language of 
civility and a lively political imagination that recognizes situations calling for changes ‘before 
they are half over the moral horizon’:
And although this engagement of caring for the conditions of a civil association may seem 
less demanding, as it is certainly less exciting, than that of deliberating the policy and 
conducting the affairs of an enterprise association, it calls for so exact a focus of attention and 
so uncommon a self-restraint that one is not astonished to find this mode of human 
relationship to be as rare as it is excellent (OHC 180).
In fact, being appropriate only for civil association, it is not to be found in actually existing 
states at all and for reasons indicated by Collingwood: not all the water that goes into the mill- 
race of civility at one end comes out at the other. The place of politics within such ambiguous 
association as states or ‘international society’ still has to be considered. What, however, can be
62
identified by way of conclusion is those aspects of politics which require consideration on the 
way to ‘world politics’.
Politics and poetry
Politics, then, is the activity of thinking and speaking about the overall conditions of an order 
composed entirely of moral rules. It does not exclude either prudential considerations or ‘higher’ 
moral considerabilities. In fact, it is intrinsically related to both these standards of action, but it is 
not reducible to any of them. Last but not least, it is clearly distinguished from the activity of 
ruling and does not occupy, nor does it require, any specific office within the kind of order to 
which it belongs. This kind of order can be described as civil association or the condition of 
civility and is opposed to enterprise association or the state of nature. Importantly, neither of 
these two kinds of order can be equated with the state. Rather, at least in Collingwood’s account, 
the state is an ingenious human invention, the mill-race constructed so as to ensure the 
conversion of one kind of order, the state of nature, into the other, the condition of civility. 
Politics, in this view, is the procedure by means of which such conversion is maintained.
This is how, according to Collingwood, the thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
understood ‘classical politics’: by analogy with ‘classical physics’. The latter became possible 
once modem Europeans understood the necessity of limiting their theoretical objectives, decided 
that the body of science consisted of logical abstractions and empirical facts, and recognized 
mathematics as providing the armature of abstractions, thus limiting their inquiries to empirical 
facts which admitted of mathematical treatment (NL 31.1-31.39). Similarly, ‘classical politicians’ 
understood law as providing abstractions for their science, and limited the scope of empirical 
observation to facts which admitted of regularian treatment, that is, to the social end of political 
life. The rest became ‘the state of nature’ described only insofar as it was needed for an adequate 
account of society. But regularian thinking begins with setting a rule for oneself. So classical 
politics describes a process ‘whereby a centre already infected with freedom, existing in an 
uninfected environment consisting of human beings in the “state of nature”, gradually infects the 
environment and brings it into a condition of homogeneity with itself: brings it out of the “state 
of nature” into the “condition of civil society”’ (NL 32.33).
The state of nature is not the state of war; it is an abstraction needed to indicate the direction 
of the expansion of civility. War is an activity marking the break-down in this expansion: ‘the 
state of nature catabolically re-establishing itself on the ruins of a civil society’ (NL 32.69). Civil 
society is an abstraction of the same kind; both are abstractions from change. Politics, in turn, is 
the activity of controlling change. Insofar as classical politicians believed change to be 
unidirectional they did not need to understand both ends. Whether they held such beliefs is a 
historical question. What matters is that ‘we of the twentieth century’ do not. But giving up on
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the idea of progress does not entail giving up on reason. On the contrary, it is here that the 
difference between the methods of natural and social sciences acquires practical relevance, 
especially so once it became clear that ‘for sheer ineptitude the Versailles treaty surpassed 
previous treaties as much as for sheer technical excellence the equipment of twentieth-century 
armies surpassed those of previous armies’ and ‘the reign of natural science’ thus threatened to 
convert ‘Europe into a wilderness of Yahoos’ (A 91).
Theory should be grounded in a historical understanding of politics, in which case it matters 
‘which end of the process is the right end and which the wrong; so that, granted we need not 
hope ever to reach the one or fear ever to reach the other, we can tell which is being brought 
nearer by a certain change’ (NL 30.79). In other words, to conduct politics one has to know the 
difference between ‘society’ and ‘nature’, ‘civilization’ and ‘barbarism’.
In Oakeshott, the story begins with the dissolution of the morality of communal ties into that 
of individuality and the subsequent transformation o f ‘community’ into ‘association’ (HL 18-24; 
R 364-9; OHC 233-42). In a world thus being transformed successful entrepreneurs were 
accompanied by displaced labourers, and enthusiastic self-directed men by dispossessed 
believers (OHC 275-9; HL 24-7; R 370-81). Alongside the individual proper stood the individual 
manque, and around these two characters, modem European states organized themselves in terms 
of societas and universitas respectively, a distinction corresponding to the ideal characters of 
civil and enterprise associations.
Within the modem European state, the relation between these two is never in terms of 
either/or. The very term ‘state’ is a ‘masterpiece of neutrality’, an attempt not to grant 
unconditional allegiance to any of the modes of association (OHC 233). But ‘a modem European 
state at war, whatever the strength of its disposition to retain its character as civil association, is 
indisputably turned in the direction of association in terms of a substantive purpose’. Having 
turned into an universitas, it turns its citizens into individuals manques and thus perpetuates 
acquired purposeful disposition, for lessons learnt in wars are remembered when hostilities 
subside: ‘The model of a state understood as association in terms of a substantive purpose and of 
its apparatus of ruling has always been sought and found in the image and organization of a state 
bent upon conquest or of a city besieged’ (272-4).
So, to decide between war and peace, between ‘managing’ and ‘civilizing’ relations among 
agents, one has to know the difference between ‘nature’ and ‘society’, enterprise and civil 
associations. Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s political theories define both ends of the political 
process while arguing that there is nothing within, let alone without, this process that may cause 
its unconditional flow in one particular direction (and for Oakeshott, this makes the word 
‘process’ itself inappropriate). Unless, that is, individuals either do not acquire or surrender their 
freedom understood as their capacity for intelligent conduct. It is on this premise that Oakeshott,
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in one of his rare comments on the international situation of the cold war, insists that the ‘shadow 
of the atomic bomb... obscures the diagnosis’, while ‘the havoc wrought in Eastern Europe... is as 
bad as any atomic devastation; a powerful mass of deluded human beings is far more destructive 
than any bomb’ (V 109-10).
To say, then, that civilization is preferable to barbarism, is to say that individuality is 
preferable to herd-marching, and to say so is not only to distinguish between rationality and 
capriciousness but to define rationality in terms other than the mere ability to pursue 
premeditated purposes, or to apply ready-made rules. In what kind of understanding such 
rationality can be found will be discussed in the next chapter.
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4Poetry
The idea of politics presented so far opens up a possibility for the discussion of world politics but 
as yet cannot be directly followed up by it. The possibility is open because politics is not tied 
conceptually to any entity. It is meaningful mostly in relation to the choice between two distinct 
conditions, enterprise and civil associations (Oakeshott) or the state of nature and the state of 
civility (Collingwood). Thus the question of the actual or possible location of politics in the world 
of states (or other such institutions) will be put by for the next chapter. The task of the present 
chapter is to see what exactly is involved in the choice between the two ideal characterizations in 
terms of which any specific institutions purporting to be ‘political’ can be understood.
What is at stake is individuals’ freedom to make their own choices while subscribing to the 
conditions of a moral order. This order, and nothing else, is the object of the activity of politics. 
Being the condition for the satisfaction of unspecified wants, this order cannot be derived from 
these wants themselves. Also, it is not an entity but an activity the quality of which can only be 
revealed in the individual subscription to its conditions. Politics is either the activity of thinking 
and speaking about this order in terms of its desirability (Oakeshott) or that of establishing and 
maintaining it, in which case its desirability is already ascertained (Collingwood). But what are 
the criteria, if any, by which such desirability can be judged?
Here it is not enough to say that only that order is desirable which allows for the enjoyment of 
concrete individuality as it reveals itself through the performance of one’s duty (Collingwood) or 
in self-enactment (Oakeshott). For Collingwood, to think about order in these terms is to think 
about it historically: ‘to explore a world consisting of things other than myself, each of them an 
individual or unique agent, in an individual or unique situation, doing an individual or unique 
action which he has to do because, charactered and circumstanced as he is, he can do no other’ 
(NL 18.52). For Oakeshott, this calls for the suspension of one’s judgement for the sake of the 
contemplative ‘admiration’ of others besides oneself (OHC 77). However, this is not a call for the 
abandonment of inquiry but rather a conclusion of a critical inquiry different from Collingwood’s 
‘history’. Oakeshottian ‘historic’ self-enacted individuals may be similar to Collingwood’s agents 
performing their duties in the presence of others. Yet inverted commas indicate the possibility of 
another kind of history. In itself, this other kind of history has little direct bearing on the 
understanding of human conduct and therefore will not be considered in any significant detail 
here. However, some rough preliminary distinction between the two kinds of inquiry is needed so 
as to highlight the difference between Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s understanding of the 
relationship between theory and practice more generally. Further, Oakeshott’s discussion of 
historical inquiry proper supplies a model for his idea of political deliberation.
In Collingwood, history enters the discussion of politics because without knowledge of the 
past one cannot understand any present situation. The past is within the historian’s reach since it 
survives into his present through a series of modifications of social practices. In the abstract it is 
impossible to separate the past from the present; but for a concrete historian the past becomes 
identifiable once he faces a modification of practice which is not immediately comprehensible 
from within that of his own. His immediate evidence of its existence is the difference that this 
survival of the past makes and therefore, as always, the question, ‘What is going on here?’ which 
takes the form of ‘What was intended then?’ (A 107-15). The past is ‘a living past; a past which, 
because it was thought and not mere natural event, can be re-enacted in the present and in that re­
enactment known as past’ (IH 158).
For Oakeshott, such living past may ‘afford us a current vocabulary of self-understanding and 
self-expression’ (OH 21) while its survivals ‘are legenda, what is “read” and what may be read 
with advantage to ourselves in our current engagements’ (18-9). This is the past of human 
conduct. It cannot be re-enacted on account of it being an outcome of intentional action: ‘A 
recorded past is no more than a bygone present composed of the footprints made by human 
beings actually going somewhere but not knowing (in any extended sense), and certainly not 
revealing to us, how they came to be afoot on these particular journeys’ (36). The survivals it
67
offers cannot attain the status of ‘facts’ because their propensity to point towards a possible future
‘may make it worthwhile to corrupt the record, to see that it gets lost or to destroy it’ (19). The
world approaching its past in the idiom of conduct deals with it as with a ‘practical’ man whom it
expects ‘to talk sense and have something to say apposite to its plebeian “causes” and
engagements’, whereas for the historian, the past is feminine: ‘He loves it as a mistress of whom
he never tires and whom he never expects to talk sense’ (R 182).
What is proposed here is not merely a ‘methodological’ defence of a ‘genuinely historical’
knowledge but a view of human life in which the claims of conduct are recognized as being
conditional and therefore questionable. In Collingwood, historical understanding, as all
theoretical reason, is an outgrowth of practical reasoning. This postulates an agent ‘endowed with
a capacity for free, “transcendent”, purposive activity’, whose ‘sole concern is to “live”; that is, to
seek and enjoy his identity in the exercise of this capacity’, for whom ‘the meaning of everything
he encounters, as of everything he fabricates and every action he performs, must be its propensity
to illuminate, to promote or to hinder that pursuit’ (OH 23). This understanding might not be
possibly ‘questioned, confirmed or refuted’, its universe of discourse ‘must itself be nothing else
than an object of practical concern, and the engagement of making and elucidating this claim in
respect of it can be no more or other than an action performed by the claimant in pursuance of a
current practical purpose’ (25).1
However, a lesser claim on behalf of practical understanding -  that it is primordial and
inescapable -  can be conceded:
The contentions here are that practical understanding is that in which a human being awakes to 
consciousness; and that, while other modes of understanding may be concerned with objects of 
other kinds than those which compose the present-future of practical engagement, such objects 
are conceptually constructed out of those which belong to practical understanding and 
unavoidably reflect the modality of the materials out of which they are constructed. In short, 
all modes of understanding have an intrusive, qualifying component of an original practical 
understanding which may never be excluded.... Moreover, this practical understanding may be 
recognized as unique in being universal to mankind and a condition of survival (25-6).
This closely matches Collingwood’s understanding of human identity to be outlined in the first
section of this chapter. It is against the background of such understanding that he defends his idea
of human freedom. In Oakeshott, and this will be the theme of the second section, this view is
qualified, if not rejected altogether: ‘What we ordinarily perceive... is a much more messy affair
in which we come and go somewhat inconsequentially between a variety of universes of
discourse. And as for priority, some of our earliest experiences are not practical, governed by
1 Oakeshott clearly states whom he is arguing with: ‘Heidegger and some others, rather than... more 
commonplace pragmatists whose award of unconditionality to praxis is both arbitrary and obscure’ (OH 23, 
n. 5).
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usefulness, but poetic and governed by delight’ (25-6, n. 8). Accordingly, the ‘so-called “priority” 
of practical understanding and of the subject and objects which compose the present-future of 
practical engagement is at best circumstantial, not logical; in relation to other modes it is 
obtrusive, not intrusive’ (26-7). This obtrusiveness has to be insisted upon. Any engagement of 
understanding ‘emerges in a choice to undertake this inquiry and not another.... each has a 
meaning as a constituent of the Lebenswelt of the agent concerned’ (27). Yet this cannot deny the 
historically acquired disposition for being engaged with the world differently, ‘historically’, 
‘aesthetically’, ‘religiously’ or ‘scientifically’. All such engagements may be distractions from 
conduct, but ‘as categorially distinct modes of understanding they cannot be subordinate to 
practical understanding, the circumstantial priority of which gives it no superior status. Their 
relationship to it and to one another is conversational, not argumentative’ (28-9).
Accordingly, there are at least two kinds of ‘history’, ‘freedom’ or ‘identity’. The ones that 
exist in ‘practice’ and those shaped by the conversation of mankind conducted in the voices of 
‘practice’, ‘history’ or ‘science’. Oakeshott’s account of ‘practical’ freedom is not that different 
from, albeit not identical with, that of Collingwood. But what may be called ‘conversational’ 
freedom is different. The highest degree of the former is usually referred to as ‘autonomy’. The 
highest expression of the latter is ‘poetry’. Since they are categorially distinct, one cannot be 
derived from the other. Nevertheless, poetry, although itself necessarily ignorant of ‘truth’ or 
‘moral excellence’, provides a ‘critical’ standpoint from which the achievements of practical 
freedom can be questioned because what is intimated in poetry is individuality achieved through 
unusual exactness in subscribing to a given way of ‘speaking’, be it dancing, painting or writing. 
Thus, whereas for Collingwood, ‘there is nothing that a poet is trying to say; he is trying simply 
to speak’ (EPM 200), for Oakeshott, what is said in poetry is inseparable from how it is said. 
Poetic utterance is ‘authentic’ like no other performance is.
Each individual achievement of authenticity is an eventum, and some kind of it exists in every 
universe of discourse. In history proper, as distinguished from the legenda of a given Lebenswelt, 
it is the component feature of some ‘authenticated survival from the past’ which makes a 
difference in terms of how this survival, itself a difference in the historian’s present, came into 
being:
An historically understood past is... the conclusion of a critical inquiry... in which 
authenticated survivals from the past are dissolved into their component features in order to be 
used for what they are worth as circumstantial evidence from which to infer a past which has 
not survived; a past composed of passages of related historical events (that is, happenings, not 
actions or utterances, understood as outcomes of antecedent happenings similarly understood) 
and assembled as themselves answers to questions about the past formulated by an historian 
(OH 36).
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The counterpart of such ‘critical inquiry’ in respublica is ‘political deliberation’. Like any 
deliberation, it is ‘limited only by the virtuosity of [the agent’s] imagination’ (OHC 43). Yet, 
insofar as civil association is composed entirely or moral rules, political deliberation is also 
guided by the agent’s virtuousness, which cannot be acquired within the bounds of any given 
mode of experience: ‘good behaviour is what it is with us because practical enterprise is 
recognized not as an isolated activity but as a partner in a conversation... in which all universes of 
discourse meet’ (R 491).
Before presenting all this in greater detail and in closer relation to politics, it is important to 
note that Collingwood also attempts to establish a standpoint from which to question the 
directedness of the agent’s free will. Like the state in his account of politics, individual 
consciousness appears in this attempt as a ‘mill-race’ that drives the activity of self-determination 
through history. Oakeshott’s investigation of historical inquiry provides a different image, that of 
a ‘dry wall’. I shall use these two images in turn to revisit Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s 
accounts of both action and contemplation, now in view of highlighting their conceptions of 
freedom.
The mill-race
For Collingwood, politics is the process of the historical conversion of one condition of human 
life into another, more specifically, into the condition of civility. Yet the admission that ‘we need 
not hope ever to reach it’ poses serious problems, not dissimilar to that resulting from the 
liquidation of philosophy as the highest form of theoretical reason polemically announced by 
Collingwood in 1939. To retain an idea of progress, either in theory or in practice, without a 
preconceived idea of a final destination, one has to proceed on the basis of what seems to be a 
mere assumption, as Collingwood does, in the case of theory when he says: ‘So far from 
apologizing... for assuming that there is such a thing as the tradition of philosophy, to be 
discovered by historical study, and that this tradition has been going on sound lines, to be 
appreciated by philosophical criticism, I would maintain that this is the only assumption that can 
be legitimately made’ (EPM 224-6).
Historical study, however, is not merely an intellectual pastime but a form of theoretical 
reason appropriate for the understanding of the highest form of practical reason, the performance 
of one’s duty, and as such it cannot be content with the critical interpretation of the philosophical 
tradition or actions performed in the past. Both the past and the future are interesting insofar as 
they respectively intimate the necessities and the possibilities hidden in the present.2 Once
2
See Jan van der Dussen’s discussion of Collingwood’s 1926 paper on the nature of time; IH, xliv-xlv.
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historical understanding eschews the naturalistic conception of the necessities imposed upon
human action by the past, it introduces the possibility of ‘the activity by which man builds his
own constantly changing historical world’ as an experience of freedom (IH 315). This freedom
has nothing to do with man being ‘captain of his soul’ but rather presents him with an immediate
future saturated with the experience of the otherness:
A healthy man knows that the empty space in front of him, which he proposes to fill up with 
activities for which he accordingly now begins making plans, will be very far from empty by 
the time he steps into it. It will be crowded with other people all pursuing activities of their 
own. Even now it is not as empty as it looks. It is filled with a saturate solution of activity, on 
the point of beginning to crystallize out. There will be no room left for his activity, unless he 
can so design this that it will fit into the interstices of the rest (316).
Put differently, rational action entails thinking about one’s situation as constituted by other 
actors, and, although any situation consists entirely of thought, one’s own and other people’s, it 
cannot be changed by a voluntaristic change of mind: ‘The freedom that there is in history 
consists in the fact that this compulsion is imposed upon the activity of human reason not by 
anything else, but by itself.... The hard facts of the situation, which it is so important... to face, are 
the hard facts of the way in which [one] conceives the situation’ (316-7). Thus Collingwood’s 
twofold contention, that philosophical thinking is historical thinking and all history is the history 
of thought, presents him with the task of accounting for the reality of others which also has to be 
brought into line with his evolutionist understanding of politics.
Action
This task Collingwood attempts to fulfil in the first part of the New Leviathan, which traces man’s 
awakening to consciousness and then his evolution towards theoretical reason and historical 
understanding in particular. This adventure begins as an ordeal experienced by a creature bom, as 
it were, into the fuzzy, undifferentiated mass of sensual experience, possessing a rudimentary 
language (more precisely, ‘discourse’ as ‘the activity by which a man means anything’ (NL 6.12) 
of which language is a specific abstraction) in which to express his ambiguous feelings. 
Becoming conscious of a feeling coincides with naming it in this crude language and also with 
giving this particular sensation an edge (4.53), a boundary of meaning, and thus breaking the 
totality of one’s immediate here-and-now, as well as the totality of one’s discourse, into a 
manifold of specialized abstractions.
The experience in which feeling is first infected with the beginnings of thought is defined as 
‘appetite’ and it falls into two types, ‘hunger’ and ‘love’ (7.1-69; 8.1-12). Hunger arises out of a 
feeling of weakness which, because it is not yet associated with any particular way of eradicating 
it, seems to pervade the whole of the world and calls for an equally obsessive response: ‘the
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heaping up of “Power after power” in oneself (8.51). This, as yet, has nothing to do with fear (as 
it does in Hobbes whom Collingwood is quoting), for a hungry self is not yet aware of the 
existence of others and imagines the whole of the world in its own image: ‘The first notion of a 
god which arises untaught in every man’s mind is much older than fear. It is bom of hunger. It is 
the notion of what a hungry man is pursuing: the infinitely magnified image of himself.... No 
religion quite forgets that, whatever else its God may be, he is first and foremost the infinite 
satisfaction of man’s hunger: man himself become omnipotent’ (8.28-9). Omnipotent maybe he 
is, but he is also undefined, blended, as it were, back into the immediacy of his initial here-and- 
now enormously enlarged and, according to some versions of Idealism, awaiting to be 
transformed through thought to subsume the totality of experience, ‘a divine event [located in the 
future] whereby thought shall not only return into the womb but there digest its own skeleton’ 
(7.67).
Love, in contrast, requires a specialized self but also carries with it an expectancy of a kind, 
understood as an evolution from some actual condition towards an ideal one: ‘The actual self of 
love is a self with which you are dissatisfied because it is lonely. The ideal self of love is a self 
which has achieved a relation with something other than itself... of such a kind that the 
dissatisfaction is removed’ (8.16). Love is directed not towards one’s self infinitely enlarged, but 
towards a relation with an object it can practically create, a not-self. Now a variety of new, 
explicitly relational experiences is intimated. Thus ‘love turns into fear when a man starts 
thinking of the not-self no longer as existing for the satisfaction of his own appetites but as having 
an independent character of its own: as being, so to speak, alive', when ‘a lover finds the object of 
his love no longer content with the passive role of accepting adoration, but behaving like a real 
person or whatever it is’ (10.3-32). This is when man becomes ‘healthy’, that is, begins to realize 
that others have reality of their own which might be quite different from the one fancied by him 
in his initial solitude. Characteristically, this recognition of the reality of the not-self engenders 
what Collingwood presents as the state of war fought on two fronts: ‘You have to fight not only 
the victorious not-self but the self which has been frightened into treachery. The renewal of the 
war against the not-self is anger: the renunciation of the cowardly self is shame’ (10.48).
At the same time, this ongoing warfare implies also the plurality of the possible not-selves of 
love. It is only through this recognition of plurality that appetites are converted into specific 
desires, which are always directed towards one possible satisfaction among many and thus imply 
valuation, the notion of goodness and the possibility of choosing. A self which has reached this 
stage in its mental development, so that it can recognize the possibility of doing otherwise, is free. 
It is constituted by its consciousness awakened to its freedom, whereas everything that precedes
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this awakening (e.g., immediate sensations and appetites not yet converted into desires) is the 
apanage of this self; thus a plank constitutes a boat while a mooring is only its apanage and, 
although both may be seen as belonging to this boat, the nature of this belonging is different 
(4.14-16). Historical understanding begins only at that level at which humans are already 
constituted as free actors: ‘The world of Nature... is as real as you will; but it is not history, it is 
the background of history.... For twentieth-century thought the problems of history are the central 
problems: those of Nature, however interesting they may be, are only peripheral’ (18.91-2).
Thus Collingwood believes that he has overcome the futile expectation of the ‘divine event’ of 
thought’s absolute reconciliation with immediate sensual reality which plagued the philosophies 
of Bradley or Bergson, for example, by establishing the unity of the worlds of nature and history 
or the symbiosis of immediate consciousness and abstractions (7.62-66). Yet there is a price to be 
paid for this symbiosis when it comes to the theory of society or politics.
Contemplation
The central character of Collingwood’s social theory is a self situated within the web of concrete 
intersubjective relationships, ‘love’, seeking highly specialized satisfactions from concrete non­
selves each of whom is ‘accessibly lodged in the world, an “immanent” god whose many 
addresses the worshipper knows, with whom he can take tea, and whom he can hope to find about 
his path and about his bed’. Yet, insofar as these concrete intersubjective relationships originate 
in the abstract notion of subjectivity, ‘hunger’, they are tainted with the ‘fatally transcendent’ 
religion of unsatisfied love, whose practitioner ‘cries into the dark and gets no echo because there 
is nothing there’ (8.38). This religion has found its concrete historic expression in Christianity, 
which continuously reproduces the war on two fronts, with anger directed at gods and shame at 
one’s sinful self. It can also be found earlier, in Plato’s doctrine of the tripartite soul, where 
humans are already pictured as inevitably passing through ‘anger’ (or more generally, ‘passions’) 
on their way from appetites to reason (10.1-63).
Collingwood is clearly dissatisfied with this image and wants to replace it with a ‘religion of 
dependence’ which would put hunger into commission so that ‘the one final absolute satisfaction 
for which appetite in its primary form is the quest is cut up into an infinite number of partial, 
temporary satisfactions’. However, his own tripartite evolutionary conception of action, as guided 
by the standards of utility, rightness and duty, mirrors the initial image, as does his political 
theory (to be discussed in more detail in the next chapter) where he resorts to ‘contentment’ with 
what falls short of perfection (8.59). This may well be a recognition of the ‘necessities’ present in 
historical understanding in the form of the discursive practices conditioning the ways of thinking 
about one’s particular situation or human condition in general (more precisely, conditioning the
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way in which every particular situation can be thought only in some relation to human condition 
in general so that it is not possible to put subjectivity into commission by cutting up the latter into 
the manifold of the former). As such, this recognition would be consistent with Collingwood’s 
understanding of the ‘hard facts’ of any given situation. What it is less consistent with, is his 
assumption about the evolutionary character of the European philosophical tradition, at least if 
evolution is understood as promoting the ‘religion of dependence’. This, perhaps, is best seen in 
Collingwood’s treatment of imagination as one way of exploring the possibilities of a current way 
of thinking about the world and also going beyond this way of thinking.
Collingwood’s major concern in the Principles o f Art, where the discussion of imagination is 
taking place, is to distinguish artistic performance from two other conceptions of creation. The 
first is Plato’s idea of it as craftsmanship, which, both in its human or divine forms, entails a 
distinction between a vision of a thing as it really is and an activity of copying an image thus 
visualized by means of ‘making’ (PA 15-7). This is a ‘technical theory’ inappropriate for any 
human activity. The artist is certainly not making copies of some ideal things or worlds he is 
creating, but in a specifically human manner, distinct from another possible idea of creation, 
appropriate only for God who does not have any environment and creates out of nothing (128- 
30).
The artist’s environment is the world of practice. Collingwood examines the situatedness of 
human experience in connection with ‘feeling’ so that to ground the character of artistic 
experience (as one way of thinking about the possibilities open to human reason) in the 
conception of imagination not tainted by the ‘confusions which in the minds of most [English] 
philosophers beset the whole idea of sensation’ and reality (201). Now he re-arranges the Humean 
distinction between ideas and impressions into a triad: ‘bare feeling, below the level of 
consciousness’, ‘feeling of which we have become conscious’, ‘feeling which, in addition to 
becoming conscious of it, we have placed in its relation to others’ (213). These, as in Hume, are 
distinguished in terms of their ‘vivacity’, but in a manner different from Hume’s. Both the first 
and the third are ‘strong’, but whereas the former controls us, the latter is under our control due to 
the activity of ‘intellection’. The second is transitory, fleeting and feeble. The ‘bare feeling’ is 
impression proper, the other two are ideas but different in kind. Impressions are converted into 
ideas by the activity of consciousness. At the level of experience at which this conversion occurs, 
further bifurcation is taking place: ‘there is a distinction between that which effects the 
conversion and that which had undergone it. Consciousness is the first of these, imagination is the 
second’. Thus ‘imagination is a distinct level of experience at which the life of thought makes 
contact with the life of purely psychical experience’. In this manner ‘ideas of imagination’
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provide the data for the intellect. On this characteristically transient level of experience relations 
between them do not yet exist and every such idea is singular and unique, ‘a simple indivisible 
unity: a sheer here-and-now’ (215).
In Collingwood’s earlier account, thought was bound to proceed towards Absolute 
Knowledge. Now it is different. Intellectually mature individuals are differently situated in the 
totality of human experience and therefore they differently come into contact with the ‘purely 
physical experience’ and differently convert it into the ideas of intellect. Those whose attention is 
directed towards history, for example, will experience ‘historical imagination’; the same applies 
to ‘political’ or ‘artistic’ individuals. Accordingly, ‘beauty’ is no longer a mistaken conception of 
truth held by the artist (as opposed to philosopher) but the only truth there is for him as an artist. 
Collingwood explicitly retracts his own ‘youthful follies’: ‘on the poet’s behalf it may be replied, 
to some one who argues that a lady cannot be both adorably virtuous and repellently vicious, or 
that the world cannot be both a paradise and a dust-heap, that the arguer seems to know more 
about logic than he does about ladies, or about the world’ (288).
At this point Collingwood’s view of experience gets closer to Oakeshott’s. Yet differences 
remain. All Collingwood’s individuals are located in the practical experience.3 It is from there 
that they slip, as it were, into their different imaginative moods, and it is back into practice that 
they are bound to return. Imaginative experience is invariably located at the intersection of 
practice with some specialized mode. A work of art is bom and exists exclusively in the artist’s 
mind so that the music an artist ‘actually enjoys as a work of art is thus never sensuously or 
“actually” heard at all’, it is imagined. What is imagined is not sounds but the totality of 
experience available to this particular artist. Any ‘work of art proper is a total activity which the 
person enjoying it apprehends, or is conscious of, by the use of his imagination’ (151). But, 
situated as he is in practice, the artist attends to emotions arising from practical experience and 
has to express himself through language which is communal experience.
Thus Collingwood’s triadic, and also evolutionist, conception of understanding 
(impression/consciousness/intellection) is matched with a triadic conception of artistic practice 
(emotion/imagination/expression), and both are underpinned by the idea of the totality of human 
experience: ‘The poet converts human experience into poetry not by first expurgating it, cutting 
out the intellectual elements and preserving the emotional, and then expressing this residue; but 
by fusing thought itself into emotion: thinking in a certain way and then expressing how it feels to 
think in that way’ (295). Inasmuch as artistic experience is inseparable from the totality of
3 ‘Practice’ here, unless preceded by an adjective, like ‘artistic’ or ‘scientific’, denotes ‘human conduct’.
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experience, the business of art ‘would be to construct possible worlds, some of which, later on, 
thought will find real or action will make real’ (286).
It is this triadic conception of artistic experience that Oakeshott explicitly rejects (‘but not 
without consideration’): ‘A poet does not do three things: first experience or observe or recollect 
an emotion, then contemplate it, and finally seek a means of expressing the results of his 
contemplation; he does one thing only, he imagines poetically’ (R 525). Behind this reformulation 
lies a different mode of putting into commission ‘the one final absolute satisfaction’ sought in all 
experience by cutting it up into an infinite number of partial, temporary achievements.
The dry wall
The question Oakeshott addresses is similar to that of Collingwood, namely, how to relate the 
idea of human freedom to the ‘hard facts’ of human condition? In relation to politics it takes a 
paradoxical form: ‘it is not at all inconsistent to be conservative in respect of government and 
radical in respect of almost any other activity’ (R 435). For Oakeshott, however, this task appears 
as doubly challenging because he rejects the hierarchical view of experience in which different 
modes of self-knowledge succeed each other in an evolutionary progression. Collingwood 
abandoned the idea of Absolute Knowledge but postulated instead the apanage of pre-conscious 
condition so that to establish a critical standpoint from which to judge the achievements of the 
individuals and the quality of the relations between them. Humans are liberating themselves from 
the dictates of desire and, out of respect for similar efforts in their fellow-beings, should abstain 
from any attempts, deliberate or inadvertent, to upset this undertaking.
For Oakeshott, this is inadequate as an account of both human freedom and the way humans 
think about their situations. The former is unduly linked to the world of nature (if only as a 
background of all genuinely human activity), while the latter is too monological for the highly 
specialized world of modernity. A human being is bom not into ‘a world lit only by the 
flickerings of biological urges from which he escapes with difficulty into agency’, learning on the 
way how to control his unconditional desires ‘with the aid of moral practice’ (OHC 62-3), but 
comes into the manifold of practices, each with an edge already in place. Human freedom consists 
not in drawing and re-drawing these boundaries, as in Collingwood’s account, but in learning 
how to move within and across them while recognizing the authority of practices thus shaped. 
The resulting image is not that of the mill-race of the evolutionary process of conversion, but 
rather the dry wall of contingently related performances held together, not by any mortar, but by 
the magnetic field of the conversation of those performing them. This image, in turn, has a history 
of its own which spans the whole of Oakeshott’s work.
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In Experience, Oakeshott is still uncommitted in respect to the relation between different 
modes of experience. All of them are deviations from the ideal totality of experience and, as 
abstractions, they are equidistant from this totality. The question, whether different modes 
succeed each other historically, is put by rather than resolved. However, in ‘The Voice of Poetry 
in the Conversation of Mankind’, Oakeshott states resolutely that ‘voices’ (the new name for the 
modes of experience) in which humans speak in their ‘conversation’ (the meeting-place of the 
different universes of discourse which takes the place of the postulated totality of experience) do 
not compose a hierarchy (R 490), nor are they ‘divergences from some ideal, non-idiomatic 
manner of speaking, they diverge only from one another’ (497). There is nothing ‘above’ the 
individual voices but there is also nothing ‘below’ to ground them in. The utterances they offer 
‘are not made out of some other, less-defined material (impressions or sensa), for no such 
material is available’ (496).
Still, the task is to ascertain the reality of each voice and to offer a view of their meeting-place, 
conversation, where each voice is taken at face-value and ‘everything is permitted which can get 
itself accepted into the flow of speculation’ (490). In fact, nothing of value should be excluded 
from conversation, for an ‘excluded voice may take wing against the wind, but it will do so at the 
risk of turning the conversation into a dispute’ (494). The value of the individual utterance cannot 
be derived from the mere fact of its existence or dominance: the ‘insidious vice’ of the 
appropriation of the conversation by one or two voices consists in the fact that ‘in the passage of 
time it takes on the appearance of a virtue’ (494). Scepticism may serve as a check against all 
exclusion, but it cannot help in telling a vice from a virtue, especially so if straightforward 
appeals to the current consensus are ruled out. Meanwhile, what Oakeshott demands from the 
different voices in the conversation of mankind-ability to take each other at face-value without 
endangering the overall constellation-is exactly what is required from the ‘historic’ self-enacted 
individuals capable of speaking the language of civility as it should be spoken. So how is this 
condition met in both cases?
Action
Oakeshottian world is constituted by selves which emerge out of possibilities, harden into ‘facts’, 
only to dissolve back into the possibilities again. They do so not by coming into contact with 
some certainties or with doubt, ‘but by being kindled by the presence of ideas of another order’ 
(489). What ‘on occasion is recognized as self is recognized on account of its separating itself 
from a present not-self: self and not-self generate one another’ (495). The self is activity, not 
something capable of acting, but activity as such which cannot be intrinsically good or bad but is 
always understood as conducted well or ill in accordance with the intrinsic standards of a given
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practice: ‘to be skilful but with no particular skill, is as impossible to the self as not to be active at 
all’ (496). This activity Oakeshott calls ‘imagining’ and it is ‘neither the (fxxv t o s s i o l  of Aristotle, 
nor is it the “original fancy” of Hobbes, nor is it what Coleridge called “primary imagination”, 
nor is it the “blind but indispensable link” between sensation and thought which Kant called 
imagination’; it is thought itself in one of its modes, while various not-selves made by it are 
‘images’ (497).
In conduct, self is first and foremost a desiring self, its images are the objects of desires and 
aversions, while relations between self and not-self are an unavoidable bellum omnium contra 
omnes even when not-selves are other humans recognized as being different from ‘things’ 
because they have desires and aversions of their own. In this case, war is carried on by other 
means, requiring more skill and cunning, but does not entail the genuine recognition of the 
subjectivity of the not-self. However, conduct constituted exclusively by desiring selves is an 
abstraction and a merely desiring self is ‘an image which remains a mere image and refuses to 
qualify as “fact”* (501).
The distinction between ‘mere images’ and ‘facts’ is central to the discussion in On Human 
Conduct, although here Oakeshott no longer uses these terms. Now an agent inhabits a world of 
intelligible pragmata so that ‘when alternatives present themselves to his imagination, he must be 
able to choose between them and decide upon a performance’ (OHC 36). The images thus created 
qualify as ‘facts’ inasmuch as an agent composed of beliefs about himself and his situation can 
move about them without severing the link between belief and conduct. In instrumental practices 
this link can never be secured in principle, in moral ones it can never be broken.
An agent may subscribe to an instrumental practice because he believes that such subscription 
can best promote some particular wants of his. These may or may not coincide with the wants of 
other participants to this practice, for, insofar as the terms of their subscription are set exclusively 
by the pursuit of their wants, collective or individual, the mode of their association is still that of 
an enterprise, transactional or co-operative. Each agent, then, should be able to revoke his 
subscription the moment his wants are satisfied or in the case that he no longer believes they can 
be satisfied through his participation in this practice. In moral practices, where agents are related 
exclusively in terms of their recognition of the non-instrumental, self-authenticating 
considerations of conduct, the link between belief and conduct cannot be broken and practices 
themselves cannot be chosen, precisely because the standards of conduct intrinsic to moral 
practices are not the matter of beliefs, but what Collingwood would call the ‘absolute 
presuppositions’ of these practices, the conditions of their continuous enactment.
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Thus, in the case of respublica composed entirely of rules, such rules specify ‘performances in 
terms of obligations to subscribe to injunctions’ (67). Obligation denotes ‘a reason, distinguished 
from all others, not for acting, but for subscribing to the conditions specified in a rule; namely, 
because it is acknowledged to be a rule’, that is, understood exclusively in terms of its authority 
(155). Each rule receives its authority from its place in civil practice as a whole, and as far as the 
authority of respublica itself is concerned, it matters not whether an agent who recognizes it 
believes respublica to be good or bad, right or wrong. Obligation ‘is not to be identified with 
having a feeling of being obliged or constrained, or even with a belief that one ought to do so; 
obligations subsist independently of any such beliefs’; they cannot be identified with the habit of 
obedience, for ‘rules are not responded to in acts of “obedience” and habits are not reasons’, and 
it is a mistake ‘to identify having such obligation with membership in an association in which 
such obligations are usually fulfilled’; obligations ‘cannot be extinguished by non-fulfilment, 
whether it be that of one or of many, and they are not denied even in refusal to subscribe’ (155-6).
So, in the first instance and in a rather restricted sense, obligation and authority are the ‘hard 
facts’ of one’s civil condition; they are ‘just there’, insulated from the vicissitudes of the 
individual beliefs, the way Latin, for example, is there and, even when it is not practised 
routinely, anyone who wants to read St. Augustine in the original has to learn this language and 
not any other. Yet it is not on account of this ‘reality’ that a world of conduct composed of merely 
desiring selves remains an abstraction. Even in non-subscription, obligations have to be 
recognized as such, that is, as human inventions, the ‘reality’ of which is revealed only once they 
are fulfilled (or rejected) through substantive individual performances. The skill of being 
obligated has to be leamt and it is leamt prior to entering a respublica. A self lacking in this skill 
altogether would be incapable of ascertaining itself as being human, for human conduct, as an 
activity in which self and not-self reciprocally enact each other, postulates agents who are free, 
that is, act in accordance with their beliefs (36-7; 157-8).
This link between conduct and belief, in turn, is established and maintained through learning, 
which is the most basic capacity of humans distinguishing them from things (12-4). Learning 
requires the ability to approve or disapprove of one’s situation and one’s own responses to it. 
When this situation is recognized to be constituted by other humans in whom the same capacity 
for learning is expected and whose own freedom is thus recognized, an agent embarks upon the 
activities of approval and disapproval. Here, again, he is not constrained by the mere presence of 
others, by their choices, by previous choices of his own or by his physical strength. All these and 
similar considerations may have a bearing on the range or the character of his responses to his 
situation but they do not qualify his freedom to understand (or misunderstand) his situation as an
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invitation for action, to ‘imagine it different from what it is’ and to ‘recognize it to be alterable by 
some action or utterance of his own’ (36).
Thus, long before subscribing to the conditions of respublica as a civis, a human being ‘comes 
to consciousness in a world illuminated by a moral practice and as a relatively helpless subject of 
it’ (63). As he comes along by way of learning, including learning under the conditions of 
imposed criticism (education), he becomes a ‘historic’ self-enacted individual capable of 
recognizing his situation as ‘you are shivering’ and responding accordingly (52). The actions he 
chooses to perform are his own (although the way he performs them, well or ill, is conditioned by 
his competence in subscription to a practice) and their outcome is neither more nor less than he 
himself in a new situation of his; but from this ‘it does not follow that what he intends, the 
meaning of his action, must be a self-gratification.... Agents are related to one another in terms of 
understandings... they may care for one another because they think of one another. The myth of 
the necessarily egocentric agent is a denial of agency’ (53).
There is a long way to go from this distinction between conduct as the world sub specie 
voluntatis and the world sub specie moris to the clearly specified texture of respublica and the 
distinction between enterprise and civil associations.4 Yet first, it is clear that the most important 
distinction between the two modes of association is not that between their respective 
characteristics, nor even between their characters composed of these characteristics, but that 
between their postulates. What the two modes of association postulate is two different 
conceptions of human freedom. In enterprise association freedom is ‘conceptually tied to the 
choice to be and to remain associated’ and is threatened every time such association becomes 
compulsory (158). Accordingly, ‘the undertaking to impose this character upon a state whose 
membership is compulsory constitutes a moral enormity, and it is the attempt and not the deed 
which convicts it of moral enormity’ (MHC 367). In civil association, there is nothing ‘to threaten 
the link between belief and conduct which constitutes “free” agency, and in acknowledging civil 
authority cives have given no hostages to a future in which, their approvals and choices no longer 
being what they were, they can remain free only in an act of dissociation’ (OHC 158).
It is also clear that Oakeshott’s conception of civil freedom is related not to the background 
reality of nature, but to that of the authority of existing practices. To be consistent with this 
conception of freedom, Oakeshott cannot be content with the reified ‘hard facts’ of these
4 Thus, in ‘The Voice of Poetry’, approval and disapproval are ‘moral’ activities, as opposed to desire and 
aversion. But in OHC, they, when exercised in the context of respublica and exclusively in relation to its 
conditions rather than the individual performances of others, are considerations ‘political’, distinguished 
from ‘moral’ in that the latter are the considerations, intrinsic to moral practices, which an agent takes into 
account while choosing to perform this or that action.
80
practices, nor can he aim at transcending them. To remain free, humans have to recognize these 
practices as alterable by some action or utterance of their own, to imagine them being different. 
At the very least, there should be a possibility of interpreting these practices differently, and mere 
doubt offers little guidance here. Thus, acknowledging that most of the human ideas have their 
theological analogues, Oakeshott rejects, as does Collingwood, the idea of ‘a divine Purpose to 
which [man’s] conduct willy-nilly contributes’, but also that of ‘a divine Will to which he must 
submit himself and his conduct or join the party of the devil’ (this, according to Collingwood, is 
an attribute of a god bom out of man’s primordial ‘hunger’). Instead, God may be understood to 
be a law-giver ‘and the believer is not only necessarily left to subscribe to his obligations as best 
he may but can do so only in self-chosen actions’ (158).
As in Collingwood, analogy with religious experience is significant, and in what are perhaps 
the most moving five pages of On Human Conduct, Oakeshott sketches out an account of it very 
different from that of Collingwood. For Collingwood, religion is a historical expression of the 
‘fatally transcendent’ love directed towards the unattainable not-self which at once infects human 
experience with hope and the frustrations of shame with oneself and anger at there being nothing 
to respond. For Oakeshott, what is sought in religious belief ‘is not merely consolation for woe or 
deliverance from the burden of sin, but a reconciliation to nothingness’ (83-4). Salvation it offers 
consists not in the promise of a hereafter but in the intimation of the highest expression of 
freedom authentically related to the highest expression of rule.
Freedom for Oakeshott, as it is for Collingwood, is a matter of degree insofar as it implies ‘the 
quality of being substantively “self-directed” which an agent may or may not achieve and which, 
when a high degree of it is enjoyed, is properly called “self-determination” or “autonomy”4 (36- 
7). It is clarified later that ‘moral autonomy’ has nothing to do with one’s ability to make moral 
choices as a ‘gratuitous, criterionless exercise of a so-called “will” (an isolated meum) in which a 
lonely agent simultaneously recognizes or even creates a “value” for which he is wholly 
responsible and places himself under its command, thus miraculously releasing himself from 
organic impulse, rational contingency, and authoritative rules of conduct’; it does not require 
‘some other release from having to recognize a rule of conduct merely in terms of its being a rule; 
that is, in terms of its authority’. The moral autonomy of an agent ‘lies, first, in his character as an 
agent (that is, in his action or utterance being a response to an understood want and not the 
consequence of an organic impulse), and secondly, in his action or utterance as self-disclosure 
and self-enactment in a contingent subscription of his own to the conditions of a practice (which 
cannot tell him what to do or to say) recognized in terms of its authority’ (79). This is why, on 
another occasion, the meum of an agent in self-enactment is described as ‘authenticity’ rather than
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autonomy to indicate that even the quality of his sentiments, something an agent negotiates with
himself, is still judged in relation to a practice (75).
Still, what is sought in self-enactment is a ‘release from the bondage of contingent
circumstance’ (76), an ‘echo of an imperishable achievement’, heard more clearly when an agent
is primarily concerned with the virtues or sentiments in which he performs this or that action,
‘when the valour of the agent and not the soon-to-vanish victory, when his loyalty and fortitude
and not the evanescent defeat, are the considerations’. But even thus enacted self is ‘a fugitive;
not a generic unity but a dramatic identity without benefit of a model of self-perfection’ (84).
Religious experience offers such a model:
Religious faith is the evocation of a sentiment (the love, the glory, or the honour of God, for 
example, or even a humble caritas), to be added to all others as the motive of all motives in 
terms of which the fugitive adventures of human conduct, without being released from their 
mortal and their moral conditions, are graced with an intimation of immortality: the sharpness 
of death and the deadliness of doing overcome, and the transitory sweetness of a mortal 
affection, the tumult of a grief and the passing beauty of a May morning recognized neither as 
merely evanescent adventures nor as emblems of better things to come, but as aventures, 
themselves encounters with eternity (85).
However, in the absence of a substantive image of God, a similar echo of durability may be 
heard in ‘the magnitude of the agent’s malice and not merely the injuriousness of his action: the 
grandeur of devilry’ (84). This is why the spectrum of the possible understandings of freedom is 
supplemented in Oakeshott with a hierarchy of rules, so that the image of God is not eliminated 
altogether, but presented as that of a law-giver. This image originates in the conversation, rather 
than decrees it, for religion on its own cannot provide a unity which is unconditional, it also 
oscillates between the extremes and ‘may be terrible, it may sink to the prose of a merely 
anticipated release’ from ‘malignant current condition, or it may rise to a serene acquiescence in 
mortality and a graceful acceptance of the rerum mortalia, joys and sorrows alike transformed’. 
Its dignity lies not only in the recognition of the true character of human condition, nor merely ‘in 
the cogency of the reconciliation it intimates’, but also ‘in the poetic quality, humble or 
magnificent, of the images... in which it recalls to us that “eternity is in love with the productions 
of time” and invites us to live “so far as is possible as an immortal”* (86). Thus the ‘motive of all 
motives’ is intimated not in religious belief (here it is only more readily recognized as such), but 
in the experience of poetry, for it is in poetry that, through imagination, one engages in the 
activity of contemplation.
Contemplation
Oakeshott’s account of poetic experience begins, as does Collingwood’s, with the rejection of 
Platonic Rationalism, only it rejects not just the ‘technical theory’ of art but that tradition of
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European thought ‘in which all activity was judged in relation to the vita contemplativa’ (R 493),
while the supremacy of contemplation in the conversation of mankind was asserted ‘on account
of its release from the concerns of craftsmanship’ (511). Oakeshott does not deny the possibility,
nor does he question the desirability of such a release, and he follows tradition in describing this
activity as ‘contemplation’. What he rejects is rather the possibility of the contemplative life.
If human life is illuminated by practices created by humans themselves, then in contemplation
humans slip into a less structured world of indistinct images following one another in ‘lazy
association’ (513). This individuals can do only by renouncing the authority of existing practices
or modes of experience, as in
a pathological condition, called apraxia, in which a subject is still able to identify an object... 
as a concretion of qualities, but has lost all sense of the purpose for which it might be used or 
for which it was designed and is, thus, incapable of recognizing it as an object of practical 
concern, and yet does not replace it in his perception with an object of any other sort-an object 
of worship, of love or of poetic contemplation (OH 13).
Since participation in the modes of experience, as in moral practices, is involuntary (there is no
intelligible experience in-between the modes, as there are no habitable worlds outside all
morality), this is a pathological condition indeed which can only be transient and, strictly
speaking, cannot be ‘achieved’ but can only ‘happen’ due to some distraction from the routine of
doing, historic or scientific imagining. The generic name for this distraction is ‘wonder’ and ‘any
practical image which, from the unfamiliar circumstances of its appearance, induces wonder may
open a door upon the world of contemplation, so long as wonder does not pass into curiosity
(scientia)* (513). In this sense, contemplation is always a journey into a foreign land and subsists
only insofar as the foreignness is not abated or reified.
Thus art, according to Oakeshott, emerged not out of premeditated attempts at creating a work
of art but out of the unsought encounters with the foreignness, as when ‘the invading Romans
were provoked to contemplative delight by the temples and statues of Greece because for them
they had no religious-symbolic significance’ (532). It became art proper, more readily
recognizable as such, with the dissolution of the pre-modem homogeneity of human condition (if
that ever existed), when the activity of an artist could be no longer confused with those of the
ancient seer or his counterpart, the gleeman (530). Once this happened, art proper, ‘poetry’,
became the only genuinely contemplative activity. As such, it ‘can only have an intermittent
fulfilment.... there is no vita contemplativa; there are only moments of contemplative activity
abstracted and rescued from the flow of curiosity and contrivance’ (541).
Thus the outcome of Oakeshott’s inquiry into the character of poetic experience is not just the
reversal of the traditional hierarchy of vita activa and vita contemplativa but the dissolution of the
83
totality of the flow of experience, as it appeared in his earlier work, into episodic encounters 
matching the inconclusive character of human conduct. As for the relationship between action 
and contemplation, certain sentiments in conduct, relationships arrived at in these sentiments 
partake of the character of poetry, in particular of its unconditional conversability. Unlike in all 
other voices in the conversation of mankind, in poetry what is being said cannot be separated 
from how it is said, not only is every performance a perfect subscription to a practice, but practice 
and performance are invariably one and the same. And although this level of authenticity can 
never be achieved in human conduct, some uncommon excellence, reminiscent of poetry, may be 
observed in such undeniably practical experiences as ‘moral goodness’, childhood, friendship or 
love:
Loving... is not a duty; it is emancipated from having to approve or to disapprove.... What is 
communicated and enjoyed is not an array of emotions -  affection, tenderness, concern, fear, 
elation, etc. -  but the uniqueness of the self.... Neither merit nor necessity has any part in the 
generation of love; its progenitors are chance and choice -  chance, because what cannot be 
identified in advance cannot be sought; and in choice the inescapable practical component of 
desire makes itself felt (537).
In other words, virtuous individuals do have an earthly model for self-enactment, while 
characters located on the other side of the spectrum of freedom, despite the wonder excited on 
occasion by the grandeur of their actions, are condemned by the standard of conversability 
because their heroic exploits disrupt the flow of conversation. Here one meets, for example, the 
snake of the Lost Garden recast into a ‘slick encyclopaedia salesman’; the architect of the Tower 
of Babel, who in his revolt against the gods ‘is not a petty thief, like Prometheus’ but ‘the leader 
of the cosmic revolution whose enterprise is not only doomed to failure but entails the destruction 
of all the virtues and the consolations of the vita temporalis, a destruction of which the “confusion 
of tongues” is the emblem’; a character in Dante’s Inferno: ‘a deformed human being, a giant, 
who out of vanity made war upon heaven and in consequence confounded the conversation of 
mankind’, ‘a gibbering idiot forever blowing a tin trumpet: O anima confusa’ (OH 189).
This is the spectrum of freedom, at both ends of which one finds some form of release from 
the deadliness of doing, and, contrary to both Samuel Butler’s ‘sceptical’ remark that it is not 
possible to adjudicate between God and the devil, for God has written all the books, and Eliot’s 
‘authoritarian’ injunction that it is better to worship the Golden Calf than to worship nothing, 
virtuous individuals know their way because they have leamt how to reconcile themselves to 
nothingness through the practice of conversation, and in so doing they have also leamt to 
recognize all sorts of devilry (including that of rationalism in conduct) as the emblems of the 
denial of this practice. This criterion of conversability is present in human conduct even on the 
crudest level, when agents are concerned mostly with their immediate wants, insofar as the
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satisfactions sought are ‘ imagined and wished-for’ outcomes of their reciprocal engagements with
others besides themselves.
Thus the extremes are the absolute authenticity of ‘delight’ (Oakeshott’s word for
contemplation proper) and the absolute autonomy of disgrace, intimating the Conversation of
Mankind and the Tower of Babel respectively. Between these extremes is the day-to-day conduct
of the ‘unprofessional guardians’ of the vernacular of moral practice, ‘who speak it somewhat
monotonously but with a care for its intimations of balance, sobriety, and exactness’ and whose
‘solid gracelessness makes possible the stylist, the hero, the saint, the aristocrat and the vagabond,
who, caring only for its intimations of magnificence, are apt to neglect the prosaic pieties which
keep barbarism at bay’ (OHC 66). As concrete exhibitions of reflective consciousness, they are
the postulate of the conversation of mankind. It is delight in their monotonous inconclusive
encounters that is intimated in poetry. And if to prop themselves up in their daily engagements
they rely on the historically acquired ways of abstracting their highly indeterminate moral
practices into a respublica with its ‘hard facts’ of authority and obligation, it is not the theorist’s
business to convict them of reification.
The theorist’s task, firstly, is to show how exactly a disposition to be radical almost about
everything is consistent with being conservative in respect of government:
Since life is a dream, we argue (with plausible but erroneous logic) that politics must be an 
encounter of dreams, in which we hope to impose our own. Some unfortunate people, like Pitt 
(laughably called ‘the Younger’), are bom old, and are eligible to engage with politics almost 
in their cradles; others, perhaps more fortunate, belie the saying that one is young only once, 
they never grow up. But these are exceptions. For most there is what Conrad called the 
‘shadow line’ which, when we pass it, discloses a solid world of things, each with its fixed 
shape, each with its own point of balance, each with its price; a world of fact, not poetic 
image, in which what we have spent on one thing we cannot spend on another; a world 
inhabited by others besides ourselves who cannot be reduced to mere reflections of our own 
emotions. And coming to be at home in this commonplace world qualifies us (as no 
knowledge of ‘political science’ can ever qualify us), if we are so inclined and have nothing 
better to think about, to engage in what the man of conservative disposition understands to be 
political activity (R 436-7).5
Secondly, since this recognition of the individuality of ‘others besides ourselves’ is 
inseparable from the recognition of the authority of rules (since individuality can be revealed only 
through an authentic subscription to a rule), the theorist may recognize that, in the case of a civil 
practice, the validation of its authority, when it becomes an explicit engagement, inevitably 
‘moves up the scale of authorizations’, but he has to make it clear that, however ‘high’ the 
hierarchy of rules might turn out to be on any given occasion before it ‘yields a contingently
5 In this passage, the distinction is not yet made between ‘government’ (or more precisely, ‘ruling’) and 
‘politics’.
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satisfying conclusion’, it will nevertheless culminate, not in a principle, nor in a charismatic 
personality, but in yet another rule (OHC 151). Hence the image of a divine law-giver. As a 
poetic image, it carries with it, perhaps more clearly than other images, an intimation of both the 
ubiquity of rule and the uniqueness of individuality. Thirdly, because this image is arrived at 
through conversation (rather than preceding it and then conditioning its flow, as it does in 
Collingwood), even when signalling the possibility and the desirability of ‘escape’, it does not 
deny the conversation itself.
However, the interplay of poetry and conversation, action and practice, wants and moral 
considerabilities to be taken into account in their satisfaction requires important addition to the 
understanding of the character of human conduct. Knowledge of the latter does not result in an 
understanding of substantive performances and, at the same time, remains incomplete without 
such understanding. Since practices are not law-like processes, they are not demonstrated by 
substantive performances (like a falling stone demonstrates the operation of the law of gravity), 
but constituted by them through contingent relationships. This understanding of substantive 
performances as contingent relationships is distinguished by Oakeshott from theorizing them in 
terms of ‘human nature’ or ‘social structures’ (91-100). Although these modes of analysis 
approach action differently, on closer examination, both ‘human nature’ and ‘structure’ are 
meaningful only as practices and therefore neither adds much to the task of understanding a 
substantive performance in which agent, his understanding of his situation, his action, the 
response it receives and the practice in subscription to which it is performed form a relationship 
which has to be understood. This relationship is ‘contingency’ and ‘the identity it constitutes is an 
eventum’ (101).
Contingency in Oakeshott is clearly distinguished from ‘chance’ and moved closer to the 
notion of ‘cause’ so as to re-define the latter. This move is indicated already in On Human 
Conduct, where contingent relationship is presented as requiring, at the very least, ‘the absence of 
interval and therefore the absence of a mediator between occurrences, which is not itself an 
occurrence’, and that ‘every antecedent is itself a subsequent and every sequel is an antecedent’ 
(104). If this echoes Humean requirements for causation (proximity in space and sequence in 
time), so does Oakeshott’s denial of any ‘necessary connexions’, but his reasons for this denial 
are different because what is being related contingently are intelligent individual occurrences 
which through this relationship acquire conditional dependency (104). Here ‘what went before, in 
respect of its going before, is understood... as an action which calls for a response, which perhaps 
even knows how it would be responded to but, since there are many possible alternative 
responses, is necessarily ignorant of the exact response it will receive’ (104). There is no
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‘constant conjunction’ either. This, however, does not warrant arbitrariness in assembling a 
contingent relationship, for what is being assembled (understood) in this manner is already 
recognized as a concrete individuality and thus requires deepest respect and ‘an eye for shades of 
difference between plausible likeness, an ear for echoes and imagination, not to conjecture what 
is likely, but to devise, recognize, entertain, and criticize a variety of contingent relationships, 
each sustained by a reading of the evidence’ (106). Such an understanding is ‘historical’ and in 
On History Oakeshott gives it more exact shape.
As with the recognition of individuality in human conduct, historical events are understood in 
terms of the interplay of chance and choice. Chance is ‘the exemplar of purely external, 
insignificant relationship’ (OH 101), a relationship the historian chooses to consider as either 
incomprehensible or insignificant, since everything in experience may be related to everything 
else, but not everything can be established or assigned equal value. This in itself does not render 
historical understanding impossible but rather makes it conditional, limiting the historian’s 
ambitions and subordinating chance to his choices. As in Collingwood, the historian chooses to 
investigate those situations that strike him, in his present, as making a difference. Unlike 
Collingwood, Oakeshott refuses to limit the historian’s understanding of the antecedents to their 
purposeful contribution to the emergence of a subsequent. Rather, an antecedent makes that 
difference which shapes the character of a subsequent as being itself a difference which attracts 
historian’s attention in the first place. A historical event has neither necessary nor essential 
character but is ‘a conflation of accessories which... are the difference they made in a 
convergence of differences which compose a circumstantial historical identity’. Historical inquiry 
is neither an explanatory nor a metaphysical exercise, nor it is an attempt to solve a problem, but 
‘an engagement to infer, to understand discursively and to imagine the character of the historical 
event’ (103).
The same is true for humans as ‘historic’ self-enacted individuals and their practices, for the 
individual voices and the conversation of mankind and, paradoxically, for the future condition of 
respublica once it is imagined politically. The whole point of Oakeshott’s critique of historical 
research is that historical events, understood as assignable individual performances or as 
‘structures’, are often taken as given: a known destination X  located in the past to which the 
historian has to arrive from some yet more distant point Y. When such teleological understanding 
of history is further confounded by the suggestion that the character of X  is interesting merely 
insofar as it contributes to the understanding of some present condition, then history is conflated
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with practice: ‘Once it was religion which stood in the way of the appearance of the “historical” 
past; now it is politics; but always it is this practical disposition’ (R 182).6
Assembling a historical event is never a simple reconstruction of a given fact, even if this fact 
is understood as a practice (‘paradigm’ or ‘structure’). It is the elucidation of the ‘conditions of 
human circumstance come upon from behind and understood in terms of their emergence’; its 
outcome is ‘a past of which there can be no record and one necessarily unknown in default of 
such an inquiry’ (OH 65-9). This involves taking a number of related individual occurrences out 
of some context which up till now endowed them with conditional intelligibility and composing 
out of them an event which is not yet given. As a new context for the thus re-assembled 
occurrences, this event constitutes the unintended by-product of the ‘transactional engagements 
which, because they are not assignable performances, cannot be understood in terms of 
“personalities” but which may be understood in terms of their relation to antecedent by-products 
of human engagements’ (71).
In the language of On Human Conduct, ‘practices’ are just such unintended by-products of the 
transactional human engagements. Substantive performances are not simply individual actions, 
but actions recognized as authentic, that is, constituted by the relationship of ‘touching’ which, in 
turn, shapes the practice in subscription to which these actions are performed. Thus, ‘a sequence 
of contingently related occurrences is not a process in which there is room for manoeuvre; it is 
wholly composed of manceuvrings in touch with one another’, and ‘understanding in terms of 
contingent relations is contextual: what has to be understood and the terms in which it is 
understood are not two different kinds of identities (like a “law” and examples of its operation), 
they are individual occurrences made to elucidate one another in an investigation of their 
evidential relationships’ (OHC 105).
Political deliberation, like historical inquiry, is concerned not with individual transactional 
performances but with one particular by-product of them, respublica. Like historical inquiry, it is 
concerned with its subject in terms of the possibility of change. Insofar as it is concerned with 
respublica as an event located in the future, it approaches it ‘from behind’ and in view of the re­
arrangement of the practices and rules which compose it. Needless to say, it is categorially 
distinct from historical inquiry, or any theoretical investigation, insofar as what is sought in 
political deliberation is the satisfaction of a substantive want (a change in the conditions of 
respublica) brought about in an authoritative manner (through an act of legislation), and any
6 Here both ‘practice’ and ‘politics’ are used in their earlier meanings: the former as the mode of 
experience, the latter as an activity not wholly commendable.
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‘practical’ want is excluded by Oakeshott from the scope of the legitimate concerns of the 
theorist.
Yet even an articulation of such a want would be impossible without political deliberation
partaking of the character of historical inquiry in respect of at least three of its characteristics.
First, it has to recognize the practices or rules which are proposed for amendment as human
creations. Second, it recognizes practices as contingent compositions of ‘historic’ events rather
than processes. Third, an act of legislation which modifies the conditions of respublica, although
an action of an assignable person, insofar as it is preceded by genuinely political deliberation is ‘a
convergence of occurrences’ and thus itself an eventum: ‘not a merely recorded occurrence, not
itself an assignable action or an assignable response to an action, but the contingent outcome of
the choices and encounters of assignable agents and understood as this outcome’ (107). Change in
the overall conditions of a respublica is not powered by any political mill-race, which ensures the
purposeful concentration of the resources of civility. Assembling a respublica politically out of
the milling about of human conduct is ‘historical’ not on account of it being evolutionary, nor
simply in virtue of its concern with change, but because it is akin to historical inquiry proper in
recognizing both humans and their creations as individual events:
When a historian assembles a passage of antecedent events to compose a subsequent he builds 
what in countryside is called a ‘dry wall’: stones (that is, the antecedent events) which 
compose the wall (that is, the subsequent) are joined and held together, not by mortar, but in 
terms of their shapes. And the wall, here, has no premeditated design; it is what its 
components, in touching, constitute’ (OH 102).
Thus, what is true of historical inquiry, is also true of the activity of politics: ‘As nothing here 
is necessary, so also nothing is impossible’ (104).
Poetry and civilization
Despite the important differences between Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s understandings of 
politics, in both cases politics is understood ‘historically’. Central to such understanding is the 
idea of human freedom. Both historical consciousness and political action are possible because 
the ‘facts’ of the human condition, however ‘hard’ they may appear to an agent deliberating some 
imperfect and inconclusive bargain with the future, are recognized as amenable to transformation 
through deliberate human action because they are human inventions. To recognize the human 
condition as a human invention is to recognize it as composed of ‘others besides ourselves’ and to 
accept the reality of these others as, perhaps, the least conditional of all the conditions to be taken 
into account in conduct.
Here the difference between Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s accounts of this reality is most 
explicit. It is tempting to present it in terms of the individualism/holism opposition. When
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Collingwood’s individuals step into society, they are already engrossed in the idea of subjectivity 
and their subsequent ‘historic’ conversion into the condition of civility (a never fully-attainable 
congregation of the immanent ‘religion of dependence’) is marked by an attitude of ‘contentment’ 
with what falls short of the standards of both individuality and civility as they imagine them. 
Oakeshott’s individuals are bom into practices and ‘historically’ enact themselves towards the 
highest degree of freedom by learning to subscribe to these practices so authentically that this act 
of subscription becomes a ‘release’ performed in the attitude of ‘delight’ (enchantment rather than 
enjoyment) in which all human transactions, including those of appraisal and censure, are 
intermittently suspended; both the practice of civility and the moments of ‘poetry’ are readily 
available for those willing and capable of recognizing them here and now. This, however, is not 
the whole story. Collingwood’s account is holistic insofar as it begins with the gross-total of 
sensual experience, and it is out of the first encounter with a more structured world of human 
artifice that the idea of individuality arises. Oakeshott’s story is invariably composed of events 
recognized in their individuality. What matters is not so much the preference given to 
individuality or practice, but how the tension between individuality and practice is resolved.
In Collingwood, the resolution is brought about by reasoning capable of establishing 
specialized relations between the selves. This is what distinguishes ‘love’ from ‘hunger’. In 
Oakeshott, already in Experience, where the ‘practical’ self first appears convinced of its own 
reality and uniqueness, ‘it is never a philosopher, persuading us that this separate self is an 
abstraction, who will succeed in ridding us of this obsession; it is a lover who momentarily 
convinces us that it is an illusion’ (EIM 272). In ‘The Voice of Poetry’ this is reversed. Love, 
rather than reminding humans of the unity of experience, intimates the uniqueness of the self. But 
in one respect these conflicting accounts are similar. In both cases, concrete individuality, be it 
the individuality of the totality of experience or that of a human being, cannot be demonstrated or 
proven from any set of assumptions or principles. Acceptance into the flow of the conversation of 
mankind cannot be secured through reasoning but can only be achieved discursively, since the 
standard of excellence intrinsic to this practice is conversability.
In ‘demonstrating’ how this standard of conversability is kept alive in poetry, Oakeshott is 
concerned not with establishing a starting point for a chain of inferences but with illustrating the 
current availability of this standard, and also its historic character as a human invention. Love, 
friendship, moral goodness and the reality of ‘others besides ourselves’ can be shown to be akin 
to poetry, but they cannot be deduced from its presence. Still, what is achieved, in relation to 
politics, by casting a ray of poetry onto these expressions of self-enactment which themselves do 
not belong to the practice of civility, is the recognition of individuality as a dramatic identity, and
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thus not a principle but a moral considerability to be taken into account in political deliberation:
‘while there can be no action specified in terms of place (e.g. “at home”), or circumstance, or
consequence, or relationship (e.g. that of a man to his dog or to inanimate things), in principle
exempt from civil conditions, civil intercourse recognizes a circumstantial privacy... which merits
consideration’ (OHC 179).
Conversely, while all political desirabilities necessarily stem from some transactional interest
or moral grievance, the art of politics requires from those willing to practise it an ability to
translate such interests and grievances into concrete proposals concerned exclusively with the
conditions of respublica and only in terms of their desirability rather than authority.
And since men are apt to make gods whose characters reflect what they believe to be their 
own, the deity corresponding to this self-understanding is an Augustinian god of majestic 
imagination, who, when he might have devised an untroublesome universe, had the nerve to 
create one composed of self-employed adventures of unpredictable fancy, to announce to them 
some rules of conduct, and thus to acquire convives capable of ‘answering back’ in civil tones 
with whom to pass eternity in conversation (324).
There is a counterpart to this image, and this self-understanding, in Collingwood’s argument, 
where artistic experience is recognized in its individuality, but also, and invariably, in some 
relation to the idea of the totality of experience, be it the Absolute, the imperfect world in which 
man is lodged, or the totality of language in which he expresses himself. The playfulness of art is 
acknowledged as one possible intimation of Absolute Knowledge (when Collingwood is still 
discussing experience in these terms), but only to be contrasted with the ‘higher’ claims of utility, 
right and duty:
So art and play have something in them which though not really divine is a likeness of 
divinity; and God may be pictured as an artist, or as playing, with far more verisimilitude than 
as a scientist or a business man. Aristotle actually raised the question whether play might not 
be considered a good definition of God’s activity; and the only reason why it cannot is that the 
sit pro ratione voluntes of play is below the claims of expediency and right, the action of God 
above them (SM 105).
This earlier arrangement was to be significantly revised by Collingwood towards the end of his
life, but what was never to change was the attitude, the upbound thrust of human existence
grounded in the evolutionary conception of both action and understanding expressed in the image
of the scale of forms and the corresponding idea of the seriousness of man’s tasks:
And those of every age who permit themselves to play are permitting themselves to forget that 
there are duties waiting to be done and evils crying out for correction all around them. Nor is it 
an answer to protest that the bow cannot always be bent, that the overstrained spirit must be 
allowed some relief from the burden of responsibilities; for these responsibilities, properly 
understood, are nothing but its highest and freest life, and to face them is to find, not to 
sacrifice, our happiness (107).
91
For Collingwood, practising the immanent ‘religion of dependence’ based on the recognition
of the plurality of others besides ourselves is one such responsibility, and the recognition of this
plurality itself is each individual’s achievement brought about by highly disciplined ‘work’. For
Oakeshott, individuality itself is an achievement possible due to the ineliminable ‘play’ in the
conditions of practices which results from their, equally ineliminable, plurality. When, in his later
work, Collingwood brings into view yet another totality, that of ‘physical experience’, his
reasons, stated as a rebuttal of Rousseau’s idea of freedom, could be also presented as an
objection to Oakeshott’s view:
The facts of human infancy are dirtier and less picturesque, perhaps, than the fancies of 
Rousseau; but they are the safer foundation on which to build a science of the relations linking 
a man to his fellow men.... A man is bom a red and wrinkled lump of flesh having no will of 
its own at all, absolutely at the mercy of the parents by whose conspiracy he has been brought 
into existence. That is what no science of human community, social or non-social, must ever 
forget (NL 23.92-7).
This image of human condition is reflected in Collingwood’s understanding of civilization, 
where man’s upbringing into the condition of civility is explored through his relations with 
nature, members of his own society, and ‘strangers’. Underneath this exploration is yet another 
triad, that of civilization as an ideal, as an actually-existing practice and as the process of 
approximation of the latter to the former. What drives this process is the idea of a universal 
society implied in every particular society. The historic expression of this driving force is the 
state, polarized into the rulers and the ruled, related to each other by the process of law-giving. 
And although Oakeshott’s image of ‘external relations’ at first appears as a rejection of almost 
every single point in this construction, it contains a triad of its own: an idea of respublica, its 
reflection in the actually-existing states (societas), and yet another expression of these same 
states, universitas. In this case, ‘civilization’ stands for a historically enacted practice of modem 




The previous chapter outlined two different modes of contemplation and action. In the first 
mode, both are powered by the ‘mill-race’ of the individual consciousness. In the second, 
human practices, including that of contemplation, are likened to the ‘dry wall’ composed of 
contingently related images-events. In both cases, politics is concerned with the possibility of 
change, while change is recognized as being possible due to the ‘historical’ understanding of 
human associations as human inventions. Yet politics in the ‘mill-race’ mode (Collingwood) 
is an activity which brings about the progressive conversion of individuals and their 
associations to the condition of civility, while politics appropriate for the ‘dry wall’ mode 
(Oakeshott) is a procedure meant to increase (or maintain) the overall coherence of the 
already existing practice of civility. This way or another, politics is meaningful only in 
relation to civility and the question of this chapter is that of the location of civility in the 
world of states.
To begin with, the different modes of politics presuppose different location of civility vis- 
a-vis the state. In Collingwood, there is a distinction between universal and particular 
‘society’. In Oakeshott, this corresponds to the distinction between respublica (limited to the 
area where the European mode of civility is competently practised) and societas (locked 
within particular state-borders). The counterparts of particular ‘society’ and societas are 
territorially located ‘community’ and universitas, representing that which is non-civil in 
human associations. A particular ‘community’ and ‘society’ are brought together by the ‘body 
politic’, the state, through the activity of politics. Every particular ‘society’ is potentially 
universal, but the realization of this potential through politics would require the territorial 
expansion of the ‘body politic’ and thus the creation of the global state. In Oakeshott, the state 
oscillates between universitas and societas and politics belongs to societas only. Politics, 
rather than requiring the expansion of societas, let alone the state, is practised by way of the 
careful anatomizing of existing practices of civility. In Collingwood there is, however, a 
counterpart to this location of civility and politics. To see it more clearly, additional concepts 
-  ‘civilization’ (Collingwood) and civitas (Oakeshott) -  need to be introduced.
The following passage in Oakeshott may serve as an example of civitas:
The members of the Order which constituted the Abbaye de Theleme dispensed with rules 
and duties to govern their conduct and took as their Rule a precept about how they should 
think when acting: the Augustinian principle of conduct, ‘Love and do what you will’. 
But... this was a sufficient rule, not because ‘virtuous’ sentiment suffices, nor because the 
Thelemites had been miraculously redeemed from inclination to incontinent self-assertion 
in their adventures in self-disclosure, but because they were well-born, well-bred, and 
well-educated in a language of moral intercourse, hi the absence of rules and duties, 
wanton conduct was to seek in the Abbaye (and in the lives of those who went thence into 
the world), not because the Thelemites were conspicuously indifferent to self-disclosure in 
action, but because of their exceptional mastery of a vernacular of moral self-disclosure 
and their unhesitating acknowledgement of its authority (OHC 78).
Respublica can be seen as civitas shaped by a historically acquired constitution and equipped 
with the apparatus of ruling. Thus civitas is sought, not beyond the bounds of respublica, but 
in the interstices of power that holds respublica together. The possibility of going ‘thence into 
the world’ is not ruled out, but it is the peregrination rather than the expansion of civitas.
As conversation verges onto the outbursts of poetry, so the peregrinations of civitas tend 
towards a pilgrimage, or even the hermitage of ‘moral excellence’, an escape from the 
practice of civility. There is in them a tendency to sweep aside ‘the narrow boundaries of the 
local and the contemporary’ so as ‘to reveal, not what might be going on in the next town or 
village, in Parliament or in the United Nations, but a world of things and persons and 
happenings, of languages and beliefs, of utterances and sights and sounds past all 
imagination’ (V 32). Respublica, as the meeting place of cives at once less disciplined than 
the Thelemites and more diverse in their choices of the precepts about how they should think 
when acting, holds them all together by the power of ‘being able to formulate [its rules] 
clearly and to make them known in utterances which reach and are readily understood by all 
those concerned’ (OHC 194). The bounds of respublica are limited not by territorial 
arrangements but by the range of the principles of conduct which respublica can 
accommodate without frustrating altogether the ‘sentimental’ dispositions of its cives towards 
‘virtuous’, as distinguished from ‘civil’, action.
In contrast, the power of the European states was acquired by settling and guarding 
‘frontiers to their areas of authority, marked upon accurate maps, which none may pass 
without scrutiny and perhaps only by permission’ (194). In so doing, they also acquired the 
character of universitas and the habit of using their power in a way appropriate for things 
rather than humans, so as to be able ‘to act quickly, economically, certainly, with the desired 
effect and as little hindered as may be by the undesired consequences of action’ (HL 34). 
Thus within Europe every societas is a species of respublica bound to a particular territorial 
arrangement by the presence of its local counterpart, universitas. In relations between such 
territorial units, politics is likely to be found, if at all, only once they relate to each other as 
societates. What is sought in this mode of politics is not the reconstruction of an original
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respublica, but the dissolution of the existing societates into more detailed instances of civitas 
out of which a respublica not yet known might be composed as a dry wall.
In Collingwood, ‘civilization’ has three meanings. As an ideal and potentially universal 
state of civility, it is similar to civitas. As a form of civility which actually exists in modem 
Europe, it is closer to respublica. As a historical process by which a particular form of civility 
is being approximated to the ideal, it is powered by the mill-race of the ‘body politic’. This 
way of ‘going into the world’ may be seen as intimated not so much in the practices of the 
nation-state as in the European, and more specifically British, idea of empire, in which the 
experience of ‘being kindled by the presence of ideas of another order’, with poetry as its 
likely companion, is categorially distinguished from the actual practices of imperialism, while 
politics, rather than ‘corrupting the soul’, becomes the school of virtuous sentiment.1 Once 
notionally resolved from the rest of what may be going on in the practices of imperialism, this 
idea of empire may serve as a nucleus for the idea of world politics, which would be no 
longer related to the modem European state.
Such resolution requires two further distinctions, to be explored in two separate sections: 
between politics and policy and between laws and manners. Each of these distinctions may be 
seen as a reaction to particular historical wave of imperialism. The first may be described as 
‘republican’, the second as ‘historicist’. In both, the central concern is with the power of the 
state, and solution is sought in the re-constitution of this ‘mill-race’ of civilization. In 
Oakeshott’s ‘dry wall’ re-arrangement of both responses, concern with growing state-power is 
preserved, but the focus of attention is shifted towards the mode of governance in its relation 
to the character of governed subjects. One possible way of entering into both ‘republican’ and 
‘historicist’ stories is at one point of their intersection, where what Collingwood calls the 
‘English school’, culminating in David Hume, is ‘reorientating philosophy in the direction of 
history, though as whole it is not clearly aware that it is doing so’ (IH 73).
Policy and politics
There is a significant tension between Hume’s essay ‘Of the Balance of Power’ and that ‘Of 
the Balance of Trade’. The balance of power proper, according to Hume, was known only in 
modem Europe, where individual states maintained the tranquillity of the whole of the 
continent by way of deliberate policy. The ancient city-states, although the outcome of their 
conduct seemed to be the same, achieved it by chance rather than choice, through the jealous 
emulation of each other’s greatness. The right balance of trade required nothing more than 
such unrestrained emulation. Once, however, state-power became increasingly associated
1 Compare Arendt’s interpretation of the legend of the British Empire: ‘its result is the imperialist 
character (imperialism was the only school of character in modem politics). And while the legend of 
the British Empire has little to do with the realities of British imperialism, it forced or deluded into its 
services the best sons of England. For legends attract the very best in our times, just as ideologies 
attract the average, and the whispered tales of gruesome secret powers behind the scenes attract the 
very worst’. Origins o f Totalitarianism (London: Harcourt, 1976): 208-9.
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with trade, balancing became more problematic. When taken in its entirety, Hume’s argument 
was directed not only against mercantilists but also those who believed that benign 
commercial empires would supersede the more militant territorial entities of the past, 
establishing the harmony of individual interests, be it the interests of states or humans.2 For 
him, and all those whom Burke once called ‘economical politicians’, the problem of 
burgeoning capitalism ‘was not whether or how the state (or natural law) should regulate the 
investment of private capital in private enterprises, but how private or joint-stock capital 
should be invested in the war-making and governmental power of the state’.3 Meanwhile, this 
growing power, although often justified in republican terms, undermined the republican 
conception of citizenship insofar as the balance of power, sought in the world of expansively 
trading empires, transformed ‘politics’ into ‘policy’ and, by the same token, made obsolete 
the previous republican balancing strategy of setting limits to the state’s size. Thus, against 
the background of the continuous discussion of the idea of a ‘perfect commonwealth’ 
triggered by the Peace of Westphalia, important changes were taking place in the mode of the 
understanding of politics.
The mill-race
When the Swedish Vasas abandoned their long-standing tradition of neutrality and plunged 
into the Thirty Years War, the Austrian Hapsburgs were unprepared for the entrance of such 
ruthless belligerents, whom they saw as opportunistic newcomers moved by conflicting 
sources of intellectual inspiration. The Vasas’ reasons for plundering the palaces of the 
Empire were derived both from national identity myths about their Gothic descent and from 
Grotian legal writings, which explicitly excluded such claims from the spectrum of just causes 
of war.4 Although this eclecticism can be explained by straightforward opportunism, there is 
also a possibility that Sweden’s major prize in that war was recognition rather than 
domination.5 Since recognition required a certain status, Gustav Adolf was attentive to all its 
major attributes: credible imperial lineage, diplomatic etiquette and international law. The 
achievement of all of these at once was more important than the intrinsic coherence of the 
overall construction and, where all the relevant nuances could not be put into a single 
coherent story, story-telling gave way to naked force.
Philosophers of the time attended to incoherencies with more care but not necessarily with 
more success. Right after the settlement of Westphalia, Pufendorf famously referred to the
2 John Robertson, ‘Universal monarchy and the liberties of Europe: David Hume’s critique of an 
English Whig doctrine’, in Political Discourse in Early Modem Britain, eds Nicholas Phillipson and 
Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 371.
3 John Pocock, ‘The political limits to premodem economics’, in The economic limits to modem 
politics, ed. John Dunn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 131-2.
4 Cf.: Robertson, ‘Empire and Union: Two Concepts of the Early Modem European Political Order’, in 
his A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the British Union o f1707 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995).
5 Erik Ringmar, Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation o f Sweden’s Intervention in the 
Thirty Years War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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constitution of the Holy Roman Empire as a ‘deformed monster’, meaning that it did not fit 
into any of the categories known from Aristotle or the Romans.6 As always, his staunch 
opponent, Leibniz, disagreed: ‘In explaining the concept of sovereignty, I confess that I must 
enter into... a field which is thorny and ill-cultivated. The reason for that, because of a 
deplorable mania, those who undertake to write [on sovereignty] have eyes only for what is 
ancient, of which vestiges scarcely survive, while they are not interested in more modem 
things’.7 For his part, Leibniz distinguished between simple powers to coerce within a given 
territory and ‘supremacy’ proper, as an attribute of those only who could ‘wage war, sustain 
it, survive somehow by their own power, make treaties, take part with authority in the affairs 
of other peoples’, and do all this by effectively controlling territories large enough to make 
them ‘somehow exempt from the commerce of private persons’. These entities could unite 
into a larger body, like the United Provinces and the Empire. Yet there was a cmcial 
difference between the two, one was a confederation, another a union: ‘A confederation is 
entered into by words alone and, if necessary, forces are joined. For a union, it is necessary 
that a certain administration be formed, with some power over its members’. Only the latter 
could be properly called the state.8
When, towards the end of the next century, Burke reproached the makers of the French 
Revolution for not understanding the character of their trade and thus wasting their tools, 
what he meant was very similar: ‘society is indeed a contract’ that can be taken up or 
dissolved at will in pursuit of a temporary interest, ‘but the state ought not to be considered as 
nothing better than a partnership agreement’.9 Yet by then the opposition between ‘society’ 
and ‘company’ had acquired a new countenance appreciated, among others, by Hume, who 
considered this change in meaning to be the single most important development in political 
theory since Machiavelli: ‘Trade was never esteemed an affair of state’ until the ‘great 
opulence, grandeur, and military achievements of the two maritime powers seem first to have 
instructed mankind in the importance of an extensive commerce’.10 The two maritime powers 
were England and the Netherlands, and the character of their conflict differed significantly 
from that of the Thirty Years War which preceded it.
Like the Hapsburgs and the Vasas before them, the English were well aware of the idea of 
universal monarchy, which circulated around Europe consequently gaining currency at one 
place or another, and saw the Dutch as the most immediate aspirants for its fulfilment. This 
attitude was echoed in London taverns, where the Dutch were called ‘butter-boxes’ because
6 Cf.: David Boucher, ‘Resurrecting Pufendorf and Capturing the Westphalian Moment’, Review o f  
International Studies, 4, 2001: 557-77; Robertson, ‘Empire and Union’: 25-7.
7 G. W. Leibniz, Caesarinus Furstenerius (De Suprematu Principum Germaniae), in Political Writings, 
trans. and ed. Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 111-20; 113-4.
8 Ibid.: 114-7; see also Riley’s discussion in ‘Unpublished Manuscript on the Allegiance Due to 
Sovereign Powers’: 119-24.
9 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987): 84-5, 139.
10 David Hume, Essays Moral Political and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty, 1985): 88-9.
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they were ‘apt to spread everywhere’ and for their sauciness had to be ‘melted down’; and at
the Court, where Dryden in his bid for laureateship produced the following pearl:
Trade, which like blood should circularly flow,
Stop’d in their Channels, found its freedom lost:
Thither the wealth of all the world did go,
And seem’s but shipwreck’d on so base a coast.11
The conflict no longer concerned territorial conquests and even when it was about one’s status 
the recognition sought was different in kind: ‘The Kingdoms and Principalities were in the 
World like the Noblemen and Gentlemen in a Countrey; the Free-States and Cities, like the 
Merchants and Traders:... Some of these came to grow Rich and Powerful by Industry and 
Parsimony; and some of the others Poor by War and Luxury: Which made the Traders begin 
to take upon them, and carry it like Gentlemen; and the Gentlemen begin to take a fancy of 
falling to Trade’.12 Like the commercialising domestic societies, international society was 
undergoing a change in the order of ranks. Commercial competition was no longer waged by 
small trading republics among themselves; large territorial monarchies were pressing them 
out of the market.
There was scant doubt as to who was to lose out in this new conflict: small states whose 
often sophisticated financial, legal or trading practices were not matched by their military 
resources. Even less happy was the predicament of the mostly agricultural entities, like 
Scotland, drawn into the vortex of the great-powers’ competition.13 The ‘insuperable 
difficulty’ of making such states happy in a world where trade had become the ‘golden ball’ 
for which all nations were competing led Andrew Fletcher to believe that there was ‘no other 
tendency than to render, not only my own country, but all mankind as happy as the 
imperfections of human nature will admit’.14
Fletcher’s argument was grounded in the recognition of the growing importance of 
commerce and its impact on the nature of European politics. The universal empire could be 
realized not only through territorial expansion but by way of the radical concentration of all 
the trade in one place. This would invite corruption of manners and the inevitable collapse of 
the commercial empire. Such catastrophes were disastrous not only for those who
11 Cf.: Steven Pincus, ‘The English Debate over Universal Monarchy’, in A Union to Empire: 37-62; 
Annabel Patterson, ‘“Crouching at home, and cruel when abroad”: Restoration constructions of 
national and international character’, in The Stuart court and Europe: Essays in politics and political 
culture, ed. R. Malcolm Smuts (Cambridge: CUP, 1996); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modem World 
System. Mercantilism and the Consolidation o f the European Economy, 1600-1750 (Cambridge: CUP,
1980): 160.
12 William Temple, Observations Upon the United Provinces o f  Netherlands, ed. George Clark 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972): 124.
13 Cf.: H.F. Kearney, ‘The Political Background to English Mercantilism, 1695-1700’, The Economic 
History Review, XI, 1959: 484-96; David Armitage, ‘The Scottish Vision of Empire: Intellectual 
Origins of the Darien Venture’, in A Union to Empire: 97-120.
14 Andrew Fletcher, ‘An Account of a Conversation concerning a Right Regulation of Governments for 
the common Good of Mankind’, in Political Works, ed. John Robertson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997): 168.
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immediately suffered them but for the overall texture of world politics. Therefore trade is ‘not 
the only thing to be considered in the government of nations: and justice is due, even in point 
of trade, from one nation to another’ insofar as it facilitates the recognition of diversity. In the 
situation, however,
not only all those who have ever actually formed governments, but even those who have 
written on that subject, and contrived schemes of constitution, have... always framed them 
with respect only to particular nations, for whom they were designed, and without any 
regard to the rest of mankind. Since, as they could not but know that every society, as well 
as every private man, has a natural inclination to exceed in every thing, and draw all 
advantages to itself, they might also have seen the necessity of curbing that exorbitant 
inclination, and obliging them to consider the general good and interest of mankind, on 
which that of every distinct society does in a great measure depend. And one would think 
that politicians, who ought to be the best of all moral philosophers, should have considered 
what a citizen of the world is.15
Fletcher’s ‘citizen of the world’ was opposed here not to the idea of state-citizenship but to 
the universalizing effect of trade which, through the ‘corruption of manners’, threatened any 
genuine citizenship regardless of the location of this or that state-boundary. There was 
nothing ‘natural’ or sacrosanct about state-boundaries, and Fletcher’s own design for the 
constitution of Europe -  ten roughly equal in size entities capable of defending themselves but 
made unfit for conquest by means of internal limitations on their sovereignty achieved 
through division into yet smaller units -  resembled, in character if not in the detail, both 
discussions conducted by Pufendorf and Leibniz half a century earlier, in the immediate 
aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia, and Hume’s ‘Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’, 
published half a century later.
Characteristically, however, in two instances when it perhaps came closest to its 
fulfilment, in the form of the ‘Philadelphia system’ and the German Confederation designed 
at the Concert of Europe, a carefully established balance was eventually upset either by the 
unrestrained ‘external’ expansion or ‘internal’ consolidation of power.16 By then it would 
have hardly appeared ‘natural’ to anyone to compare politicians to moral philosophers. The 
maintenance of both the balance of trade and the balance of power was believed to be the 
business of the ‘insidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called a statesman or a politician’.17 
‘Politics’ no longer meant what it still did for Fletcher: the activity of ruling and being ruled 
within a shared social space in which everyone knew his place and the duties it entailed. 
Instead, it mostly referred to the Lockean understanding of ‘government’, the multifarious 
activities of the occupants of numerous bureaux (such as the prevot de la police, for example, 
whose main concern was with the efficient administration of the market-places of Paris):
15 Ibid.: 175.
16 Cf.: Daniel H. Deudney, ‘The Philadelphia System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of 
Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1787-1861’, International Organization, 1995, 49: 191- 
228; Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Europe After Napoleon (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1973).
17 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations (Indianapolis: Liberty,
1981): 468.
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‘Politics’ now denoted the conduct of the policy and police of... states, expanding their 
internal and external power in consequence of their engagement in market processes they 
did not attempt to control. To the individual... it meant his involvement in the life of such 
a state, which expanded its power by recognising his freedom, but no longer treated (if it 
ever had) his participation as defining his moral personality or minded very much what 
sort of moral personality he had. He had to decide whether he felt liberated or alienated by 
this indifference, which is why the term ‘liberalism’ is now used as a term of reproach, 
both by conservatives, who fear that it is not libertarian enough, and by radicals, who fear 
that it is not liberating enough.18
The dry wall
This diagnosis is the starting point of Oakeshott’s analysis, the recognition that modem
‘government in respect of its pursuits had come to enjoy a lengthened tether and could browse
upon pastures hitherto far out of its reach’ (HL 11). Consequently, instead of focusing on
questions of the constitution and authorization of governments, the most perceptive of the
early-modem theorists began to concentrate on the tasks appropriate for the office of
government within associations grown ‘political’ as they came to practise politics as an
activity, ‘not of governing, but of determining the manner and the matter of government’ (8).
Theorizing became ‘political’ too, owing more to Hegel’s understanding of politics as ‘the
counterpart of the modem state whose government and public arrangements are recognized to
be the product of human choices and therefore alterable at will’ (9) rather than Aristotle’s
vocabulary, where ‘politics’ and ‘rule’ remained indistinguishable because ‘civil’ condition
was not yet introduced and distinguished from the ‘political’ one (OHC 167, n. 1).
Thus Montesquieu, according to Oakeshott, was interested in ‘democracy’ or ‘aristocracy’,
not as forms of rule grounded in the particular constitution of the office of government, but as
two different modes of governing appropriate for different self-understandings of the
governed subjects (HL 29-43). From this distinction follow two of Oakeshott’s rare remarks
about the relations of states:
Kant and others conjectured that a Europe composed of states with republican 
constitutions would be a Europe at peace. This absurdity is often excused on the ground 
that it is a plausible (although naive) identification of war with so-called dynastic war, but 
it is in fact the muddle from which Montesquieu did his best to rescue us, the confusion of 
the constitution of government (republican) with a mode of association (civil relationship) 
(OHC 273, n. 1).
Another confusion identified by Oakeshott was that international peace was sought in the
‘wrong’ mode of association:
It is perhaps worth notice that notions of ‘world peace’ and ‘world government’ which in 
the eighteenth century were explored in the terms of civil association have in this century 
become projects of ‘world management’ concerned with the distribution of substantive 
goods. The decisive change took place in the interval between the League of Nations and 
the United Nations (313, n. 1).
18 JohnPocock, ‘Political limits’: 141.
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This latter confusion represents what Oakeshott described on another occasion as ‘the
impulse to escape from the predicament by imposing it upon all mankind’ (HL 24). The
‘predicament’ here is a disposition of modem state-conduct towards a transactional
association of states in which prudential rules of conduct certainly exist but do not constitute
the terms of this association. ‘Escape’ is sought in a co-operative association of states by
which their divergent interests are subordinated to a single one. Again, rules are devised and
enforced in order to bring about and sustain such a convergence of interests, but the terms of
association are still constituted by interests rather than civil rules. Now confusion results not
so much because the imposition of a single interest denies individual states the freedom to
pursue their own ends, but rather because world government of this kind would achieve world
peace by way of denying a particular understanding of human freedom and a mode of
governing appropriate to it. While attempting to overcome the all too obvious
‘entrepreneurial’ streak in the character of the modem state, this mode of governing denies to
individual states what they in fact possess, a disposition towards civil association of their
citizens. Judged from the standpoint of individual freedom, a co-operative association of
states does not add anything to the transactional one. Both kinds of association belong to a
single mode of relationship, enterprise association, in which there is no politics, but ‘only
Purpose, Plan, Policy and Power’ (OH 135).
However, even if the aforementioned confusions are resolved, there are still important
objections to the idea of world government. The first concerns the absence of any interstate
system of lex in the recognition of the authority of which a global respublica could be
anchored. Not only does not such a system exist, its absence prevents individual states from
acquiring a less ambiguous character:
there has been one unavoidable contingent circumstance of modem Europe for which the 
rule of law cannot itself provide, namely, the care for the interests of a state in relation to 
other states, the protection of these interests in defensive war or in attempts to recover 
notional irredenta, and the pursuit of larger ambitions to extend its jurisdiction. And this is 
not on account of the complete absence of rules (although most of so-called international 
law is composed of instrumental mles for the accommodation of divergent interests), but 
because ‘policy’ here, as elsewhere, entails a command over the resources of the members 
of a state categorially different from that required to maintain the apparatus of the rule of 
law, and may even entail the complete mobilization of all those resources. This, of course, 
does not entail the destruction of all law; but it does entail the desuetude for the time being 
of a state as an association exclusively in terms of the rule of law (177-8).
The second objection concerns the impossibility of a global morality. Although composed 
entirely of mles recognized exclusively in terms of their authority, respublica is the public 
concern of its cives rather than homines. This involves a distinction between ‘the conditions 
of moral association (“good conduct”), and those which are of such kind that they should be 
imposed by law (“justice”)’ (174). Thus Oakeshott interprets Aristotle’s understanding of 
civil condition as a diluted or ‘watery’ version of such human relationships as ‘friendship’ 
(OHC 110). Although the claims of morality and legality (and thus civility as a special mode
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of morality) never fully coincide, nor do they diverge from each other at random: ‘Law and 
morals normally have the same centre but not the same circumference’ (HL 16). Civil 
association is possible only when the gap is not too wide, when the practitioners of diverse 
moral languages still recognize civility as being constitutive of their shared condition, while 
such recognition does not require of them unbearable moral compromises. Only then will the 
non-instrumental and constitutive practice of civility meet two other conditions, Aristotelian 
in spirit if not in letter: the equality of all its practitioners as cives and their authenticity as 
homines (OHC 110).
The last of these four conditions, authenticity, is yet another way of saying that civil 
relationship is possible among humans who are free not only to disclose but also to enact 
themselves. And this may be problematic on the global scale, given the diversity of vernacular 
moral languages:
This unresolved plurality teases the monistic yearnings of the muddled theorist, it vexes a 
moralist with ecumenical leanings, and it may disconcert an unfortunate who, having ‘lost’ 
his morality (as others have been known to ‘lose’ their faith), must set about constructing 
one for himself and is looking for uncontaminated ‘rational’ principles out of which to 
make it. But it will reassure the modest mortal with a self to disclose and a soul to make 
who needs a familiar and resourceful moral language (and one for which he may hope to 
acquire a Sprachgejuhl) to do it in and who is disinclined to be unnerved because there are 
other such languages to which he cannot readily relate his own (80-1).
Insofar as rules are abridgements of moral practices, and civility, as a specific moral 
practice, is composed entirely of rules, civitas is an abridgement from less determinate but 
also ‘thicker’ practices, to which it owes its authenticity. Such moral practices, allowing for 
the ‘making of one’s soul’ rather than just the civil pursuit of imagined and wished-for 
outcomes, come prior to civil practices. It is not altogether impossible to fancy a gradual 
emergence of a moral language of this kind out of increasingly global communication of 
humans. Yet it is easier to imagine this global language to be so ‘thin’ that, by failing to 
accommodate the immense diversity of self-enactment, it would also fail to meet at least one 
consideration of any political deliberation: the recognition of a circumstantial privacy, which 
merits consideration.
Further, were a global respublica to be established on the basis of such thin moral 
language, it would require an apparatus of ruling capable of the enforcement of the civil 
conditions prescribed. In principle, any rule can be enforced. There are, however, rules which 
might require for their enforcement ‘an apparatus of search and inquisition... such as to 
conflict with the norms of civil conduct written or plausibly tolerated by the respublica’ 
(OHC 179). The tether of world government would extend dramatically, while the resources 
for world politics, which can be found only in the vernacular moral languages, would be put 
under additional strain. Consequently, global government, while becoming oppressive for the 
individuals, might also destroy already existing practices of civility. This contradicts another 
important consideration in political deliberation: that the ‘fit’ of whatever is proposed is
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‘acknowledged to be among the desirabilities -  lest one good rule should destroy the 
coherence of the practice’ (180).
Thus there is no a priori given ‘cosmopolis, discernible to Civil Imagination, the rules and 
arrangements of which provide wholly reliable and sufficient models for those of a civitas’ 
(176). Nor can cosmopolis be modelled upon the practice of civility as it exists within the 
modem European state. Yet there seems to be a possibility for a ‘cosmopolitan’ mode of 
action and contemplation within Oakeshott’s political theory. It can be discerned from his 
earlier pronouncements about the building of the British Empire, but to see what kind of 
imperialism Oakeshott has in mind, one has to compare his views of the relation between 
ruling and politics to those of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers.
Oakeshott’s distinction between civility and morality is similar to Smith’s attempt to 
articulate the ‘science of the legislator’ which he limited to the ‘mles of grammar’ which do 
not specify the content of individual performances and distinguished from ‘the mles which 
critics lay down for the attainment of what is sublime and elegant in composition. The one are 
precise, accurate, and indispensable. The other are loose, vague, and indeterminate’.19 This 
also echoes the earlier distinction between ‘civil’ and ‘natural’, a ‘considerable, though very 
uncertain, achievement’ of the seventeenth century (OHC 111). The uncertainty resulted not 
from the distinction as such but from the unwarranted firmness with which ‘natural’ was 
endowed:
John Locke... inadvertently imposed the idiom of faith upon the sceptical understanding of 
government. But how out of character this enterprise was soon became apparent. To turn 
‘rights’ and ‘duties’ which were known as historic achievements, elicited by patient and 
judicial inquest from the manner in which men were accustomed to behave, into ‘natural’ 
rights and duties was to deny them just that contingency of character which was the heart 
of the sceptical interpretation, and was to attribute to them an absoluteness and a 
permanence which in the sceptical understanding of them they could not possess. And 
political scepticism was recalled from its unnatural alliance with the politics of Natural 
Rights, not by the criticism of Bentham (which was never quite critical enough), but by the 
genius of Burke and Hegel (PF 83).
Burke was not the only (and, according to Oakeshott, not even the most successful)
opponent of the Lockean understanding of ‘natural’.20 Moreover, he himself was perfectly
aware of the existence of his allies in this undertaking, sometimes rather ‘unnatural’ ones, for
whom current ‘manners’ were the only natural foundation for politics:
Mr. Hume told me that he had from Rousseau himself the secrets of his principles of 
composition. That acute though eccentric observer had perceived that to strike and interest 
the public the marvelous must be produced; that the marvelous of the heathen mythology
19 Smith, The Theory o f Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis: Liberty, 1984): 175.
20 Actually, despite some consensus about the usefulness of the natural/civil distinction, there was 
never much of an agreement on the meaning of ‘natural’. Compare Pufendorf s plea to study ‘diligently 
the Ambiguity of the Word Nature’ {Of the Law o f Nature and Nations, 4th ed. (London, 1729), Book 2, 
chapter 3, 16) and Hume’s claim that our understanding of the fundamental principles of morals 
‘depends upon the definition of the word, Nature, than which there is none more ambiguous and 
equivocal’ (A Treatise o f Human Nature: 473-4).
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had long lost its effect; that the giants, magicians, fairies, and heroes of romance which 
succeeded had exhausted the portion of credulity which belonged to their age; that now 
nothing was left to the writer but that species of the marvelous which might still be 
produced, and with as great an effect as ever, though in another way; that is, the marvelous 
in life, in manners, in characters, and in extraordinary situations, giving rise to unlooked 
for strokes in politics and morals.21
What, however, in Oakeshott’s interpretation, set Burke apart from some of his
contemporaries was the immediacy of the connection between the assertion of selfhood and
the duty to recognize individuality in others: ‘what for Kant was a piece of illogicality
(claiming individuality to oneself and denying it to others), and for Adam Smith a failure to
recognize the minute human disposition of “sympathy”, Burke identifies as a moral enormity’
(HL 70). The same enormity that is, as, on Oakeshott’s account of morality, would manifest
itself in the inability to recognize the authority of a moral rule and to subscribe to it
adequately. Only, whereas in Burke ‘the transference from the proposition this is what men
are like, to the proposition this is how they ought to behave, is made in the perception that this
is how God created them’ (70), in Oakeshott this theological premise is transformed into a
‘poetic’ one, and the overall construction is returned to the realm of human artifice.
This ‘return’, while reinforcing the diversity of vernacular moral languages, does not
relieve the individual of what Hume described as the ‘absolute necessity’ to act ‘and live, and
converse like other men’.22 But it does make the task of the political reformer more difficult,
precisely because he has to imagine the constraints of the daily intercourse as already existing
in not yet experienced situations located in the future: ‘No difficulties occur in what has never
been tried. Criticism is almost baffled in discovering the defects of what has not existed; and
eager enthusiasm and cheating hope have all the wide field of imagination in which they may
expatiate with little or no opposition’.23 For Oakeshott, imagination thus freed from the
constraints of conversation is fancy. Yet it is difficult to see him embracing, at least without
qualification, the Burkean ‘solution’:
It may be allowed to [the true lawgiver’s] temperament to catch his ultimate object with an 
intuitive glance, but his movements toward it ought to be deliberate. Political arrangement, 
as it is a work for social ends, is to be only wrought by social means. There mind must 
conspire with mind. Time is required to produce that union of minds which alone can 
produce all the good we aim at. Our patience will achieve more than our force.24
For Oakeshott, what has to be achieved by the true lawgiver is the union of the system of 
lex which recognizes the diversity of ‘minds’. Political imagination stems from this diversity, 
recognized as the diversity of moral standpoints and not interests. Legislators or rulers may 
engage in political deliberation not because they occupy specific offices but in spite of this. 
To become ‘politicians’ they have to put by their identities of rulers or legislators. As far as
21 Burke, Reflections: 150.
22 Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980): 6-7.
23 Burke, Reflections: 148.
24 Ibid.: 148.
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the relations between states are concerned, this separation of politics from ruling implies that, 
rather than envisaging, as most of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers did, global 
legislative acts and constitutional transformations intended to curb the insatiable appetites of 
states, one has to anatomize existing civil practices with a view to their possible re­
arrangement. If a particular manner of governing ‘is to be planted elsewhere in the world’, it 
cannot be ‘abridged into something called “democracy” before it is packed up and shipped 
abroad’; rather ‘what is exported is the detail and not the abridgement of the tradition and the 
workmen travel with the tools -  the method which made the British Empire. But it is a slow 
and costly method. And, particularly with men in a hurry, Vhomme a programme with his 
abridgement wins every time’ (R 55).
Nothing could be farther removed from Oakeshott’s intentions than slowing down the 
world of modernity, returning it to a more ‘traditional’, more uniform rhythm or arresting its 
characteristic ‘bustle of getting and spending’ (OH 191). This would have required a return to 
the pre-modem understanding of both politics and political theorizing, whereas Oakeshott 
clearly intends to move on, following Hegel, from the origins of modernity towards the idea 
of politics as the counterpart of the modem state already recognized as a powerful human 
invention. Even a quick perusal of the third essay of On Human Conduct would be enough to 
dispel any suspicion that Oakeshott attempts to idealize the actual practice of empire-building. 
Moreover, he clearly states that for those whose own manner of ruling was not touched by the 
genius of the Romans and the Normans the imposition of the rule of law ‘could not be 
anything but an ordeal, the difficult surrender of one persona for another’ (166). What he 
insists upon is that the activity of politics becomes closer to that of civil philosophy (as 
Fletcher in his opposition to the nascent British imperialism wanted it to) when it is 
distinguished from the writing of abstract constitutions or from the enactment of concrete 
laws, not to mention the ‘crafty and insidious’ policy-making.
Yet Oakeshott’s political theory departs also from Hegel’s: ‘So far from its being the case 
(as Hegel suggested) that the character of an association in terms of the rule of law is most 
fully expressed when it is engrossed in the pursuit of policy or when it is at war, these are the 
occasions when it is least of itself (178). This departure is due to a different idea of history, 
and also a different conception of the state, which is never an association in terms of the rule 
of law, but nor is it merely an enterprise in pursuit of power. Here again it is interesting to 
compare Oakeshott’s idea of the state with that of Collingwood, focusing primarily on the 
difference between their responses to the Hegelian identification of history with political 
history and an idea of world politics implied in it.25
25 Hegel, according to Arendt, overheard in the cannonade of Jena not only the political attempt to 
usher in a new beginning for the whole of mankind, and thus a new form of imperialism, but also the 
descending of the realm ofTruth onto the world of human action. Truth, although unfolding in time 
and in this sense ‘historical’, was believed to be valid for all men: ‘Truth had to relate to man qua man, 
who as worldly tangible reality, of course, existed nowhere. History, therefore, if it was to become a 
medium of the revelation of the truth, had to be world history.... The very notion of world history was
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What constitutes a shared background for these responses is the distinction between laws 
and historically acquired manners of particular societies. What makes a difference is the 
attitude towards the plurality of ‘others besides ourselves’, Collingwood’s ‘contentment’ and 
Oakeshott’s ‘delight’, discussed in the previous chapter. In accordance with his view of 
history as an evolutionary process powered by the mill-race of human self-determination, 
Collingwood, while rejecting Hegelian ‘finalism’, introduces the background of man’s 
relation to nature so as to establish a universalist critical standpoint. Oakeshott, in contrast, 
finds intimations of unity in the instances of poetry and difference and thus anatomizes 
practices into the individual performances-events.
Laws and manners
The state, according to Collingwood, is capable of both creating and abating various social 
nightmares, including the favourite one of the twentieth century: our ‘powerlessness in the 
giant grip of economic and social and political structures’, when these ‘creatures formed by 
the art of man, “for whose protection and defence” they were intended’, become ‘the chief 
authors of the evils for whose ending we have made them’. Then hope turns to despair. Yet, if 
‘the hope went, the despair would go too. If we believed Marx’s monstrous lie that all States 
have always been organs for the oppression of one class by another, there would be nothing to 
make all this fuss about’ (12.9-95).
The concluding reference to Marx has more to it than just an assertion of the ambiguous 
character of the state as well as its importance (two points on which there is little 
disagreement between Collingwood and Oakeshott). A much more important issue concerns 
what Collingwood believes to be Marx’s denial of human freedom (again, a criticism with 
which Oakeshott would agree). Collingwood’s way of re-asserting the importance of both the 
state and politics for human freedom locates politics within the state, as the site of civilization 
‘domestically’ and the vehicle of it ‘internationally’. The state, at least in the second part of 
the New Leviathan, is the mill-race indeed, a human invention meant to accumulate power 
and to put it into the service of civility. However, while discussing civilization, Collingwood 
reverses the flow of analysis, beginning this time not with the purposive individual action but 
with the practice of civility. This introduces a tension into the overall argument so that it ends 
up telling two conflicting stories at once. Oakeshott’s idea of the state, as oscillating between 
universitas and societas, offers a possibility of locating the activity of world politics on the 
map of human experience, again, in relation to laws and manners, but in a manner different 
from Collingwood’s.
The mill-race
This difference is best seen against the background of what is similar in the two accounts. 
Thus Collingwood’s understanding of civil condition is also premised on the four Aristotelian
bom from the first attempt at world politics, and... in one form or another world politics has been an 
adjunct to politics ever since’. On Revolution (London: Penguin Books, 1990): 53.
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characteristics identified by Oakeshott, although formally his idea of society is stated in 
opposition to that of class (19.1-7). The basic distinction is that classes are organized in terms 
of resemblance, societies in terms of participation. To be able to make a classification, one 
has to participate in a society within which public agreement as to what resembles what 
already exists. This agreement constitutes a society. Insofar as human societies are constituted 
by social consciousness, they can be constituted only by agents who have and can share it, 
that is, by humans who are free and capable of recognizing the freedom of others. Thus 
members of society are also equal as far as their membership is concerned.
The remaining characteristic of the civil condition, the non-instrumental character of 
civility, is presented by Collingwood, again, with reference to Marx, but also to the Roman 
idea of societas. His disagreement with Marx concerns the contention that it is humans’ social 
existence that determines their consciousness. As a description of the capitalist system 
imposed upon humanity by brute force, Marx’s dictum first denies any social existence proper 
to this particular system and then, as a more abstract statement, subordinates human freedom 
to a non-entity (19.83-94). Meanwhile, the words ‘society’, ‘social’ already contain a 
reference to free will, often however obscured because the Roman conception of societas is 
‘swallowed... [as it is] found in text-books’ without looking at the facts of modernity (20.82). 
The Romans were interested in partnerships as long as these involved economic interests, but 
with some modifications their theory holds good without any reference to transactional 
considerations. The most important of these modifications concerns the criteria of 
membership, which were defined by Romans in terms of sex, age and citizenship. These were 
context-specific safeguards ‘of the idea that no one could legally be a party to a contract 
unless he was capable of making up his mind for himself and explaining it, if need be, in 
court’, that is, the idea ‘that a contract must be a joint activity o f free agents', their free 
participation in a joint enterprise’ (19.57).
Collingwood repeatedly stresses that ‘enterprise’ here is as far removed from economics as 
might be the joint decision to ‘go for this walk’ or to ‘sail this boat’ (20.91). But the stress on 
this, as in ‘this society’, results in a tension in his theory of ‘external politics’. Politics in 
Collingwood belongs to the body politic, which is always and irredeemably a mixture of a 
non-social community and society proper: ‘The world of politics is a dialectical world in 
which non-social communities (communities of men in what Hobbes called the state o f 
nature) turn into societies’ (24.71). What constitutes a society is an authoritative agreement 
presented in the ‘contractual’ idiom of decision-making. Society, as a joint will of its 
members, is also an enterprise, but of a special kind, ‘intended to “travel hopefully” but not 
“to arrive”: no time of termination being either stated or implied’ (21.92).
Within a body politic, authority belongs exclusively to its social part and here it is clearly 
separated from force. But every body politic invariably includes non-social element, those 
incapable of ruling themselves and therefore unfit to enter a society. Hence the distinction
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between the rulers and the ruled: the rulers constitute a society and rule the rest of the body
politic by force (the first law of politics). Politics is the process of up-bringing the ruled so
that they might become the rulers (the second law of politics). This process can be maintained
only in a manner historically established and accepted within a given body politic (the third
law of politics). All three laws operate concurrently, but logically the process is firmly
grounded in the activity of self-ruling (25.7-9).
For Collingwood, there are also three possible reasons for the outbreak of war: first,
‘because men charged with the conduct of external politics are confronted by a problem they
cannot solve’; second, ‘because the internal condition of the body politic is unsound’; and
finally, ‘because the rulers [of a given body politic] are at loggerheads’ (30.31; 30.34; 30.37;
emphasis deleted). The problem men charged with the conduct of external politics cannot
solve is ‘systemic’: there are ineliminable differences between the bodies politic (29.55). But
differences as such need not result in war. War is a failure to obey international law, which
Collingwood believes can operate without legislators to enact or rulers to enforce it (28.76-9).
The internal condition of a body politic depends on the operation of law and order within it
(30.25). Law and order are bound to break down when ‘the rulers are at loggerheads’, which
is the main cause of war, since this marks a breakdown in the activity of participation in a
society and therefore a breakdown in the activity of self-ruling.
Thus Collingwood’s theories of man, society and ‘external politics’ are all presented in the
idiom of conversion, all three are theories of ‘human nature’, where ‘human nature’ is human
history and as such the history of the self-knowledge of the mind. Yet there is one important
difference. In the ‘theory of man’, the universalism is triggered by subjectivity and then
converted by reason into a web of intersubjective relationships. Now universalism takes two
forms. It is either the ‘slavishness’ of the ruled that infects the rulers, or it is universalism
inherent in the idea of society as such. In the theory of man this dualism was not visible since
both subjectivity (hunger) and reason were assumed to be universal in character, common to
all men as men. In external politics, a different kind of persona, a citizen, enters the scene and
particularity takes a different form:
The idea of a particular society is the idea of a society distinguished from other societies 
not by having different members but by having a different aim. The idea of a universal 
society is the idea of a society having no special aim which might distinguish it from any 
other; the idea of a society whose only aim is to be a society; one, therefore, which has for 
members all such agents as, being conscious of free will in themselves and each other, are 
able to be members of any society at all. The idea of a universal society is implied in the 
idea of a particular society. For the aim of a particular society is always twofold. First, it 
aims at establishing social relation between agents capable of social action; secondly, it 
aims at devoting this social activity to a particular enterprise (21.41-3).
One way of imposing the character of an enterprise onto the body politic without resorting 
to straightforward utilitarianism is by relating society’s ‘aim’ to its territorial boundaries. 
Although Collingwood occasionally refers to the notion of territorial integrity as a ground for
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the observance of international law, such grounding would constitute the ‘fallacy of swapping 
horses’, an appeal to ‘bodies’ when wills are at stake. This is not to say that state-borders do 
not matter, only that they should be accounted for. This is what Collingwood cannot do at this 
stage in the argument since the whole process of conversion is conceptualized as upbringing 
from within a territorial locality constitutive of the non-social community prior to its 
participation in the process of conversion into a society: ‘there are some things which [a 
community] must have to do with and cannot neglect, whatever kind of community it happens 
to be. Thus, any community must have a home or place in which corporately it lives’ (20.18).
Insofar as the idea of a universal society is implied in the idea of a particular society, the 
body politic has to develop a mode of ‘contentment’ with its territorial condition. This cannot 
be grounded in law, which requires rulers to give it, unless international law with its 
requirement of the formal equality of states is different in kind. This difference is not likely to 
be in international law’s favour. Rather, as in Oakeshott’s description of it, international law 
would be an amalgamation of ‘instrumental rules for the accommodation of divergent 
interests’, while the ‘aim’ of a particular society will acquire a more tangible and more 
familiar form of the balance of power. The only remaining kind of ‘external politics’, as an 
activity of upbringing, would be that of ‘true imperialism: to bring light to the darker places 
of the earth’ (EPP 205).
As Collingwood argued shortly after the end of the First World War, such an imperialism 
cannot take place between already established states but has to become their mutual civilizing 
undertaking: ‘mutual service and devotion, abnegation of self, of class, of race, nation, and 
language in the service of civilization and of the world’ (206). Twenty years later, he clearly 
had second thoughts, and in the third part of the New Leviathan outlined a different idea of 
civilization in which appeal to man’s natural environment takes an altogether different form. 
By now it is not a condition from which man liberates himself by acquiring social 
consciousness, but the one to which he returns in an attempt to recover his civility.
This transition is made through the outline of ‘classical politics’ already presented. 
Classical politics was understood in early-modern Europe by analogy with classical physics. 
The latter implied the necessity of limiting one’s theoretical objectives. This meant taking 
time and history seriously and abandoning the ancients’ search for essences for the 
combination of logical abstractions and empirical data. In classical politics, abstractions were 
drawn from the legal experience of the Romans and empirical observation was confined to the 
social end of the process of politics, the rest becoming the ‘state of nature’. However, the 
principle of limited objectives did not abrogate the whole idea of the search for essences but 
only modified it: ‘it is no longer held that the properties of a given thing can be exhaustively 
deduced from one single essence, but there is still what may be called a “relative essence”, an 
“essence from our point of view”, where “we” are the persons engaged in a certain kind of... 
inquiry’ (36.21). This is Collingwood’s outline of the transition from the tradition of Nature
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and Reason, through that of Artifice and Will, to the tradition of Rational Will. This way 
history and difference enter the picture to be treated under the heading of ‘civilization’.
Collingwood identifies three meanings of ‘civilization’: the ideal condition of civility, the 
process of approximation to this ideal and a particular, locally arrived at, stage in this process. 
Of these, he is focusing on civilization as the process. It is something which an association 
undergoes.26 For its own members, an association is a ‘we’ to which there is always a ‘not- 
we’. But there are two kinds of a ‘not-we’. The first is an absolute ‘not-we’, ‘not a self at all 
but a piece of unconscious matter’. The second a relative ‘not-we’, ‘a self in its own right, an 
“I” to itself, but an “I” other than myself (35.26), that is, what was presented as the not-self 
in the ‘theory of man’. Thus through the process of civilization, an association sorts out 
relations between its own members, the relation between any of its own members and the 
world of nature, and relations between any of its members and those of any other association. 
‘In relation to members of the same [association], civilization means coming to obey rules o f 
civil intercourse. In relation to the natural world civilization means exploitation’ (35.36). In 
relation to the members of other associations it all comes down to the question: ‘Are 
foreigners human?’ (35.61).
Collingwood approaches this question with the same relentless logic with which Hobbes 
addressed the issue of absolute sovereignty. The moment one admits the slightest degree of 
difference between himself and ‘strangers’, he is on the way to the most outrageous displays 
of violence. There is nothing in logic which could arrest this movement. There is nothing in 
practice which could prevent one from perceiving the difference. ‘Contentment’ does not 
work in relations between associations, for strangers are denied the recognition of their 
humanity. But if this is human condition, humans have to take a closer look at how they treat 
their natural environment.
What Collingwood is looking for now is a kind of natural science ‘more akin to folklore 
than to mathematics, riddled with superstition, and from the point of view of a twentieth- 
century “scientist” lamentably unscientific’ (36.31). What he is concerned with, is how 
human relation to the world of nature shapes relations within an association and also relations 
with otherness as such. The crucial distinction is that between improvement and conserving. 
Improvement has no meaning if it is justified by appeals to the satisfaction of ‘needs’ because 
‘needs’ only have meaning in relation to the current state of civilization (35.58). Conserving 
is all about the current state of civilization maintained through transition, but of a certain kind: 
‘Consider knots. The life of every sailor, the catch of every fisherman, and a thousand of 
other things of varying importance, depend on knowing that a knot will not come untied until 
you set out to untie it, and will quickly come untied when you do’ (36.35). There are many
26 Although Collingwood uses the term ‘community’ in this context, I am using ‘association’ to 
distinguish this type of community not only from Collingwood’s ‘non-social community’ or ‘society’ 
proper but also from the ‘body politic’, the state, within which the process of the transformation of 
‘community’ into ‘society’ is ‘politics’.
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different types of knots but only a small number of these is in constant use. Whoever invented 
them, was ‘a man in whose presence a fellow-inventor consisting of Archimedes and 
Gutenberg and George Stephenson and Edison, rolled into one, would hide his diminished 
head’ (36.41):
Who invented the bow-line? Ignoramus, ignorabimus. How did he invent it? Ignoramus, 
ignorabimus. I cannot conceive how anybody ever did anything so brilliant.... But how, 
once invented, was it transmitted? In general terms I know the answer. The conditions for 
such an event are that there should be a community in which inventions are not hoarded, 
but taught; that there should be men who know them and are willing to teach them, and
men who do not know them and are willing to learn them (36.59).
Such a community is possible only in the spirit of agreement now understood not as 
individual decision but as belonging to the custom that ‘everybody who does not know a thing 
that may be useful for the betterment of living shall go frankly to one who knows it, and listen 
while he explains it or watch while he shows it, confident by custom of a civil answer to a 
civil question’ (36.46). And if such conception of science, and a world it implies, is only an
ideal, a golden age, then nothing can help the world as we know it.
So, if ‘contentment’ with the presence of strangers is an impossibility, toleration can be 
introduced by issuing a warning against the ruin wrought by the mindless exploitation of 
man’s environment in general. Now analysis begins with practice, the practice of civility 
which, without losing its character as an ideal, is located not in the future but within current 
experience. Reason supports human cooperation, and powerfully, ‘but it does not originate in 
it’ (36.74). The origins of authority are now in the custom of maintaining law and order, while 
law, as an experience of converting non-agreements into agreements, is not given by the 
rulers but rooted in the manners of a society which arise historically and have nothing to do 
with vulgarly understood ‘politeness’ (40.73-5).
Now difference can be accounted for by reference to the historically acquired manners 
rather than deliberately subscribed to ‘aims’ of particular societies. Civility, as a given state in 
the process of civilization, knows no distinctions between the rulers and the ruled. It is 
sustained by the confidence in the custom of receiving a civil answer to a civil question. This 
practice is threatened by the ‘world of office-drudges and factory-drudges’, the world of 
technological exploitation of nature, ‘the world of Fascist or Nazi dreams’, the worlds of 
Marxian socialism and state-promoted capitalism, all of which are ‘only our present world 
with bankruptcy brought nearer’ by the industrialization of the most basic human 
relationships, education in particular: ‘These are the alternative forms of ruin which by now 
confront a civilization where men have been fools enough to hand their children over to 
professional education’(37.56-60).
So, if previously, while presenting the state as the mill-race of civilization, Collingwood 
described the life of politics as ‘the life of political education’, now it becomes important to 
dissociate education, and thus civility, from the state so that to protect it from the malaise
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of technology. Even more important is to locate that region of experience in which the
practice of civility is visibly present:
there is a vast region of experience in which the irresponsible attitude of doing things for 
fun resists all the onslaughts of professionalism. For every man who indulges himself in 
games and sports and pastimes, this region includes all those things. For almost every 
human being it includes eating and sleeping and making love. (‘Philosophers’ have 
traditionally belittled these things. More fools they. Look closely, and you will see in them 
the sheet-anchor of civilization.) This region includes almost all that is enjoyable in life, 
and almost all that people do well for the excellent reason that they have no motive to 
shirk it (37.83-6).
This is more than just a retraction of Collingwood’s own earlier views. It is also another 
departure from the Hegelian philosophy of history dominated by the presence of the state: 
‘This is what comes of treating political history by itself as if it were the whole of history. The 
moral is that political developments should be conceived by the historian as integrated with 
economic, artistic, religious, and philosophic developments, and that the historian should not 
be content with anything short of a history of man in his concrete actuality’ (IH 122). Political 
theory and politics are still firmly anchored in the state, but the state itself stops being the 
vehicle of civilization. Rather, humans leam the practice of civility from within the localities 
of their landscapes and manners. In so doing they participate in a potentially universal society. 
This shared participation allows for the classification of human associations in terms of their 
resemblance and thus for a distinction between the ancient polis and the modem state as 
different forms of human association constituted by a shared context of historical process.
Put differently, humans are making history by inventing and inhabiting institutions 
appropriate to their historically acquired manners. This process is driven by human 
consciousness bom out of the ‘primal’ struggle with man’s natural environment. Yet, insofar 
as the (Hegelian) ultimate resolution of this struggle is ruled out (a ‘practical’ counterpart to 
the ‘theoretical’ liquidation of philosophy), the state begins to lose its attractiveness as the site 
of historical progress. Now man turns, as it were, back to nature and his childish experiences, 
not so much in search of consolation or protection, but for a lesson in civility. This, however, 
weakens Collingwood’s initial critique of Marxism, at least if the latter is released from its 
economic determinism. Consequently, this also weakens Collingwood’s defence of the state 
and makes ‘external politics’, as an activity of social conversion brought about by the 
consorted effort of the states, an impossibility.
The dry wall
Oakeshott’s disagreement with Collingwood’s conception of the state is stated clearly: ‘It is 
often suggested that all human association must be supposed to begin in the relationship of a 
potentate (or a class of potentates) and those over whom they exercise power.... But it is safe 
to say that, in general, there is little to be said in favour of these speculative suggestions; and 
as an account of the emergence of modem European states, nothing at all’ (VMS 333). States
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emerged as pieces of ‘inhabited territory with a government: land (often ill-defined), people 
(often miscellaneous) and ruling authority (usually in the course of seeking recognition)’ 
(319). As far as the territorial arrangements are concerned, the ‘history of modem Europe is 
the history of Poland only a little more so’ (OHC 186). As for the government, its history is 
that of ‘inconclusive encounters... in which Christendom was transformed into a still to be 
imagined and invented modem Europe’ (OH 164-5).
The dualism of territoriality and government is similar in Oakeshott to that of body and 
mind. State-boundaries do matter, but only insofar as they acquire specific meanings through 
understanding:
We are apt to think of a civilization as something solid and external, but at bottom it is a 
collective dream. ‘Insofar as the soul is in the body’, says Plotinus, ‘it lies in deep sleep’. 
What a people dreams in this earthly sleep is its civilization. And the substance of this 
dream is a myth, an imaginative interpretation of human existence, the perception (not the 
solution) of the mystery of human life (HCA 159-60).
It is in this sense that Oakeshott presents Hobbes’ work as belonging not only to the 
philosophy of politics, but also to ‘our language and civilization’ (159), and states as 
‘instruments whose resources awaited the explorations of yet unborn composers’ (OHC 185). 
More often than not the fugue of European state-conduct was played by ear and replayed by 
heart, and there was a lot of ‘poetry’ in that. But poetic utterance has no settled value, its 
language is ‘without vocabulary, and consequently one that cannot be learned by imitation’ (R 
527-8). In conduct, unsettled authority invites either force or a ‘procedure of moral casuistry’, 
in which ‘every man must do his own casuistry for himself (OH 146-7). Alternatively, he is 
disciplined into obeying mles through the unreflective acceptance of the conclusions of some 
moralist.
Ironically, this is how Machiavelli, Hobbes or Hegel were seen by their contemporaries 
and later commentators: as moralists, whose conclusions assigned special importance to force. 
For Oakeshott, they are the ‘composers’ providing the mles of notation, and not of conduct, 
the terms in which practical utterances can be understood, leamt and taught. These are never 
created out of nothing. There are no situations in which there is no some authoritative 
provision for deliberating existing mles. What there may be is confusion or mystery about the 
character of such authority, and this needs to be abated. In Oakeshott’s own rendition of the 
history of this engagement, familiar patterns of political theorizing are anatomized into 
significant details which are then re-assembled into a new tapestry. Hobbes is a towering 
presence, although Oakeshott sees his contribution not in the polarization of social life into 
the states of ‘nature’ and ‘civility’ but in assigning authority to the office of government. The 
attribution of authority is ‘not a matter of choice but of subjecting what purports to be 
authoritative to a certain test and giving reasons for a conclusion; and respublica itself 
provides reasons which, because it is composed of mles, must themselves be mles’ (OHC 
154).
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This self-authenticating character of respublica, together with its capacity of evoking the 
acceptance of all cives without exception, is what makes it a considerable human 
achievement. However, respublica is never without play in its conditions and the validation of 
its authority is always an inquiry that pulls those engaged in it beyond the already known 
system of lex (151). This intrinsic pull is due to the habit of the identification of rules with 
‘rightness’ and laws with justice (or lex with jus). As Oakeshott clarifies in ‘The Rule of 
Law’, this is due to the dualistic character of moral rules, at once authoritative and 
prescriptive, even if what they prescribe is not a substantive performance but conditions to be 
observed in moral conduct. Not surprisingly, there were theorists (Oakeshott describes them 
as neoplatonic), who attempted to tackle two problems at once: validating the authority of lex 
and ascertaining its jus. Respublica was to be ruled by lex authority of which lay in jus 
conceived either in terms of some ‘higher’ law or some readily available and demonstrable 
principles such as absolute ‘values’, inalienable ‘rights’ or unconditional ‘liberties’ (OH 168- 
70).
Like these thinkers, Hobbes also identified the rule of lex with that of jus by holding that 
authentic lex cannot be injus. Yet Hobbesian jus consists exclusively in ‘faithfulness to the 
formal principles inherent in the character of lex: non-instrumentality, indifference to persons 
and interests, the exclusion of prive-lege and outlawry, and so on’ (173). This is not enough 
and requires a Hegelian addition: ‘the negative and limited consideration that the prescriptions 
of the law should not conflict with a prevailing educated moral sensibility’ within respublica, 
so that justice of the non-instrumental conditions imposed upon moral conduct by authentic 
law, thus turning it into civil conduct, should be recognized ‘as a combination of their 
absolute faithfulness to the formal character of law and their moral-legal acceptability, itself a 
reflection of the moral-legal self-understanding of the associates which (even when it is 
distinguished from whatever moral idiocies there may be about) cannot be expected to be 
without ambiguity or internal contradiction-a moral imagination more stable in its style of 
deliberation than in its conclusions’ (174).
This is a restatement of Collingwood’s ‘third law of politics’, supported by a similar 
understanding of the succession of the three major traditions in political thought. There is also 
in Oakeshott’s version a touch of British eighteenth-century political theorizing, meant to off­
set the Hegelian conflation of world history with politics. Oakeshott’s ‘anatomizing’ of world 
history into a dry wall of contingently related local practices-events is more at home within 
the Humean metaphor of society as ‘a wall, built by many hands, which still rises by each 
stone that is heaped upon it, and receives increase proportional to the diligence and care of 
each workman’.27
27 Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles o f Morals 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975): 305.
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Hume’s subsequent suggestion that the building of a just society required a premeditated 
design and cooperative effort added more than a touch of utilitarianism to his construction. In 
Oakeshott, human associations are judged in relation to human freedom, while the intimation 
of freedom is sought, not in the state, nor in history, but in poetry (dramatic individuality). 
And there is one metaphor that makes possible a comparison between states and buildings, 
both of which ‘may be said to be intrinsically ambiguous because they demand to be 
considered not only as poetic images but also from the point of view of their durability and 
the manner in which they satisfy a practical need’ (R 538). These ambiguous constructions 
may, often by chance rather than choice, lure an attentive observer ‘into looking or listening’, 
and then ‘the mood of contemplation may supervene’ and the character of the building ‘as a 
poetic image may, suddenly or gradually, come to impose itself upon us’ (539).
This should not, however, be pushed too far. Political deliberation requires an exceptional 
focus of attention rather than a willingness to get distracted. Yet here as well, an entrance to 
the world of poetry is present. The key to it, as always, is wonder; only now it imposes itself 
differently, as in Oakeshott’s image of a particular association: ‘There was once a building 
which had been constructed by many hands and over a long period of time. Its architecture 
represented many different styles, and so far conflicted with the known rules of construction 
that it was a matter of wonder that it remained standing’ (V 158). Needless to say, decisions 
whether to expand such a building or whether to provide a room within it to ‘strangers’ are 
driven by considerations of durability or the building’s ability to satisfy a practical need, nor 
can one ignore the bustle of construction work in the neighbouring districts. However, one 
can distinguish theoretically between that which is appropriate for the treatment of ‘things’ 
and that which is due to humans.
In the case of the state, this means distinguishing between its character as universitas from 
that as societas. One of the virtues of this distinction is that it locates politics in societas rather 
than the state, and world politics in the relations between, again, not states, but societates. 
This does not deny the importance of the transactional (or, on occasion, co-operative) 
relations between the same states as universitates. But deliberation, even if triggered by some 
urgent interest in or moral indignation with whatever may be going on outside the 
contingently established borders of one’s own state, becomes political once it is transformed 
into an exercise of political imagination; and this invariably begins with an instance of 
wonder, especially so once a style of construction different from one’s own is encountered.
Here again affinity between political imagination and poetry may be deceptive. First, as far 
as human conduct is concerned, poetry is akin to violence, and thus to ‘fabrication’, in 
seeking magnificence and release from the reciprocal engagements of self-disclosure. Second, 
the veil of poetry may well be more difficult to transgress than a simple country wall erected 
to protect one’s landed property. It is knit from a language emancipated from that very 
transactional character which in the vernacular of conduct is easily abridged into pocket-
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dictionaries or exchange-rate tables to equip the tourists with. One cannot be sure that a 
‘golden meadow’ is indeed and always a ‘sunlit field of grass’, and ‘plum blossom’ invariably 
stands for ‘charity’ (R 528). The origins of poetry are in the experience of learning one’s 
mother-tongue which, unlike foreign languages, is never learnt by the book and always by 
ear, and unlike languages learnt in the preliterate transactions of the market place or the 
playground, is spoken, not for the sake of transaction, but as an attempt to speak: ‘We speak 
an heroic language of our own invention, not merely because we are incompetent in our 
handling of symbols, but because we are moved not by the desire to communicate but by the 
delight of utterance’ (539). And delight, as more than one poem attests, can be sought not 
only in ‘golden meadows’ but also in ‘man’s newest form of gamble with death’, in the 
‘tumult in the clouds’ crowded with deadly pieces of technology.28
Political deliberation is dramatic rather than ‘poetic’. Nevertheless, to be possible, it has to 
be related not only to the practice of civility but to other regions of experience as well. The 
balance is never perfect, never final and never uniform. There are associations whose 
philosophers stress the communicative aspect of politics to counterbalance the claims of 
poetry, which in their climes acquired a character too heroic. There are others, always more 
fortunate with their poets than with the politicians; their songs, even when composed as 
political marches, outlive the sentiments of those who once marched to them. And there are 
those perhaps, where the ‘right’ balance was once struck, by chance and choice, and whose 
political climate acquired a permanent grim mistiness, displaying neither much madness nor 
iciness.
Perhaps this is what Collingwood meant when, contemplating the disgrace of the Vichy 
France and picking up the Nietzschean gauntlet of the ‘nation of shopkeepers’, he told his 
students that none of the ‘little fat men with a star’, including those of his own country, stood 
any chance as long as there was someone still capable of imagining ‘the ghost of Nelson’ and 
seeing it ‘smile grimly as one who knew it all the time’ (EPP 222). Civilization cannot be 
defeated because it fights in a ‘sentimental’ manner, not by pursuing a premeditated purpose 
but by upholding its historically acquired disposition and thus turning its own ‘playfulness’, 
diversity and imperfection into its major assets: ‘What ensures the defeat of barbarism... is the 
literally infinite possibility of varying the nature of the thing called civilization, leaving it 
recognizable in its diversity’ (NL 41.7).
This is another way of saying that ‘as nothing here is necessary, so nothing is impossible’, 
another way of re-asserting human freedom and the possibility of the continuous re­
arrangement of the overall conditions of the practice of civility; that is, the possibility of 
politics. For Collingwood, ‘sentiment’ is the evolutionary ‘process in which the same thing 
begins as an emotion and ends as a thought’ (41.33), for Oakeshott, it is ‘virtue’, an attitude in
28 Cf.: Eliot, ‘Defence of the Islands’, Collected Poems: 227; W.B. Yeats, ‘An Irish Airman Foresees 
his Death’, in Collected Poems (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1994): 111.
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which an action is performed and thus, as a performance itself, an event, meaningful in its 
relation to a practice. Thus difference persists, but against a shared background of the 
recognition of the diversity and the open-endedness of human experience:
The road runs always to the sea
‘Twixt duty and delight (OHC 324).
Civilization and tradition
The point of this chapter has been mostly negative: to show that the modem European state 
cannot serve as a model for a global order compatible with the understanding of human 
freedom that is central to Oakeshott’s idea of civil association and Collingwood’s conception 
of the state of civility. Nor can such order be found in the relations between actually-existing 
states. Rather, the global association of states may be understood as at once composed of 
universitates and societates.
As far as relations between universitates are concerned, these are driven by ‘policy’, that 
is, ‘designs to promote and to seek substantive conditions of things recognized as the 
satisfaction of an interest or held to be the common interest of the associates’ (OH 176). 
Whether such interest is identified with the establishment of perpetual peace or with ‘the 
prosperity of the associates or the maximization of the pleasurable sensations of the associates 
and their pet animals’ (146), make little difference for the terms of association. The nobleness 
or the scale of ambition involved in any such project is irrelevant inasmuch as the imagined 
and wished-for outcome it postulates is understood as a want to be satisfied. World politics 
may be possible, if at all, only in the relations between societates, provided the diversity of 
both ‘laws’ and ‘manners’ across them can be reconciled.
In fact, some such reconciliation is necessary. Whereas respublica is considered, as far as 
this is possible, as a self-contained ensemble of practices, inhabitants of any given societas 
cannot attend to its ‘agreements, treaties, covenants, etc. negotiated and entered into with the 
rulers of other such associations’ as merely ‘miscellaneous arrangements’ which ‘bear upon 
the conduct of cives with varying degrees of remoteness’ (OHC 147). In Oakeshott’s own 
account, these arrangements unavoidably undermine the practice of civility within territorial 
boundaries to which every societas is tied by its local counterpart, universitas. It is quite 
possible that cives may come to believe that the conduct of neighbouring, or remote, 
associations makes it desirable to introduce certain changes into the conditions of their own 
societas. In itself, the deliberation of such changes will not be different from the activity of 
politics as it was defined initially. To occupy a distinct place on the map of human activity, 
world politics has to be addressed to the overall conditions of a global order composed 
entirely of moral rules and understood exclusively in terms of its civil authority and 
obligation.
The ‘classical approach’ claims that some such order exists in the form of ‘international 
society’ distinct both from the merely transactional association of states, ‘international
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system’, and the global order of human beings, ‘world society’. One of the early formulations 
of this three-fold distinction identified international society with ‘civilization’, understood 
along the lines of Collingwood’s account of the latter -  not as an original condition of 
mankind, nor as a given entity, but as a process. As Herbert Butterfield put it, ‘in the long run 
many people, who only see the surface of things, come to forget that there ever had been the 
sword behind the velvet -  and imagine that the world had been naturally civilized all the time, 
civilized in its original constitution’; but to give civilization its due one has to think of it as a 
procedure by which ‘the regime of power politics’ comes ‘to be chastened and qualified’.29
It may seem that in this formulation the connection between international system (‘the 
sword’) and international society (‘the velvet’) is stressed, while the possibility of world 
society (the world’s ‘original constitution’) is flatly denied. On closer reading, however, this 
is not the case:
The real clue to the whole civilizing process lies in the development of an international 
order and the consequent release of certain ‘imponderables’ which seem to operate on 
human affairs by a species of chemistry. And it is important that we should understand this 
phenomenon; for it is not any international paper constitution, nor is it any particular 
disposition of forces in the world, but it is just these imponderable factors, which 
constitute the operative virtue of the supra-national system. Since it is precisely these 
‘imponderables’ which have been destroyed in our time as the result of two world wars, 
we have lost the most essential aspect of an international order -  the one thing that cannot 
be recovered by the mere drafting of a paper code.30
To be sure, thinking about world society in terms of a ‘species of chemistry’ is hardly helpful. 
In a sense, the two preceding chapters were meant to ponder over these ‘imponderables’ 
which Butterfield otherwise accurately describes as ‘the operative virtue of the supra-national 
system’. As such, they are the conditions for the possibility of international society, that 
‘spirit of agreement’ which, according to Collingwood, necessarily precedes all classification 
and therefore, in the case of global order, the attribution of agency to this or that class of 
actors, be they states or any other institutions.
As has been argued in this chapter, the thinness of such an agreement on the global scale 
may not allow for the existence of an order analogous to the one which exists in civil 
association. However, Oakeshottian ‘civilization’, as an instance of civitas into which 
respublica is ‘carefully anatomized’ so as to arrange out of such instances a respublica not- 
yet-known, offers a possibility of an activity which, in the words of C.A.W. Manning, is 
‘logically pre-legal’ and yet constitutive of all the practices of international society.31
What I want to suggest in the next chapter is that such careful anatomizing of existing 
societates into highly localized civitates out of which a kind of world society might be 
arranged is the activity of world politics. ‘World society’, however, is not the most 
appropriate name for this mode of relationship. What I propose instead is ‘tradition’. Its
29 Herbert Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War (London: Epworth, 1953): 75, 79.
30 Ibid.: 79-80.
31 C.A.W. Manning, The Nature o f International Society (London: Macmillan, 1975): 132.
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origins, as those of societas, are in Roman Law where traditio was understood as ‘a mode of 
transferring the ownership of private property’.32 With the rise of contemporary sociology and 
anthropology, ‘society’ and ‘tradition’ became opposed to each other, while ‘civilization’ 
acquired a purposive countenance as a process of turning ‘traditional’ associations into 
‘societies’ proper. Responding to this specifically modem opposition, Collingwood wrote: 
‘Do you brush aside... a distant past... with the latest word of bogus anthropology: “No savage 
ever invented anything; all they possess is decayed scraps from the cultures of more civilized 
peoples”?’ (NL 36.58). If so, then ‘God help us as anthropologists; for we cannot explain, 
with all our myths about diffusion, how any civilization, however low, ever continued in 
existence for more than a single generation. We are diffusionists who do not believe in 
diffusion’ (36.6).
Under the pressure of modernity, the voice of traditio, like that of the Oakeshottian civil 
association, ‘has, here and there, sunk to a whisper, but nowhere has it been totally silenced’ 
(OHC 313), and as an ideal character it can be still overheard ‘here and there in the features of 
human goings-on, intimated in some choices and dispositions to choose and in some 
responses to actual situations, but it nowhere constitutes a premeditated design for human 
conduct’ (180-1). A disposition to assume this voice to ‘be unique in being universal to 
mankind and a condition of survival’ should be resisted. But the disposition to speak 
‘traditionally’ while deliberating the conditions of one’s own societas in its relation to 
international society ought not to be neglected either. What this disposition might entail is the 
subject of the next chapter.
32 Edward Shils, Tradition (London: Faber & Faber, 1981): 16. ‘Tradition’ Shils maintains, ‘is 
whatever is persistent or recurrent through transmission, regardless of the substance and institutional 
setting’.
Tradition
The task now is to relate Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s analyses of the ‘imponderables’ of 
human conduct to that of international society so as to arrive at an idea of world politics. The 
need for such a connection is not merely theoretical (one cannot be content with loose talk 
about the ‘operative virtue of the supra-national system’) but also practical, in the sense in 
which one cannot, according to both Collingwood and Oakeshott, be indifferent towards the 
possible range of choices between the various kinds of inquiry: ‘The difficulty posed by 
claims about brute realities and eternal necessities of the kind affirmed by so many theories 
of international relations is... that they depend on, and work to affirm, a very restricted 
repertoire of metaphysical possibilities, while pleading innocence of all metaphysical 
responsibilities and thus of all responsibility’.1 Thus the classical approach, while enlisting 
the support of Collingwood and Oakeshott for the defence of its version of international 
society against the international system of rationalism, also distances itself from the ‘critical’ 
investigations of world society. In so doing, it appeals to Collingwood’s, and especially 
Oakeshott’s, rejection of cosmopolitanism. However, cosmopolitan options are not exhausted 
by the idea of a global state. An idea of ‘tradition’ compatible with Collingwood’s and 
Oakeshott’s analyses may be, first, much more ‘critical’ than the ‘classics’ would have it, and 
second, may be interpreted as a kind of world society, as a mode of human relationship, 
located on the map of human conduct as it unfolds in the world of states (or any possible 
ensemble of institutions that make up the pattern of world order).
1 Walker, ‘The Political’: 310-1.
One way of advancing such an interpretation is to anatomize the idea of ‘civilization’ as it 
exists in contemporary International Relations so as to re-arrange its various authenticated 
features into an idea of world order more hospitable towards Oakeshottian poetry. These 
features I shall describe as international system, international society and world society. Each 
requires authentication, since these components will be borrowed from different theoretical 
discourses. Thus international system will be presented in its rationalist version, international 
society as it is understood by the classical approach, and different accounts of world society 
will be taken from ‘classical’ and ‘critical’ political theories. While mediating the claims of 
these kinds of inquiry, I shall indicate the affinity between Oakeshott’s analysis and 
‘philosophical hermeneutics’ as this was defined in the Prologue.
At least three conceptions of civilization can be identified in contemporary International 
Relations. The first is straightforwardly rationalist and announces itself in the form of the 
‘clash of civilizations’.2 Although staged in the post-Cold War world, it is rooted in the 
discontents of the late 1960s, when it was argued that, whereas modernity may be associated 
with stability, modernization is more likely to produce revolutionary upheavals.3 Now 
Westernization is presented as having a similar effect on non-Westem ‘civilizations’. The 
problem lies not so much with this diagnosis as with the understanding of what civilizations 
are. These are portrayed as rigidly bounded territorial entities organized around certain given, 
mostly religious, ideas. How exactly such entities may be understood as acting or clashing 
remains, for the most part, unclear. Civilizations, supposedly, are powered by their core­
states, if they have one, and the whole construction, as far as the explanation of action is 
concerned, tends to fall back on the meaner and leaner neorealist version of international 
system in which states, perhaps more easily allied along ‘civilizational’ lines, bargain with 
each other for their individual survival as minimum and world-domination as maximum.
Another ‘civilizational’ story is told within the English school, although under a less 
pessimistic heading of the ‘evolution of international society’.4 Here the master-image is that 
of the three concentric circles, so that international society is located in-between international 
system and world society. ‘Evolution’ may be understood in temporal terms, so that the world 
order, taken as a whole, is seen as evolving from the condition of international system into 
that of international society and then world society.5 Such a location is opposed to the 
Augustinian version of realism which does not question the existence of international society
2 Samuel Huntington, The Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f World Order (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1996).
3 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 1968).
4 Cf.: Adam Watson, The Evolution o f International Society (London: Routledge, 1992); Hedley Bull 
and Adam Watson, eds. The Expansion o f International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1984).
5 Most recent and most rigorous account of this mode of the evolution of international society can be 
found in Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); but see also Barry Buzan and Richard Little, ‘Reconceptualizing Anarchy: Structural 
Realism Meets History’, European Journal o f International Relations 1996, 4: 403-38.
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but understands it as a way of (eternal) coping with the consequences of man’s fall from the 
original condition of world society into that of international system.6 Alternatively, 
‘evolution’ may be understood in spatial terms, so that international society first develops 
into a localized nucleus of world society and then expands to the rest of the world.7
The third image originates in one of the critical approaches. Here civilization is 
understood as a dynamic search for a fit between material conditions of existence and 
intersubjective meanings characterized by three basic dimensions: the notions of time and 
space, the tension between individual and community, and a shared set of ideas about the 
relationship of humanity to nature and the cosmos.8 Although civilizations vary, depending 
on how they contingently resolve these tensions, each tends to acquire an institutional 
structure some of which are uniformly imposed by the most powerful onto the rest. There is 
also a possibility, in fact, a need for a supra-intersubjectivity to resist the imposed 
homogeneity of the global structures of dominance. This may take shape around the ‘organic 
intellectuals’ who, at the points of intersection of the various realms of meaning and 
dominance would ‘eschew determinism, and offer alternative conceptualizations of how 
things might be done’.9
Of these three approaches, only the second, in its ‘pluralist’ or ‘classical’ version, remains 
unequivocally committed to the state as the major actor in international relations. 
Consequently, it turns out to be engaged in a battle on two fronts, defending its conception of 
international society against both international system and world society. If this is the nature 
of the engagement, then neither Collingwood nor Oakeshott can be of much help in this 
undertaking, mainly because this kind of international society cannot support the idea of 
human freedom which underpins Oakeshott’s account of civil association or Collingwood’s 
understanding of civility. The ‘classics’ do provide an interesting analysis of what, following 
Oakeshott, could be described as international lex, but fail to extend it towards an 
Oakeshottian understanding of world politics. Nor is there a place for politics in the ‘clash of
6 Murray, Reconstructing Realism.
1 Cf.: Charvet, ‘The Idea of an International Ethical Order’, Studies in Political Thought, 1992, 1: 59- 
72. All these ‘concentric’ images of world order are conceptualized on the margins of the English 
School by James Der Derian in his On Diplomacy: A Genealogy o f Western Estrangement (London: 
Blackwell, 1987) and Roger Epp, ‘The English School on the Frontiers of International Society: A 
Hermeneutic Recollection’, Review o f International Studies, 1998, Special Issue: 47-63.
8 Robert Cox, ‘Thinking about civilizations’, Review o f International Studies, 2000: 217-34. Cox 
explicitly draws on Collingwood’s, among others, account of civilization and historical understanding.
9 Ronnie Lipschutz, ‘Politics Among People: Global Civil Society Reconsidered’, in Pondering 
Postinternationalism: A Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Heidi H. Hobbs (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2000): 94. Importantly, Lipschutz’s argument locates authority outside 
of the modem state, in the web of transnational, but also localized, institutions. See his After Authority: 
War, Peace and Global Politics in the 21st Century (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2000). Similar shifts in the location of authority are explored by Thomas Biersteker, ‘State, Sovereignty 
and Territory’, in Handbook o f International Relations, eds Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth 
Simmons (London: SAGE, 2002): 157-76. In principle, none of this invalidates Oakeshott’s analysis of 
human associations in terms of their dispositions to become societas or universitas, insofar as these 
dispositions are present in the conduct of these associations, whatever their name or shape is.
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civilizations’ or international system. With some modifications, however, the ‘critical’ image 
of world order may accommodate an Oakeshottian idea of world politics.
Thus I shall first examine the insights and the limitations of the classical approach. The 
former consist in the valuable distinction it makes between policy and politics. The latter 
results from its failure to grasp the distinction between laws and manners. I then turn to the 
‘critical’ way of drawing these distinctions. Finally, I shall assemble an Oakeshottian image 
of world order and locate ‘tradition’ and world politics within it.
World order
Before considering the classical approach and its version of international society, a few 
words have to said about the international system of neorealism, mostly regarding the latter’s 
claim to provide a theory of international politics.10 The word ‘politics’ in the title of 
Kenneth Waltz’s book has at least two interrelated meanings. First, ‘politics’ is defined by 
reference to what it is not, that is, ‘relations’ which, Waltz explains, may mean two different 
things: ‘the interactions of units and the positions they occupy vis-a-vis each other’.11 Since 
Waltz is interested in presenting a systemic theory, he insists on abstracting from the 
interactions of units and concentrates on a purely positional image of international system. 
Second, this system is ‘political’, this time defined positively, because the governing 
principle of its structure is not that of wealth, beauty or physical strength, but ‘anarchy’, as 
opposed to the ‘hierarchy’ of domestic political orders.
Advocates of the Waltzian version of neorealism have always stressed the positional 
character of his international system, insisting that the behaviour of its units, namely, their 
preference for relative over absolute gains and thus the impossibility of cooperation between 
such units, was caused exclusively by the anarchical structure of the international system.12 
Critics have always maintained that Waltz’s theory contains the individualist assumption 
concerning the units’ propensity to maximize their power.13 Another line of criticism 
conceded to Waltz the holistic account of behaviour but claimed that his understanding of 
units’ identity remained individualistic, chiefly because of the absence of rules in his 
conception of the system.14
Without entering into all the intricacies of these longstanding debates, suffice to say that 
Waltzian states may be as positional or holistic as one chooses, and the system in which they 
are positioned as abundant with rules as that of the most elaborate game. What matters in this 
context is that these rules are exclusively prudential and the system is exclusively
10 Waltz, Theory.
11 Ibid.: 80.
12 Cf. Joseph Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism’, International Organization, 1988,42: 485-507.
13 Cf.: Keohane, ‘Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond’ in his ed. Neorealism and 
its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
14 Cf.: Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, 
International Organization, 1992, 46: 391-425
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transactional. While such rules are designed to promote certain purposes, the authority of 
these rules does not constitute the terms in which the states are associated. Nor are they 
specific to the interactions of states. As Oakeshott puts it, describing the rules governing the 
operation of a fire station, ‘many or indeed all of them might not be inappropriate for a police 
station’. The problem is, ‘no fire would ever be prevented or put out if the associates 
recognized themselves to be related solely in terms of these rules, or if they did nothing but 
observe them’ (OHC 117).
Put differently, whatever the merits or faults of Waltzian theory as a theory of the 
enterprise association of states, this is what, at bottom, this theory is, and there is no place for 
politics in enterprise association invariably governed through managerial decisions. On the 
definition of politics presented so far, Waltzian theory is a misnomer, it is a ‘theory of 
international management’. As such, it can only offer a partial account of world order, and 
international system, as one ideal characterization of such order, analogous to the 
Oakeshottian universitas, and has to be supplemented, in the first instance, with another one, 
in which the authority of the procedural rules of ‘good international conduct’ will constitute 
the terms of association. This is what Terry Nardin and Robert Jackson attempt to provide in 
the form of international society.
Although both Nardin and Jackson draw on Oakeshott’s understanding of human conduct, 
their versions of the classical approach are quite different. First, they understand the state 
differently. Second, they ground international society differently. Nevertheless, in both 
accounts, international society is opposed to both international system and world society. 
This indeed bears some resemblance to Oakeshott’s positioning of human conduct in- 
between two modes of ‘fabrication’: extraction of wished-for outcomes by force and the 
pursuit of the ‘higher morality’ of self-enactment. Yet Oakeshott’s account is meaningful, 
first and foremost, in relation to the understanding of individual identity which, by and large, 
remains under-theorized in both Nardin and Jackson, and in the classical approach more 
generally. Consequently, the ‘classical’ understanding of the overall constellation turns out to 
be predicated on a rather limited account of world society, in which Oakeshottian rejection of 
one particular mode of cosmopolitanism is taken for a denial of any cosmopolitanism 
whatever.
Policy and politics
Unlike Oakeshott, who introduces the universitas/societas distinction so that to problematize 
the modem European state, Nardin takes the states as he finds them in today’s world. 
Accordingly, that very apparatus of power which prevents the actually-existing state from 
obtaining the unambiguous character of societas serves, insofar as it allows for the 
personification of the state internationally, as the precondition of having what Nardin 
describes as ‘practical association’ of states. This mode of association is opposed by him to 
‘purposive association’ in which states jointly pursue shared ends so that ‘an international
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society can be said to exist only to the extent that there is cooperation in this pursuit’.15 
Nardin rejects this kind of association as non-feasible, non-desirable and at any rate non­
existent. States pursue divergent ends, while durable relations between them ‘presuppose a 
framework of common practices and rules capable of providing some unifying bond where 
shared purposes are lacking. Such practices are embedded in the usages of diplomacy, in 
customary international law, and in certain moral traditions’.16
Contrary to some cursory statements of Oakeshott, Nardin demonstrates that at least some 
international institutions are not merely instrumental in their character but shape the morally 
authoritative context for the conduct of states. The dualistic, instrumental and authoritative 
nature of these institutions is, however, undeniable. Thus Nardin takes up Oakeshott’s brief 
sceptical remark about ‘world government’ and develops it into a detailed analysis 
highlighting the incoherence of the idea of the United Nations, which posits itself both as an 
association within the society of states and the institutional embodiment o f  this society; an 
ambiguity which undermines its authority as either.17 The argument is that, if only one 
focuses on whatever is ‘practical’ in international society, one can still meaningfully speak 
about world governance if not ‘government’. International society, construed in ‘practical’ 
terms, is the mode of such governance.
What, then, accounts for the instrumental, purposive disposition in the relations of states? 
One possible answer is: both the anarchical nature of international system and the aspiration 
to transform international society into a mutually advantageous global enterprise of either 
states or individuals; that is, to recall Oakeshott’s expression cited earlier, ‘the impulse to 
escape from the predicament by imposing it upon all mankind’. If this ‘impulse’ alone is 
considered, then the plurality of states appears as an alternative. If further it is argued that the 
purposeful disposition thus conceived is undesirable, then this plurality acquires positive 
value. Such positive value is what Nardin attempts to establish. If, however, it is recognized 
that the ‘purposive’ disposition in the life of international society, realized in the form of 
transactional rather than co-operative association, may well spring from the plurality of states 
as self-seeking power-bargainers, then upholding the intrinsic value of the pluralist position 
becomes more problematic.
This is recognized by Robert Jackson who, first, substitutes ‘prudential association’ for 
Nardin’s ‘purposive’ (this accommodates Oakeshott’s ‘transactional’ association, distinct 
from co-operative but still belonging to the ‘enterprise’ mode of relationships between 
agents), and second, stresses the dualist character of the state: ‘Prudential association 
between states ordinarily is entangled in procedural association between states: the 
Machtstaat and the Rechtsstaat usually exist and operate in tandem and not in isolation’.18 He
15 Nardin, Law: 3.
16 Ibid.: 5.
17 Ibid., 97-112.
18 Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant 118.
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then sets for himself the two-fold task of defending the societas of states against both the 
‘solidarists’, whom he understands as advocating a global co-operative universitas of 
individuals, and realists, for whom international society exists, at best, as a charitable 
addition to the international system so that the iMachtstaat carries the Rechtsstaat on its 
broad shoulders’.19 Another important clarification concerns Jackson’s insistence that the 
subject-matter of the ‘classical approach’ has always been, and ought to be, human conduct 
rather than the conduct of states. States may be understood as acting only insofar as they are 
represented by humans, ‘statespeople’, the occupants of specific offices endowed with 
authority to enact and interpret the practices of international society.20
The authority of these offices is derived from the Grundnorm of international society: the 
principle of non-intervention. Its value is ‘negative’, it only establishes conditions under 
which particular states can pursue their preferred forms of the ‘good life’. Whether any of 
these are actually achieved within any particular state is beyond the responsibility and the 
power of international society.21 The norm itself is a contingent historic achievement. Its first 
expression, and also its character as a principle, is to be found in the double-maxim of the 
Peace of Westphalia, cujus regio ejus religio and rex et imperator in regno suo: matters of 
religious faith, and thus the forms of ‘good life’, were to be decided ‘domestically’ by 
statespeople equal in their ‘international’ status.22 Consequently, statespeople became the 
authors of international law and international society more generally.
Jackson recognizes, in fact, insists, that international society ‘is lacking almost entirely in 
the assets and instrumentalities that sovereign states possess... virtually by definition’. It has 
no territory, government or population of its own, nobody ‘“lives” in international society the 
way millions of people do live in particular countries’.23 Lurking behind this image, however, 
is what John Ruggie described as the paradox of absolute individuation: ‘Having established 
territorially fixed state formations, having insisted that these territorial domains were disjoint 
and mutually exclusive, and having accepted these conditions as the constitutive bases of 
international society, what means were left to the new territorial rulers for dealing with 
problems of that society that could not be reduced to territorial solution?’ As it happens, the 
only solution, as expressed in such early Westphalian practices as ambassadorial 
extraterritoriality, was the gradual ‘unbundling’ of territoriality, so that over time the 
‘nonterritorial functional space’ became the ‘place wherein international society is 
anchored’.24
This is not to say that international society is hopelessly ungrounded, only, to use 
Oakeshott’s phrase, that its anchorage is to be sought in a sea-anchor rather than any fixed
19 Ibid.: 118.




24 Ruggie, ‘Territoriality’: 164-5.
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foundation. Such grounding is explored by Nardin in his analysis of the character of 
international law. The central point of this analysis is that ‘the most striking feature of 
customary international law is that, although its standards are standards of conduct for states 
and statesmen, the judgements upon which the creation and application of these standards 
rest are those of a specialized community of international lawyers’. Moreover, ‘these same 
practices figure in the judgements of many others who know little of international law and for 
whom the rights and wrongs of states and statesmen are a matter of viewing international 
conduct from the perspective of a tradition... over which lawyers and politicians by no means 
have a monopoly and which is indeed often opposed to the particular usages of law and 
government’.25 While recognizing the importance of these other judgements, Nardin argues 
that customary international law is a moral practice capable of accommodating the liberties of 
not just states but also individuals.
The authorship of international law, however, matters. In order to uphold the intrinsic 
value of the plurality of states as embodied in international law, Nardin needs to resist the 
critical pull of the pluralism of moral traditions and not just individual viewpoints generated 
and assessed from within any single tradition. This he does by noting that international law 
‘is not only a kind of law but a particular instance of that kind: the international legal 
system’.26 It is the only existing tradition which addresses itself to (and possesses traditional 
resources for) the issue of international morality. Thus Nardin finds a point of universality to 
match the unity of the territorial world subdivided into sovereign units. Unlike Jackson, he 
associates it not with a principle but with an actually existing tradition. This tradition is 
obviously tainted with contingency, contingencies of power included. Accordingly: ‘If there 
does exist an international morality transcending the contingent features of particular moral 
communities or traditions, it is likely to be found in the ongoing conversation or dialogue 
among them’.27 But would that be an international morality then?
It seems that Nardin’s theory is also a misnomer, but in a sense different from that in 
which Waltz’s is. What it actually suggests is a theory of Taw, morality and the relations of 
humans, as inhabitants of particular traditions, in the world contingently divided into states’; 
that is, a theory of ‘human conduct in a world of states’ indeed. The overall construction can 
be understood as self-contained, and thus more or less safely lodged in a single world, only 
insofar as the correspondence between international law and the diversity of moral 
standpoints belonging to different traditions is somehow related to this contingent division. 
To use Oakeshott’s metaphor, it has to be shown that a world in which not only the 
circumference but also the centre of the international legal system does not coincide with the 
multiple centres of morality can still be understood and inhabited as a single social whole.




Both Jackson and Nardin argue that international society constitutes such a whole, the 
international equivalent of Oakeshottian societas, which holds the world composed of diverse 
moral traditions together. Where their accounts differ is in the grounding of the authority of 
international society. For Nardin, it is anchored in the ‘ongoing conversation or dialogue’ of 
diverse moral traditions; for Jackson, in the ground-norm of non-intervention. Yet both 
distinguish international society not only from international system composed of Waltz’s 
‘like-units’, Jackson’s Machtstaaten or Oakeshott’s universitates but also from world society. 
Despite the different grounding of international society, Nardin is likely to agree with 
Jackson that world society does have a positive historical existence but only as a construction 
of the society of states.28 This is so because both understand world society as an institutional 
expression of the idea of the unity of mankind which spans at least from the time of the 
Stoics to the modem practice of the protection of human rights.29 In this manner, especially 
so in Jackson’s construction, an uneasy alliance between international system and 
international society is being forged against world society, or cosmopolitanism, as yet 
another mode of universalism.
However, three questions are pertinent here. Whether cosmopolitanism ought to be 
equated with universalism. Whether in the alliance of international system and international 
society Rechtsstaat becomes the hostage of Machtstaat, while ‘world policy’, as the ongoing 
struggle over divergent interests, leaves no space for world politics. And what if Nardin’s 
‘ongoing conversation or dialogue’ between diverse moral traditions is the mode of existence 
of world society which, insofar as this dialogue is limited to the deliberation of the overall 
conditions of international society in terms of their desirability, constitutes the activity of 
world politics.
Leaving the last two questions for the next section, I shall now focus on the first one. My 
suggestion is that cosmopolitanism does not have to be equated, in fact, cannot be equated, 
with any global institutional arrangement but can be understood as a disposition in human 
conduct in the world of states.
Laws and manners
Political deliberation, according to Oakeshott, presupposes two distinctions. The authority of 
lex should be distinguished both from pmdential considerations which necessarily exist in the 
life of any association and from moral considerations of a ‘higher order’ to be taken into 
account in self-enactment. The first of these distinctions may be understood as that between 
policy and politics; the second as that between laws and manners. Nardin and Jackson, while 
concentrating on the first distinction, offer a view of international lex different from 
Oakeshott’s. To address the second distinction, one can also re-assess his account of the 
Kantian federation of republics so as to examine the relation between international lex and
28 Jackson, Covenant: 112.
29 Nardin, Law: 43-44.
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possible conceptions ofjus. In such re-assessment, there is more to cosmopolitan jus than the
kind of universalism presupposed in Nardin’s and Jackson’s understanding of world society.
Here one can start, as Onora O’Neill does, by stating that ‘the justice of states will suffice
for justice only if we can show that any system of just states will itself be just. But this claim
is implausible’.30 This argument can be expanded to the general criticism of legal positivism
thus stated by John Charvet:
The positivist aspires to provide a wholly self-contained theory of legal authority, but this 
aspiration cannot be satisfied. For it can be reasonable for each participant in a rule- 
governed system to acknowledge the authority of the rules solely on the basis of their 
acceptance by the others only if the various rules available for an authoritative choice all 
satisfy some basic condition of justice, so that the choice itself is to that extent morally 
indifferent. Positivism cannot explain that basic condition, since there is no ideal element 
in its notion of general acceptance.31
This is yet another attempt at grounding the authority of lex in some notion of jus external to 
it. What is sought is a conception of equality more fundamental than that of Oakeshott: 
equality of homines and not just cives. However, there are different ways of arriving at it. 
Charvet and O’Neill aim to do so without assuming any knowledge of any such equality 
which comes prior to social interaction.
Both present their constructions against the background of those of John Rawls while 
revising his distinction between private and public reasoning or metaphysical and political 
justice. The international analogue of this distinction is the ‘classical’ separation of the 
Westphalian principles of cujus regio ejus religio and rex et imperator in regno suo. 
According to Charvet, Rawls articulated this distinction so as to meet the communitarian 
critique of an implicitly Kantian metaphysics of his Theory o f Justice. Instead of responding 
by developing a ‘nonmetaphysical, but comprehensive, theory of the autonomous person’ and 
showing ‘how such a theory can be used to ground an antirealist account of the authority of 
social norms’, Rawls committed himself to the view of humans who ‘are not after all one 
person, but quite distinct private and public entities’.32 O’Neill also rejects Kantian two- 
world metaphysics but sees Rawls’s conception of public reasoning as inadequate, in fact, 
more essentialist than that of Kant.
Thus O’Neill and Charvet approach the private/public and by implication the 
inside/outside divide from opposing directions and arrive at rather different ideas of 
cosmopolitanism. Charvet’s can be described as ‘institutional’ insofar as it advocates a 
confederation of states evolving into a world state, an arrangement grounded in the principle 
of just social interaction. For O’Neill, all institutional arrangements are subject to
30 Onora O’Neill, ‘Bounded and Cosmopolitan Justice’, Review o f International Studies, 2000,26: 45- 
6.
31 John Charvet, ‘International Society from a Contractarian Perspective’, in International Society: 
Diverse Ethical Perspectives, eds David Mapel and Terry Nardin (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1998): 130.
32 Charvet, The Idea o f an Ethical Community (London: Cornell University Press, 1995): 5-6.
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questioning and all principles ‘are intrinsically indeterminate, and can be institutionalized in 
many distinct ways’.33 She seeks to ground equality not in a principle, nor in any set of 
institutions, but in the modality of reasoning. In the end, both may be forced to make 
important concessions, but an exploration of their arguments allows for locating a modality 
of cosmopolitanism, and therefore an idea of world society, which is closer to Oakeshottian 
framework than to the classical approach.
Charvet begins by dismantling the idea of ‘private’ by way of a contractarian procedure. 
While seeing the standard contractarian device of the ‘original position’ as useful for the 
elucidation of the foundational principle of order, he also holds that any such position 
constructed on moral-realist premises would be redundant since by claiming a priori 
awareness of the fundamental principles of justice it will already presuppose what has to be 
established. What, in contrast, underpins his analysis, is a ‘historical’ claim that at a certain 
point in the life of human associations their members may be forced to realize that they can 
no longer rely on any external authority for the maintenance of the moral order enjoyed so 
far. This leads not so much to a change in political arrangements as to their relegitimation 
from a new, ‘nonmetaphysical’, standpoint. Contractarianism here is meant to bring moral 
and social spheres into a coherent relationship with each other by highlighting the 
conditionality of both.
Charvet’s contract begins on the ‘domestic’ level. Here contractors are motivated by their 
recognition of the gains from cooperation, desire to cooperate on the basis of authoritative 
norms and acknowledgement that the authority and content of these norms spring solely from 
their own wills. Once this triadic conception is supplemented with the ideal constraint of 
equal bargaining power, contractors have to arrive at the foundational principle of collective 
moral life: ‘the equal value of persons as free or self-directing beings’.34 But not before they 
establish a political form, the state, with a dual function of solving the assurance and 
determinacy problems among co-operators and generating in them the required individualism 
which is then led ‘back to a collective expression of social cooperation’.35
The latter point is of particular importance for the ‘international’ part of the overall 
construction, since now political autonomy cannot be granted to states unconditionally, 
regardless of the content of their domestic conceptions of justice. It becomes derivative of the 
individuals’ autonomy which each state is put under obligation to secure for its citizens. 
However, once Charvet moves his construction to the international level, it becomes clear 
that here one additional condition is implied in his procedure: it has to unfold within actually- 
existing state-borders. Two interrelated problems arise from this requirement. First, one has 
to account for the identity of states. Second, significant inequalities in power between 
actually-existing states impose additional requirements onto the centralized interstate




authority (whatever its form) in terms of its capacity to satisfy the assurance and determinacy 
conditions for the moral international society. Further, having been shaped as moral beings 
domestically, individuals will attempt to interact globally, but since such conduct will 
obligate them to abstract from their particular situations, and no global individual morality 
can be presupposed in advance, they will be confronted with assurance and determinacy 
problems again and will have to fall back on their particular associations. Since, for practical 
reasons, the assurance and determinacy conditions cannot be satisfied by a world state 
(although it is not ruled out in principle) this task has to be fulfilled through the relations of 
states.
So now states are put into a contractarian procedure which, unlike the initial domestic 
one, does not require pre-existing interstate morality. States, as personalities (assuming that 
the problem of their identity is solved) are already shaped as moral beings. The best they can 
agree upon in this manner is to recognize each other’s equality as states, that is, to recognize 
each other’s political sovereignty and territorial integrity. While this satisfies the minimal 
requirements for cooperation on morally just terms, this is not enough. First, identity of 
particular states remains disputable. Second, in the contemporary world, political sovereignty 
and territorial integrity in themselves do not make all states truly autonomous agents. 
Therefore, to be fully just, the society of states has to develop into a confederation with 
authority to adjudicate on questions of identity, distribution and the use of force. The removal 
of the rigid private/public divide may sanction the establishment of such a confederation (and 
eventually a world state) through a kind of ‘moral imperialism’ checked mostly by prudential 
considerations.36
All in all, international society is not merely a society of states but a ‘network of private 
relations... built up on the basis of the moral life created within each state together with the 
interstate peace that is made possible by the states’ commitment to respect one another’s 
rights to political sovereignty and territorial integrity’.37 World society seems to be included 
into the scope of international society rather than being merely an outgrowth of it, as in 
Jackson. Yet this is not the case. In fact, Charvet relies on states, and more specifically on 
universitates, more heavily than the principle of equality would allow.
Although Charvet advanced his idea prior to the publication of The Law o f Peoples, it 
makes explicit what, according to O’Neill, is the major shortcoming of the latter work. 
Rawls’ ‘peoples’ (and Charvet’s ‘ethical communities’) are hostages not just to actually- 
existing states but to that in these states which corresponds to Oakeshott’s universitas: ‘There 
is something laborious about anchoring an account of [public] reasoning in a conception of 
territorial agents not well exemplified in our world, who (if they were exemplified) would
36 Ibid.: 121.
37 Charvet, ‘International Society’: 122.
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acquire the political capacities Rawls imputes to them only by developing the very state and 
governmental structures from which he tries to detach his argument’.38
According to O’Neill, Rawls’ conception of public reasoning, or political justice, does not 
sit particularly well with his idea that justice is possible only within bounded communities. In 
her reading of Kant, any reasoning that appeals to an authority which is not vindicated can 
only be ‘private’. Rigidly policed and jealously protected territorial boundaries are the means 
for such ‘privatization’: ‘Boundaries of whatever sort are not unquestionable presuppositions 
of thinking about justice, but rather institutions whose structure raises questions of justice’, 
while ‘commitment to cosmopolitan principles does not entail-although it may not rule out- 
commitment to cosmopolitan political institutions, such as world state or world federation’.39 
Thus, whereas Rawls’ and Charvet’s constructions are cosmopolitan, or semi-cosmopolitan, 
as far as proposed institutional arrangements are concerned, they are not that different from 
Jackson’s or Nardin’s in terms of the modality of reasoning involved. Only Charvet, contra 
Rawls, embraces such communitarianism and, contra Jackson and Nardin, refuses to be 
content with the status quo.
However, in order to attain a standpoint from which to judge the status quo, Charvet, 
while refusing to assume the universality of natural rights, assumes the universality of the 
human condition. Although his ‘original position’ is not an encounter prior to all interaction, 
its ‘metaphysical crisis’ befalls the world as a whole uniformly wiping out all previous 
conceptions of authority. The uniformity of calamity results in a uniform remedy. Although 
some tribal associations may well satisfy Charvet’s requirements for an ‘ethical community’, 
the ‘great advantage of the state over tribal association lies in its ability to integrate 
individual interactions over a much wider area and on a much more intensive scale, and 
hence to facilitate economic and cultural developments that make it impossible for human 
beings to return to stateless societies’.40 It is difficult to see, however, why this of itself 
should be an advantage for anyone but the citizens of such states. Unless, that is, one accepts 
the argument of those eighteenth-century thinkers who recognized in modernity the promise 
of the enrichment of human personality through its ‘reorientation towards history’, but 
recognized also that it came at a price which included not only the crisis of authority (the 
presupposition of Charvet’s contract) but also the temptation of institutional imperialism 
(such contract’s possible implication) as yet another impulse ‘to escape from the predicament 
by imposing it upon all mankind’.
As shown in the previous chapter, in his response to this temptation Collingwood turned 
to the experience of man’s emancipation from his natural condition so that to posit human 
freedom or self-determination as a criterion for action. A similar attempt, grounded in the 
philosophy of history as the story of man’s emancipation, was undertaken by Andrew
38 O’Neill, ‘Justice’: 51.
39 Ibid.: 46.
40 Charvet, Ethical Community: 185-6.
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Linklater so as to make possible the ‘radical critique of the state which historicism [that is, 
communitarianism] was unable to supply and modem natural law theory was unwilling to 
undertake’.41 However, nature, as a background for historical understanding inseparable from 
the locality of human situations, could not possibly provide a desired universal standpoint. 
Thus Collingwood turned to ‘tradition’, as the modality of man’s engagements with both 
nature and his fellow-beings. This shift of attention, from institutional arrangements to the 
mode of governance, is what, according to Oakeshott, characterized specifically modem 
European political thinking in the first place. Accordingly, Kantian ‘perpetual peace’, sought 
in the confederation of states with republican constitutions, was read as a ‘muddle’, an 
unfortunate theoretical retreat from the achievements of earlier thinkers.
In O’Neill’s reading of Kant’s political writings, however, what makes up a republican 
state is a combination of three requirements quite similar to the three characteristics -  
freedom, constitutiveness, equality -  with which Oakeshott, following Aristotle, begins his 
own exploration of the civil condition. Republican citizens should be free. They recognize 
their mutual dependence on a single shared legal system. And in relation to this legal system 
they are equal.42 The fourth characteristic, non-instrumentality, is implied in O’Neill’s 
interpretation of Kant’s idea of public reason as a strictly procedural way of thinking which 
cannot, and did not for Kant, suggest any institutional arrangement as being intrinsically just 
or peaceful. Commitment to public reason is neither more nor less than a recognized 
obligation to proceed so that every action or argument could be understood by anyone else.
Inherent in this interpretation of public reasoning is a reference to what one believes to be 
possible for others to follow and thus a reference to the ‘private’ identity (both one’s own and 
that of any possible other one may encounter) shaped prior to the exercise of public 
reasoning. Recognizing the problem, O’Neill shifts the emphasis in the Kantian account of 
individual autonomy as self-legislation away from ‘some (rather amazing sort of) self that 
does the legislation’ to the activity of ‘legislation that is not borrowed from unvindicated 
sources, that is not derivative, that is both freely chosen and has the form of law’.43 Thus 
public reasoning is not exempt from the rule that ‘any activity in human life that can count as 
reasoned must be structured’.44 Accordingly, although the known boundaries of humanity 
constitute the only legitimate boundaries of justice, a realistically institutionalized world, and 
this is what Kant proposed, ‘will be a world in which boundaries are not absent, but also one 
in which there are further institutional structures which support international justice between 
states and cosmopolitan justice for people when they interact across borders’.45
41 Linklater, ‘Men and Citizens in International Relations’, Review o f International Studies, 1981, 7: 37.
42 O’Neill, ‘Cosmopolitan Justice’: 58.




Thus O’Neill’s idea of public reasoning requires neither assumptions nor conclusions 
about the substantive equality of homines, save for the belief in their ability to formulate and 
follow authoritative rules, with further insistence that the authority of these rules cannot be 
derived from anything but human freedom. However, it also requires an autonomous subject 
which is less amazing than Kant’s, namely, a subject whose identity is shaped within some 
particular association. Freedom, then, has to be conceptualized along the communitarian lines 
proposed by Charvet.46
It seems that, even with these amendments, cosmopolitanism will still be at odds with 
Oakeshott’s claim that, as cives, humans are free to choose anything but their civil obligation 
which is the counterpart of the authority of respublica. Yet respublica is treated by 
Oakeshott, as far as this is possible, in isolation from any environment. The authority of a 
societas is linked to the territorial boundaries established through the interaction of states 
(which includes universitates) that cannot stand the test to which civil authority is always 
subjected. This does not abrogate the authority of societas altogether, but it does increase 
significantly the ‘play’ in its overall conditions, even when societas is notionally rescued 
from the presence of universitas. Accordingly, the territorial arrangements of a given state 
necessarily fall into the scope of the deliberation of the overall conditions of ‘its’ societas in 
terms of their desirability, that is, within the scope of the activity of politics. And just as 
homines are responsive to the invitation to live ‘so far as is possible as an immortal’, cives 
can respond to the call of the self-authenticating, non-instrumental ‘public reasoning’, 
provided it is a discursive rather than demonstrative engagement, and to converse so far as is 
possible as participants to the conversation of mankind, ‘simply’ because they are capable of 
thinking about those beyond their own borders.
Put differently, O’Neill’s ‘public reason’ can be incorporated into the Oakeshottian 
framework as a ‘sentiment’ in which cives may choose to attend to the overall conditions of 
their societas. Insofar as such deliberation is limited to a given societas, it remains the 
activity of politics. The activity of world politics has to be directed at the overall conditions 
of an ensemble of moral practices enacted and ruled by societates which, in the language of 
the classical approach, constitute international society. Its counterpart in O’Neill is 
‘institutional structures which support international justice between states’. A world divided 
by boundaries policed by universitates would be international system. As the modem 
European state can be understood in terms of both universitas and societas, so international 
system and international society make up world order. They coincide in space and time, and 
neither evolves into the other, although the density of each may vary across time and space. 
Both are human inventions and what distinguishes them is the mode of human association.
O’Neill’s structures supporting ‘cosmopolitan justice for people when they interact across 
borders’ make up world society. As there is no need, in Jackson’s account, to armour
46 Charvet, Ethical Community: 63-85.
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international society with a government, territory or armies of its own, there is no need to 
think about the structures of world society as being more solid than, to use Oakeshott’s 
expression, ‘what a people dreams in its earthly sleep’. Only ‘a people’ now has to be 
substituted not with an impersonal ‘mankind’ but with the individuals capable of visiting 
each other in their civilizational dreams. After all, ‘public reasoning’ is anything but 
‘collective’. Now disposition to participate in the conversation of mankind ought to be 
counterbalanced by the disposition to recognize everything as an occasion, an occasion for 
being kindled by the presence of the ideas of another order, for there is no way of knowing in 
advance of such experience whether a proposed moral rule can be indeed followed by 
concrete others. Put differently, O’Neill’s idea of public reasoning and Charvet’s 
understanding of individual identity, conflicting as they are, have to be put into a single story.
World politics
Like international system and international society, then, world society is a mode of human 
relationship. To deny its existence or importance here and now would be similar to denying 
the existence or importance of self-enactment for human conduct. To expect its arrival, 
through the evolution of international society, in the future, is to endow international society 
with the character of a global universitas. Rather, world society is to be found, if at all, in the 
ongoing conversation among diverse moral traditions unfolding within or across the 
boundaries established and upheld through the practices of international system and 
international society. The stories told in this conversation do not cross state-boundaries 
easily, not least because in such stories individual identity is linked to that of a closed 
territorial unit, while adventures of self-enactment are routinely likened to heroic conquests.47 
Characteristically, O’Neill’s idea of cosmopolitanism, while treating all territorial boundaries 
as conditional, stumbles at the amazing character of a self-legislating subject, whereas the 
global communitarian contract of Charvet, while rejecting any objective standards against 
which to measure our thinking about individual identity, cannot account for the identity of 
states.
Perhaps this tension cannot be resolved. However, the task of a theory of politics is to 
offer an understanding, not a resolution. Thus, despite the superficial similarity between the 
‘classical’ location of international society in-between international system and world society 
and the way Oakeshott locates human conduct in-between two modes of ‘fabrication’, 
Oakeshott’s account of the overall constellation offers an understanding of the individual 
identity that the classical approach, with its exclusive focus on the practices of statespeople, 
cannot provide. The authority of statespeople, however, depends ‘on myths of origin and 
projections of the edge of time’ continuously narrated by ‘ordinary’ people.48 Accordingly,
47 Hume’s ‘marching up directly to the capital or centre’ of all sciences, cited in chapter 3, n. 2, 
provides a paradigmatic example.
48 Walker, ‘The Political’: 311.
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what Nardin presents as ‘the most striking feature of customary international law’ (that its 
standards, as standards of conduct for states and statesmen, are rooted in the judgements of 
the inhabitants of various moral traditions), for Oakeshott would be ‘not a paradox but a 
truism’: any system of lex ‘regulates its own creation’ (151, n. 5) by establishing who and 
how assumes the roles of legislators, adjudicators and rulers within it. The most striking 
feature of international lex indeed consists in that it often does so through such institutions as 
war. Yet even in war it is possible to distinguish policy from politics and laws from manners, 
so as on the ground of these distinctions to distinguish world ruling from world politics.
In this section, I shall draw these distinctions by addressing in turn the two questions 
raised but put by in the beginning of the previous section. Whether in the ‘classical’ alliance 
of international system and international society the latter inevitably becomes the hostage of 
the former. Whether the ongoing conversation or dialogue between diverse moral traditions 
can be understood as the mode of existence of world society. Here I shall draw on the so- 
called ‘critical’ understanding of identity, arguing that Oakeshott’s account of politics is 
closer to this mode of theorizing rather than the classical approach.
Policy and politics
The location of international society in-between international system and world society was 
codified in Hedley Bull’s taxonomy of traditions which associated the classical approach 
with the name of Grotius and distinguished it from the realism of Hobbes and the idealism of 
Kant.49 The names given to the three traditions were meant to indicate dispositions in 
thinking rather than precise theoretical directions. Therefore that line of criticism which 
focuses on the actual pronouncements of Grotius, Hobbes or Kant, highlighting those aspects 
of them that do not fit into this classification, interesting though it may be, is not really 
damaging for the classification as such. After all, one can always change the labels. Another 
line of criticism addresses the very practice of the personification of the state claiming that 
the problem lies not with any personification but with the inadequacy of both ‘classical’ and 
neorealist understanding of personality or identity as such. This results in what Erik Ringmar, 
following Martin Hollis, describes as ‘the two-way vanishing trick’: either the state, endowed 
with a Grotian (or Humean) character, vanishes into the manifold of conventions that make 
up international society the durability of which this state was meant to explain or, in its 
Hobbesian variety, it is kept outside of international system thus making any account of the 
latter non-falsifiable.50
49 Bull, Anarchical Society: 24-7; ‘The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations’, 
in Hugo Grotius and International Relations, eds Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990); ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’, in Diplomatic 
Investigations.
50 Erik Ringmar, ‘On the Ontological Status of the State’, European Journal o f  International Relations, 
1996, 2: 448.
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To maintain their own identities, however, both schools put forward their stories in which 
the state reappears, just like man reappears in the stories which Hobbesians tell about his 
redemption or Humeans about his futile attempts to ‘catch himself. Both stories may be 
flawed in their own terms or those of their rivals; but as stories they stand, if understood 
appropriately: as neither more nor less than a succession of metaphors arranged in a 
particular way for a particular reason. And there are compelling reasons for taking metaphors 
and stories composed of them for what they are -  not a substitute for theorizing, but an 
integral part of any theorizing that attempts to understand the conduct of humans as story­
tellers.
Metaphors are the most basic tools of human understanding and, since understanding is 
involved in every intelligent performance, of human action. They are ‘the currency of 
interpretation just as they are of the texts interpreted’; the very idea that ‘we can escape from 
metaphor to some other conceptual mode -  especially to the idiom of ontology -  is a mistake, 
although those who apparently commit that mistake may in fact covertly be using their own 
metaphors in some more-or-less successful attempt to pre-empt the possibility of rival 
interpretations’.51 Rival stories composed of metaphors are employed to promote interests 
under the conditions of stability or to foster identities in times of crises. In a story of world 
politics which purports to provide an account of both continuity and change, law and war 
appear as ‘not so much contradictory moments -  “morality” [be it Grotian or Kantian] and its 
negation -  as complementary processes which presuppose each other’.52 The outcome of this 
interplay is recognition granted to a particular kind of actors. What such actors, be they 
sovereign princes, social forces or religious movements, are is ‘neither a question of what 
essences constitute [them] nor a question of how [they] conclusively should be defined, but 
instead a question of how [they] are seen and a question of which stories are told about 
[them]’; for what we are as subjects, more generally, ‘is neither more nor less than the total 
collection of stories that we tell and that are told about us’.53
As far as the stories told within International Relations go, the classical approach (what 
Richard Ashley, following Habermas’ classification of cognitive interests, terms ‘practical 
realism’) concentrates on a social order derived ‘from a usually protracted and arduous 
(although not necessarily intentional) struggle to establish and maintain a consensus of co- 
reflective self-understanding: a tradition\ 54 However, as long as the self central to this 
tradition is equated with a state effective in its use of power, practical realism inevitably 
allies itself with its ‘technical’ (instrumentalist) counterpart against any possibility of a
51 Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions o f Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and 
Tradition (London: Duckworth, 1990): 37.
52 Ringmar, ‘The relevance of international law: a Hegelian interpretation of a peculiar seventeenth- 
century preoccupation’, Review o f International Studies, 1995, 21: 97.
53 Ringmar, ‘The State’: 452.
54 Richard Ashley, ‘Political Realism and Human Interests’, International Studies Quarterly, 1981, 2: 
211 .
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universal consensus other than that achieved by the only legitimate participants in such an 
order, states, concerning the proper handling of power. This is not an alliance of equals. 
Practical realism, by accepting the exclusive legitimacy of the state, enjoys in it only partial 
autonomy, whereas technical realism, due to its unfailing capacity to reduce all possible 
concerns to the single measure of efficiency, purports to establish its total autonomy and to 
capture the ‘essence’ of the realist tradition.55
Thus technical realism constitutes, as it were, the hegemonic core of the overall 
construction, whereas practical realism adds only a hermeneutic superstructure which, no 
matter how refined or extended, cannot alter the fundamentals of such an order. Accordingly, 
‘the only kind of criticism that would possibly do away with realism is a global revolutionary 
change that would end the current order of domination without establishing a new one in its 
place’.56 This Ashley launches, as far as the order of theorizing is concerned, by attacking the 
neorealist base of the realist tradition, exposing the connection between its individualism, 
utilitarianism and statism.57 Yet criticism alone rarely brings down hegemonic orders. In his 
next move Ashley engages realism on its own terms: ‘the job is a matter of doing 
interpretative violence to a tradition notorious for its celebration of violence. It is a matter of 
the violent and surreptitious appropriation of a realist community in order to impose a new 
direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game. It is a matter, 
in short, of participating in the making of history’.58
The argument, however, is also targeted at the ‘classics’. International society ‘is not 
hidden away in some deep structure, customary rules, immanent revolutionary imperatives, or 
murky truth behind and unifying a fragmented political experience. It is right there on the 
surface, in the regularized practices, techniques, and rituals of realist power politics’.59 Now 
interpretation is not hostage to the ‘technical’ understanding of power but an exercise of 
power itself, as seen from afar so that ‘there is only interpretation, and interpretation itself is 
comprehended as a practice of domination occurring on the surface of history’.60 
Consequently, there is no interpreting subject in sight to be recognized for anything but a 
contingent nodal point on the turbulent surface of power. As Ashley puts it later, to 
participate in the business of mancraft is to do the job of the state which, by imposing itself in 
the form of the borderline between domesticated order and threatening ‘war’, re-creates a 
‘man’ incapable of recognizing the humanity of ‘strangers’, or coping with his own 
estrangement for that matter, because all otherness is construed as a threat and in this 
capacity constitutes ‘manhood’. To displace the state from its dominant position is not to rob
55 Ibid.: 220-5.
56 Ibid.: 234.
57 Ashley, ‘The poverty of neorealism’, International Organization, 1984, 38: 225-61.
58 Ashley, ‘The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a critical Social Theory of International 




it of its power but to cut off all the moorings of this power, including the idea of subjectivity. 
It is no longer a question of participation in the making of history, but one of ‘the 
historicization and politicization of man as the comer and foundation of modem narratives of 
history’.61
In other words, it seems, the only alternative to the policy of realism is the permanent 
revolution or exile and thus, again, an impulse to impose the predicament onto the whole of 
mankind so that the anticipated end of all order and the end of subject are one. This oneness, 
however, is recognized by Ashley for what it is: yet another promise of finality and yet 
another paradox. The subject-in-estrangement, as a model for an authentically critical 
enterprise, turns out to be conspicuously similar to the central figure of the tradition he 
undertakes to criticize: an heroic, tough-minded character galloping ‘across the surfaces of 
historical experience, a stranger to every place, seldom pausing to... explore any locale, 
eschewing all commitments, always moving as if chasing some fast-retreating end or fleeing 
just ahead of the grasp of some relentless pursuer’.62
Instead of denying this paradoxical similarity, Ashley steps back to introduce a very old 
character onto the scene: the itinerant condottiere, an ‘uprooted, estranged, nomadic figure, 
who is never far from engagement in battle but who, in his engagements, is committed to 
nothing other than an abstract and mobile will to territorialize, to make some sort of 
sovereign territorialization of life work, wherever he might be’.63 His ‘subjective posture’, 
characteristic though it may be of the ‘conversational battlefield’ of International Relations, 
is not uniform. Under conditions of estrangement, that is, when ‘the subject does not relate to 
self and circumstances in a relation of unquestioned familiarity’, it assumes three different 
shapes: ‘a project, an effect, or a work of art... in which one’s own participation is 
required’.64
The driving impulse in all the encounters of the itinerant condottiere, as in all the 
struggles for power and peace of the Augustinian realist, is this loss of ‘unquestioned 
familiarity’, understood by realism as the lack of a given, fixed ‘balance’ and by 
poststructuralism as the absence of a fixed, essential ‘centre’. To this he responds, first, by 
establishing a realm where ‘a word... can never lack for power,... can never fail to prevail, 
because its claims to represent the ultimate source of power can never be doubted’; second, 
by accepting the impossibility of such a realm and compensating for this loss ‘by effecting 
here or there whatever can be made effectively to count as a territory of self-evident being’
61 Ashley, ‘Living on Border Lines: Man, Postructuralism and War’, in Intemational/Intertextual 
Relations: Postmodern Readings o f World Politics, eds James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (New 
York: Lexington, 1989): 309.
62 Ashley, ‘The achievements of post-structuralism’, in Positivism and Beyond: 240.
63 Ibid.: 250-1. (Condottiere is most probably borrowed from Machiavelli; perhaps, with some 
mediation by Arendt: an actor who rose ‘from low conditions into the splendour of the public sphere 
and from insignificance to a power to which [he] previously had been subjected’. Revolution: 36.)
64 Ibid.: 252.
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through an act of will, ‘a will to territorialize, a territorializing intentionality, in the making 
of self and selves’; and third, by refusing to be ‘mesmerized by the works he creates,... 
trapped within the territories he would inscribe,... to mistake his renditions for earthly 
realizations of the ideal’.65
Thus Ashley’s own, ‘critical’, story returns to its starting point, the triadic rendition of the 
realist tradition. Now, however, ‘criticism’ is not meant, as was the case with the critical 
theory’s emancipatory project, to widen the hermeneutic circle of the classical approach 
beyond those experiences ‘that are personally meaningful in terms of the “true tradition’s” 
personal prehistory’ so as ‘to embrace the whole of international society and its history, not 
just a “true tradition” of statesmanship’.66 Rather, insofar as the three modes of estrangement 
make up a single character, criticism is located in the very centre of this character and this 
tradition, while being accompanied by the acknowledgement that no such centre can ever be 
fixed within any territory of meaning and is ‘ever nomadic, ever ready to move on in search, 
not of a destination, not of an end, but of whatever localities might be made the object of a 
strategy, an art of life, a way of problematizing self and selves’.67 What is rejected here is 
neither subject nor tradition, but the hegemony of one mode of action and contemplation; that 
is, Oakeshottian ‘barbarism’. What is defended is a balance of dispositions, virtues, or 
‘sentiments’ in which the condottieri of international relations and International Relations are 
coping with their mutual estrangement in a shared public space.
Oakeshott’s restless adventurers are much closer to Ashley’s condottieri than they are to 
the princely statespeople of the classical approach. It is not altogether impossible to relate 
Ashley’s three modes of estrangement to Oakeshott’s traditions of Reason and Nature, Will 
and Artifice, and Rational Will. Yet more immediate connection exists between ‘a word that 
never lacks for power’ and Hobbesian ‘absolutism’, between that which ‘counts as a territory 
of self-evident being’ and Humean ‘conventionalism’, between refusal to get trapped within 
the territories once inscribed and Nietzschean ‘genealogy’. What makes all these stories 
‘political’ is not merely that they ‘support, or undermine, a certain perspective on the world 
and hence also a certain distribution of power’ but also the manner in which, by envisaging 
particular trajectories through which the past has turned into the present and might develop 
towards the future, they set the parameters for possible action: ‘The tension of a plot needs to 
be released... and release can only come about through the actions that the characters of the 
story perform. From the perspective of these characters, the “directedness” of the story -  its 
movement from “once-upon-a-time” to “happily-ever-after” -  thus comes to correspond to the 
intentional quality of action’.68
65 Ibid.: 253.
66 Ashley, ‘Realism’: 230.
67 Ashley, ‘Post-structuralism’: 253.
68 Ringmar, ‘The State’: 455.
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In the ‘critical’ story, at least as it is presented here, release is sought not in the
transcendence of the monotonous and repetitive world of realism but in the gradual
effacement of it through that very recurrence and repetition on which realism insists. Far
from celebrating the ‘death of subject’ or the end of the territorial world, this story presents
its subject and the world it inhabits as being at once unbearably heavy and unbearably light,
while world politics appears in it as a world-effacing procedure of continuous return.69
There is, however, one quality in the character of Ashley’s itinerant condottiere which
distinguishes him from the Oakeshottian ‘self-employed adventurers of unpredictable fancy’,
namely that: ‘Even from his own most beautiful accomplishments he is estranged, knowing
that they can never be more than contingent effects, ever threatening to come undone’.70 Not
that Oakeshottian individuals are unaware of the fragility of what they call poetry. The
difference has more to do with their willingness to form attachments and the corresponding
belief that without some such ability no awareness of either space or time or poetry would be
possible. Ashley’s story questions the conqueror of the hegemonic discourse and lures him
into accepting the wanderer in oneself, someone who is ‘trying like the Flying Dutchman to
escape from himself, not so much because of the ‘closeness of the home atmosphere, the
coldness there, the intolerable ache of discords always repeated and right notes never struck’
but rather because ‘the world is too much with us, and we are too much with ourselves’.71
What this story assumes without much questioning (and not without some reasons) is the
war-inspired imagery of the human condition. An Oakeshottian response to this would be not
to deny the prevalence of conflict in human life but to assert that there is more to life than
one particular kind of conflict:
while it may seem plausible that the prevalence of political individualism on its own be 
attributed to the fortunate outcome of politico-military struggles in history... it is much 
less obvious that the hold on us of the reigning images of sexual love and personal 
fulfilment is to be explained in the same terms. We can indeed speak of these emerging 
through a struggle. But this has partly been the struggle of daily life, in which individuals 
and couples strive to make sense of their lives and give shape to their hopes, fears and 
aspirations.... [We] still have some way to go before we understand the terms and the 
nature of this struggle... [but war] and the preparations for war... [do not] even begin to 
give us the key.72
Ashley’s analysis of tradition, I want to suggest, is misplaced because any system of 
relations that does not include some reference to these ‘struggles of daily life’ cannot be 
properly called ‘tradition’. At the same time, tradition proper includes references both to the 
world and to society and thus to what may be described as world society.
Laws and manners
69 Ashley, ‘Post-structuralism’: 252.
70 Ibid.: 253.
71 George Santayana, ‘The Philosophy of Travel’, The Virginia Quarterly Review, 1964, 40: 7-8.
72 Charles Taylor, ‘The hermeneutics of conflict’, in Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his 
Critics, ed. James Tully (Cambridge: Polity Press 1988): 225-8.
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Like O’Neill and Charvet, Ashley problematizes the link between man and the state. Man in 
his story acquires more interesting contours than in those of Nardin or Jackson but, to dwell 
on Jackson’s metaphor, he also happens to be a Sisyphus condemned to carrying a 
Machtstaat on his shoulders while reflecting on its and his own closely interlinked fortunes. 
The link between international system and international society remains intact and, although 
this alliance is no longer opposed to the ongoing dialogue of individuals, the dialogue itself 
turns out to be a ‘conversational battlefield’. An ‘extreme of loneliness and impotence’ this 
image indicates is reminiscent of ‘the most antipolitical experience there is’, death, rendered 
paradoxical and deprived of its finality by the figure of eternal return.73 In this, the story is 
close to that of realism indeed: ‘Human beings are not prepared to accept that there are 
conditions -  the “state of nature” -  which does not end.... Since it has no proper ending, the... 
story has no readily graspable sense morale and no morally edifying conclusion can be drawn 
from it. Not surprisingly, the being -  the state -  which appears in, and through, this account 
will at the same time seem unbearably heavy and unbearably light’.74
This assessment draws on the Aristotelian understanding of story-telling, with its 
insistence on the cathartic quality of the story, but the teleology implied in it seems to suggest 
the same land of ‘evolutionism’ that the classical approach presupposes in its location of 
international society. However, a closer look at what a ‘conclusion’ might mean in this 
context discloses a possibility of a different story.
For Oakeshott, it is likely to begin with Hobbes, but a Hobbes rather different from that of 
realism. Man in this story is solitary ‘in the sense that he belongs to no order and has no 
obligations’. His desires ‘are centred upon no final achievement, but are confined to 
obtaining what he has set his mind upon in each moment of his existence’. His happiness is 
hindered by fear ‘that his natural powers will be insufficient to assure him of the satisfaction 
of his next desire’. His salvation is sought in some agreement with his fellow-inhabitants of 
the world ‘which may establish a kind of superficial peace and orderliness’. But this is only a 
‘lesser fear’ and an agreement as transitory as all other satisfactions he seeks. The great fear 
that cannot be removed is ‘the constant fear that death may supervene and put an end to 
satisfaction by terminating desire’. Awareness of this great fear offers an opportunity to 
ignore the lesser one, but only for ‘those who possess a certain nobility of temperament 
which refuses the indignity of unconditional competition’ (HCA 161-2).
Importantly, Oakeshott locates Hobbes at a point of rupture in the civilizational dream, 
when the proud myth of the Fall of Man was losing its power, ‘but before the tide of science, 
with its project of destroying all myth, had begun to sweep over our civilization’. Hobbes,
73 Arendt, On Violence; see note 4 in the Prologue. Of course, poststructuralist engagement is not 
exhausted by this metaphor. More optimistic accounts call for the exploration of the possibilities ‘after 
eternity’ (Walker, ‘The Political’: 322). One of Ashley’s remarks, however, is noteworthy: ‘I confess 
that I can summon little optimism in reply’. ‘Post-structuralism’: 248.
74 Ringmar, ‘The State’: 454 and 461, n. 15.
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then, ‘recalls us to our mortality’ and, ‘with a sure and steady irony, does what... the literature 
of Existentialism is doing today with an exaggerated display of emotion and a false 
suggestion of novelty’ (163). Later, Oakeshott, with the same sure and steady irony, recalls 
an earlier beginning of this story: ‘Zeus had commissioned Hermes to teach mankind how to 
manage the condition of mortality with understanding: the cunning of Prometheus had 
already enabled them to exploit the resources of the earth, but they had yet to leam how to 
accept rerum mortalia with grace’ (OH 181).
Thus, if Collingwood attempted to ascertain the ‘directedness’ of human life by reference 
to its beginning in ‘a red and wrinkled lump of flesh having no will of its own at all’, 
Oakeshott refers to its unavoidable ending, but for the same reason of establishing not so 
much a ‘superficial orderliness’ but ‘a certain nobility of temperament’ which may grace life 
with a sense of individual achievement. Both reach out for the experiences of ‘ordinary’ life 
so as to account for the possibility of the ‘extraordinary’ in it. This, again, brings certain 
Aristotelian themes into the story but in a way which is sensitive to the standard criticism of 
Aristotle.75
Collingwood, in his discussion of Plato’s and Aristotle’s writings on poetry, stresses one 
difference in their accounts. Plato describes tragedy as generating in the audience emotions 
unfitted for practical life and concludes that ‘tragedy is detrimental to the practical life of its 
audience’. In Aristotle, emotions ‘are not in fact allowed to remain burdening the mind of the 
audience. They are discharged in the experience of watching the tragedy’ (PA 51). This 
cathartic quality of tragedy, however, is achieved, according to Aristotle, not by the ending as 
such but by the necessary presence of the ‘marvellous’ in the action, rather than specific 
characters, presented in the story: ‘Tragedy is primarily an imitation of action, and... it is 
mainly for the sake of the action that it imitates the personal agents’. The most beautiful 
characters, like the most beautiful colours in a painting which lacks order, ‘will not give one 
the same pleasure as a simple black-and-white sketch of a portrait’.76 What is intimated by the 
marvellous and reflected through it in any order is the ‘true nature of things’, and in this 
manner Aristotle’s teleology as well as his theory of form and matter re-establish themselves.
However, as Collingwood’s discussion of metaphysics, Burke’s reference to the 
marvellous or sublime in politics, or Oakeshott’s account of poetry demonstrate, one does not 
have to follow Aristotle to the bitter end to retain some aspects of his understanding of order. 
In fact, none of the contemporary neo-Aristotelians does so, just as none of the contemporary 
neo-Kantians holds to Kant’s two-world metaphysics or his Newtonian theory of action. A 
central issue in the current debate between them is whether cosmopolitanism can be 
reconciled with contextual sensitivity.77 What is preserved in the neo-Aristotelian accounts of
75 Cf.: Charvet, Eithical Community: 10.
76 Aristotle, On the Art o f Poetry, tr. Ingram Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920): 38.
77 Seyla Benhabib, ‘Judgement and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Arendt’s Thought’, Political 
Theory, 1988, 1:41.
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order is a certain, but in no way unconditional, reverence towards ‘most beautiful 
accomplishments’ specific to particular traditions. After all, even Nietzsche did not restrict 
his list of possible histories to the antiquarian and critical ones. There was also the 
‘monumental history’ which, when at its best, was ‘addressed to political actors, to remind 
them that great deeds were performed by notable men and that what was once feasible is at 
least possible again’.78
The specific problem of International Relations, according to Martin Wight, is that there
are few great deeds to report and even less notable reporters.79 The classical approach
emerged as a response to this challenge: ‘Yes, there is little that is given to us by the great
political theorists, but the difference that today makes requires a re-enactment of their
conversation, to be staged in Kaliningrad rather than Konigsberg’.80 Quite often, however, it
slipped into the antiquarian understanding of history as a storage of the universally valid
ideas in need of re-legitimization in the form of the ‘true tradition’.
Responding to Hans Morgenthau’s evocation of such a tradition with its alleged reliance
on ‘higher faculties of mind’ needed by statesmen to cope with the ‘tragic sense of life’ and
‘the unresolved discord, contradictions and conflicts which are inherent in the nature of
things’, Oakeshott remarked:
This comes pretty close to the higher nonsense.... What, of course, the statesman requires 
is nothing higher than the ordinary ‘faculties’ and ordinary knowledge that everyone (even 
the convinced rationalist) uses every day in the conduct of his life and in his relations with 
other men.... To children and to romantic women, but to no one else, it may appear ‘tragic’ 
that we cannot enjoy Spring without Winter, eternal youth, and passion always at the 
height of its beginning. And only a rationalistic reformer will confuse the imperfection 
which can be remedied with the so-called imperfection which cannot, and will think of the 
irremovability of the latter as a tragedy. The rest of us know that no rationalistic justice 
(with its project of approximating people to things), and no possible degree of human 
prosperity, can ever remove mercy and charity from their place of first importance in the 
relations of human beings, and know also that this situation cannot properly be considered 
either imperfect or a tragedy (RP 107-8).
Characteristically, Oakeshott’s own image of government as ‘the cool touch of the mountain 
that one feels in the plain even on the hottest summer day’ (R 434) is built up from such day- 
to-day images as ‘a favourite view’, ‘the death of friends’, ‘the retirement of a favourite 
clown’, ‘the loss of abilities enjoyed and their replacement by others’ (409). Such a 
government should be capable of injecting into the heat of the daily clash of beliefs, ‘into our 
enthusiasm for saving the souls of our neighbours or of all mankind... an ingredient, not of 
reason (how should we expect that?) but of irony that is prepared to counteract one vice by 
another, of the raillery that deflates extravagance without itself pretending to wisdom, of the
78 Judith Shklar, ‘Rethinking the Past’, Social Research, 1977, 44: 80.
79 Wight, ‘International Theory’.
80 Michael Donelan, ‘Political Theorists and International Relations’, in his The Reason o f  States: A 
Study in International Political Theory (London: Allen & Unwin, 1978) and Elements o f  International 
Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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mockery that disperses tension’. But it is an addition to all these human enthusiasms and
extravagances, not a denial of them. It is needed ‘to do for us the scepticism we have neither
the time nor the inclination to do for ourselves’ (R 433-4).
To translate this into the language of the classical approach, a ‘conservative’ acquiescence
to the authority of international society presupposes quiescence, a point of serenity and
stillness worthy of being conservative about. In the case of human conduct in the world of
states, this is likely to be found not in contingently established territorial boundaries, and thus
in the reified alliance with international system, but in the daily experiences of ‘ordinary life’
which constitute a kind of ‘world society’. The term, it seems, does not really belong to this
context and a closer look is needed at what is meant by ‘world’ and ‘society’ in it.
The Aristotelian ‘marvellous’ of the ongoing conversations of daily life is meaningful,
first and foremost, as ‘the projection of a world which I could inhabit’.81 This world cannot
be closed by any single vision, but nor can it be limited to anything short of the total
mediation in which ‘all human tidings... speak to us’, because our ability, as well as the
inclination, to expand the horizons of our immediate worlds beyond those of immediate
perception is rooted in the experiences of growing up, meeting a friend (‘My, but he has
grown old’) or hearing of the death of an acquaintance:
how suddenly the person’s mode of being changes, how permanent he becomes, how 
much purer, not necessarily better in a moral or affectionate way, but rather with closed 
and clearly defined contours -  all this for the simple and evident reason that we can expect 
no more from him, and can do nothing more for him. The experience of this extreme case 
seems... to be a mode of knowledge. What emerges from it is truth.... That something 
suddenly stands still and remains standing still seems to help the truth to speak.
This truth intimates not only the interplay of the continuity and discontinuity of time and 
space but also their reality. Although the world is available to us only through language, our 
consciousness of history, and thus of ourselves as ‘historic’ self-enacted individuals, ‘is 
determined by real events rather than left on its own to float free over against the past’. These 
events are real insofar as they do not let themselves be forgotten and call for decisions that 
cannot be suspended: the foreignness ‘which we experience forces us to deal with it and... to 
take its truth [and the truth of a single world] upon ourselves’.82
No society, no association, however ‘civil’, can shield itself from this experience of 
foreignness by its vernacular moral language because any such language is inevitably 
saturated with this experience. Thus Alasdair MacIntyre, for example, in his engagement with 
the different modes of moral inquiry, links the interminability of contemporary debates, and 
conflict more generally, to the incoherence of our conceptual vocabulary with many of its 
terms being unrecognized survivals of forgotten and radically different ethical systems. More 
precisely, it is in the character of rationalism to misconstrue the multilayered nature of moral
81 Ricoeur, ‘Phenomenology and Hermeneutics’, Nous, 1975, 9: 93.
82 Gadamer, ‘The Continuity of History and the Existential Moment’, Philosophy Today, 1972, 16: 234- 
9.
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discourse and to exacerbate disagreement by postulating agreement as an absolute value.83 
Nietzschean genealogy understands the problem acutely but adds the despair of endless 
perspectivism to the failure of the morality of rules to cope with contingency. What is needed 
is a positive addition to the negative morality of rules, ‘a certain nobility of temperament’, 
enabling humans to face those situations in which a movement between different sets of rules 
has to be considered in the absence of any readily available rule for such consideration. The 
starting point is to recognize that to enter an association is to be drafted into one social role or 
another. Roles entail dispositions for acting, virtues, and so with roles, as with rules, one has 
to be able to move between them without experiencing incoherencies amidst such 
dispositions. Roles are shaped by wider social contexts -  practices -  with their intrinsic 
standards of excellence. Since we partake of different practices throughout our lives, 
practices need to be part of a broader context which ensures the overall coherence of different 
standards.
This is tradition, an image of the broadest available, historically contingent social whole 
within which various practices are so constituted that the intrinsic dispositions of each of 
them cohere with those of all possible others. More precisely, this is an image implicitly held 
by every human association, however small or localized, ‘a dream that a people dreams in its 
earthly sleep’, and continuously negotiated with its neighbours. This imagined order of 
dispositions is itself a disposition, that of a conditionally well-ordered tradition as a kind of 
experience.
In this manner, ‘world’ and ‘society’ come together in the form of ‘tradition’. No state, no 
bounded community can embody tradition thus understood. Equating tradition with local 
communities leaves them with nothing to guard themselves against ‘corruption by 
narrowness, by complacency, by prejudice against outsiders and by a whole range of other 
deformities, including those that arise from a cult of local community’.84 Equating it with the 
state entails outcomes perhaps even more ‘ludicrous or disastrous or both’, for the 
counterpart of such misconception of the state ‘is a misconception of its citizens as 
constituting a Volk, a type of collectivity whose bonds are simultaneously to extend to the 
entire body of citizens and yet to be as binding as the ties of kinship and locality. In a modem 
large-scale nation-state no such collectivity is possible and the pretence that it is is always an 
ideological disguise for sinister realities’. The modem state does provide important goods, 
but as long as ‘the rhetoric of the nation-state presents it as the provider of something that is 
indeed, in this stronger sense, a common good, that rhetoric is a purveyor of dangerous 
fictions’.85
83 For MacIntyre’s argument see After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1985); 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988); Three Rival Versions.
84 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: 142. In this work, MacIntyre does not use the word 
‘tradition’. However, the one he does use, ‘the network of giving and receiving’, accords well both with 
the etymology of traditio and his earlier writings on ‘tradition’.
85 Ibid.: 132-3.
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Insofar as the state cannot provide this kind of good, the small class of statespeople
routinely referred to as ‘politicians’ in their capacity of the agents of the state have little, if
anything, to contribute to the activities of deliberation and persuasion constitutive of politics
proper, neither domestically nor internationally. This is not to say that genuine ‘politicians’
cannot, on occasion, occupy this or that office of the state, only that the occupation of any
such office, of itself, does not make one a ‘politician’. Accordingly, world politics is likely to
be found, if at all, not at the conferences of the Plenipotentiaries but in the comparative study
of local associations ‘at their best and at their worst, and most of all examples of
communities that have been or are open to alternative possibilities and that sometimes move
towards the better and sometimes towards the worst’:
What such comparative studies will bring home to us is both the variety of social forms 
within which networks of giving and receiving can be institutionalized and the variety of 
ways in which such networks can be sustained and strengthened or weakened and 
destroyed. Different conditions pose different threats and in turn require different 
responses. Yet the tasks that have to be undertaken to meet these threats share a great deal 
in common. So it is, for example, with the tasks of providing for the security of a local 
community from internal crime or external aggression, tasks that can never safely be 
handed over completely to the agencies of the state. (On occasion it is the danger 
presented by just those agencies that has to be guarded against.)86
A specific contribution of International Relations to such interdisciplinary inquiry may 
consist in exploring all such localities in relation to the idea of world order as constituted by 
international system and international society. This will involve the ‘critical’ task of 
unbundling the territoriality of international society by distinguishing it from international 
system: ‘To this task belongs the destruction of all romantic illusions regarding the good old 
days and the snug security provided by a Christian cosmos’, while International Relations 
will ally itself with philosophy which recognizes itself ‘as a kind of secularized eschatology, 
possessing a kind of expectancy which takes pride in expecting nothing definite, but being, as 
it were, a kind of challenge.87 There would also be a place, then, for a ‘conservative’ 
engagement that does not seek to defend the state from such a criticism or to protect 
international society by means of international system, but reaches out instead towards 
tradition as a kind of world society on the assumption that ‘the technological dream 
entertained by our time is really just a dream, a series of changes and transformations in our 
world, which, when compared to the actual realities of our life, has a phantom-like and 
arbitrary character’:
What is involved is not a plea for the preservation of the existing order. The concern is 
simply with a readjustment of our consciousness. The conservative, like the revolutionary, 
seems to... require a similar rectification of his understanding. The unavoidable and 
unpredictable realities -  birth and death, youth and age, native and foreign, determination 
and freedom -  demand the same recognition from both groups. These realities have 
measured out what men can plan and what they can achieve. Continents and empires,
86 Ibid.: 143.
87 Gadamer, ‘Notes on Planning for the Future’, Dcedalus, 1965: 589.
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revolutions in power and in thought, the planning and organization of life on our planet
and outside it, will not be able to exceed a measure which perhaps no one knows and to
which, nevertheless, all are subject.88
In both cases, what is involved is the exploration of limits. Insofar as politics generally is 
understood as the exploration of not just any limits but the limits of the civil condition, world 
politics may be understood as an activity of ‘traditional’ self-enacted individuals thinking an 
speaking about the overall conditions of international society as it exists alongside 
international system, that is, as it exists as a constitutive part of world order. Here everyone 
‘must learn to speak for himself and in the process establish his own history. And, should 
even the most farfetched mechanization of society be successful, man will not lose this 
uniqueness. The age of post-history into which we are now proceeding will find its limits in 
this distinctiveness of man’.89
Tradition and neotraditionalism
World order, then, can be understood in terms of two ideal characters similar to Oakeshott’s 
enterprise and civil associations. The former does not have to be a co-operative association of 
states, just as the latter does not have to be a global association of individuals. What matters 
rather is the terms of association. A transactional association of states as universitates would 
be similar in its postulates and characteristics to the international system of neorealism, while 
civil association of the same states as societates would closely match the international society 
of the classical approach. However, both universitas and societas exist only in the self- 
understandings of human beings (and that only in the specific context of modernity) and no 
world order could ever exist without some idea of world society. If the difference between 
international system and international society may be understood in terms of the distinction 
between policy and politics, then international society and world society are related to each 
other as the system of lex and a manifold of the moral-legal self-understandings of human 
beings as members of particular associations. Each of these self-understandings is always 
ridden with internal contradictions, always ‘more stable in its style of deliberation than in its 
conclusions’.
There is no such style of deliberation that is common to the whole of mankind. Yet, even 
in the most closed associations, humans may be said to ‘believe they are free and open to the 
universal; their differential character makes the narrowest cultural fields seem exhaustible 
from within’, whereas difference, which ‘exists outside the system is terrifying, because it 
reveals the truth of the system, its relativity, its fragility, its mortality’.90 By referring to 
world society as ‘tradition’, I do not mean its content or boundaries but the recurrence of the 
disposition, characteristic perhaps of all specific traditions, to make sense of the world while 
mediating the ever-shifting balance of differences within and across specific associations. No
88 Ibid.: 589.
89 Ibid.: 587.
90 Rene Girard, The Scapegoat (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986): 21, 22.
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cTable 6.1 .A  ‘dry wall ’ image o f  world order
world, certainly no social world, may be said to exist apart from this ongoing attempt to make 
sense of it. International society is at once a contingent outcome of the interactions of states 
and a public concern of those inclined to make sense of the world politically. World politics, 
then, is persons without authority negotiating their views of international society with holders 
of offices of authority within it. It is ‘conservative’ insofar as the authority of international 
society itself remains unquestioned. Insofar as the authority in question is not that of the 
actually-existing states, it is necessarily ‘critical’ towards these states and their claims to 
represent what they are not and cannot possibly be -  actually-existing respublicum, even less 
so the embodiments of tradition.
All this can be presented through a simplified image (Fig. 6.1). Triangles abf bed and fde  
represent the universitates that, together with the entrepreneurial, be it transactional or co­
operative, global practice ace, compose international system. Each of the universitates is 
joined by a societas presented in the shape of a circle. These societates, together with the 
global civil practice (ace-circle), compose international society. World society may be said to 
exist at ‘the points where circles intersect’ which, of course, cannot be found on any map or 
drawing but exist only in the interactions of individuals who, in their ‘traditional’ ways, try
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the best they can to make sense of their lives, their immediate life-worlds, but also the world 
which all of them could inhabit.91
Still, maps and drawings have their circumstantial value. The value of the one I have just 
presented consists in the possibility of showing how the same image may be located at the 
heart of contemporary International Relations, rather than ‘beyond’ it, where various critical 
approaches are locating their understanding of politics. The point is to show how 
International Relations, with its initial claim to make a difference by being a discipline 
separate from political theory, can be anatomized on its own terms and then re-assembled 
into an International Political Theory, that is, a mode of inquiry which is congruent with its 
subject-matter. To be sure, this would be just one possible perspective from which to 
examine the field. In the next chapter I shall outline it as ‘neotraditionalism’.
91 Cf.: Toni Erskine, ‘“Citizen of Nowhere” or “The Point Where Circles Intersect”? Impartialist and 
Embedded Cosmopolitanisms’, Review o f International Studies, 2002, 3: 457-478; William Connolly, 
“Speed, Concentric Circles and Cosmopolitanism”, Political Theory, 2000, 5: 596-618. Note, that 
Erskine’s and Connolly’s ideas of individual identity are significantly different. Without going into 
detail, it may be said that Erskine is drawing on O’Neill’s account of the possibility of multiple 
identities, whereas Connolly is exploring the possibilities of identities negotiated under the conditions 
of difference.
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7Neotraditionalism in International Relations
What has been presented so far is the neotraditionalist idea of world politics based on 
Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s approaches to knowledge and politics. What was promised in 
the beginning was a point of conditional unity between this idea of world politics, the way of 
political theorizing by which it was arrived at, and contemporary International Relations. So 
an account of International Relations is due.
Needless to say, this can be only a very limited account centred around three closely 
related themes explored in the following order: the shortcomings of the rationalist-reflectivist 
debate, neotraditionalism as a way out of this debate, the place of international political 
theory as seen from the neotraditionalist perspective. Collingwood and Oakeshott are hardly 
mentioned now. The task, to employ one of Collingwood’s metaphors, is to dig out a tunnel 
through contemporary discourse in hope that it will lead to the same point as did the 
exploration of Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s writings, that is, to the same understanding of 
politics and theorizing. This hope is not unfounded, the major premise of this account is the 
same as in the previous discussion: in theorizing, as in conduct, practice always precedes 
reflection. Accordingly, discussion will proceed by way of reordering the images of the 
discipline already presented from within existing approaches. These images, to use Erik 
Ringmar’s metaphor, will be attended to as still-pictures, taken at various stages in the 
rationalist-reflectivist debate, and put into motion by a story about its rise and fall. The 
metaphor of the rise and fall itself is borrowed for this occasion from Ole Waever on whose 
account of the fortunes of the inter-paradigm debate my story is closely modelled, beginning, 
by way of introduction, at the crossroad at which a turn from philosophic interpretation to 
scientific explanation was taken, or at least suggested.1
1 Ole Wasver, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Interparadigm Debate’, in Positivism and Beyond: 149-85.
The 1980s was a decade of extensive metatheorizing. One reason for that was given by 
Kenneth Waltz: ‘Nothing seems to accumulate, not even criticism’.2 The discipline was in 
need of a holding operation. Despite the variety of conceptualizations offered at that time, 
there was a certain degree of consensus about the overall triadic configuration of both the 
world of practice and the field of theory. Competing positions were referred to as realist, 
pluralist and Marxist. Realists saw the world as composed of self-seeking states, pluralists 
added to this a web of institutional arrangements, Marxists emphasized the role of global 
structures in fostering the distributions of resources across the system.3
The structure of Waltz’s Theory reflects this. Waltz outlines his own position by arguing 
on two fronts, against both Marxists and traditionalists/behaviourists, and three points need to 
be noticed about this strategy. First, Waltz’s ‘borrowing’ from all three principal approaches. 
Marxian emphasis on the economic structure is off-set by the pluralist view of the world as 
divided into autonomous political units, which, however, in accordance with the realist 
reading of the situation, are states and states only. Second, Waltz positions himself so as to be 
able to gloss over the various divisions within each of his rivals’ camp by claiming that 
traditionalists and behaviourists are cast from the same mould and so are the various 
Marxists. The former reduce the workings of the international system to the properties of its 
units, the latter reduce the operation of the system to economics. Finally, although similar 
attempts at providing a comprehensive account of the field were undertaken by both Marxists 
and pluralists, Waltzian was the only one that supplemented such an account with a 
corresponding conception of science.4
However, it was this conception of science that facilitated the rapid disintegration of the 
two theoretical poles -  Marxist and traditionalist/behaviourist -  constructed by Waltz. 
Behaviourists accepted the new conception of science since it offered a resolution of the 
unsettled issues in their own polemics with traditionalists while not obliging them to 
subscribe to a uniform political position: Waltzian structuralism left enough space for a 
debate on the role of international institutions. Traditionalists were slow in responding to this 
sudden realignment brought about by someone whom they considered to be one of them in 
the previous debates. Yet the arguments in their defence were advanced by those Marxists 
who, in response to the Waltzian treatment of them as the unimaginative successors of 
Hobson and Lenin, displayed such diversity and richness of their intellectual inheritance that
2 Waltz, Theory: 18.
3 Cf.: Michael Banks, ‘The Inter-Paradigm Debate’, in International Relations: A Handbook o f Current 
Theory, eds Margot Light and AJ.R. Groom (London: Pinter Publishers, 1985): 7-26.
4 See Immanuel Wallerstein, Modem World-System (San Diego: Academic Press, 1974), for the 
Marxist position and Stanley Hoffinann, Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy Since the 
Cold War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), for the pluralist one.
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it seemed no longer meaningful to refer to them as ‘Marxists’. The new challengers came 
from all sorts of dialectical quarters and shared with traditionalists their abhorrence of the 
‘scientific man’ who did not begin to look more attractive once he embraced power-politics.
What was at stake, for the new critics, was not merely a conception of structure different 
from those of Wallerstein or Waltz, for example. They problematized any totality, in terms of 
the possibility of a co-existence of differently construed contexts, or in terms of the 
possibility of such contexts’ evolutionary succession, and invariably in view of its relation to 
agency. From these concerns followed the distinction between problem-solving and critical 
theories.5 The goal of the former consisted in the management of the system taken as a value- 
free fact, the latter was supposed to uncover the political and normative underpinnings of 
such a system and to promote human emancipation from the structural constraints thus 
imposed upon human agency, which implied a move beyond International Relations.
The latter approach yielded an account of the theoretical field different from Waltz’s. The 
discipline was constituted by the three poles again -  traditionalist, behaviourist and radical- 
dialectical -  each sustained by a dialectical opposition within itself and with its neighbours. 
Emancipation, practical and theoretical, would have consisted in reaching the intersection of 
the three hypothetical approaches which, originating within each of the three initial poles, 
addressed both of their rivals with ideal impartiality. This intersection marked the point of 
‘complete cosmopolitanism’ or ‘perfect pluralism’ embodying, on a higher level, the same 
opposition between universalism and particularism as all the individual poles (Fig. 7.1).6
For such an ideal point to be reached, two conditions had to be met. Firstly, each pole 
should be assigned equal theoretical value. Secondly, higher value should be assigned to 
communication between them. This hierarchy of values, however, presupposes the possibility 
of judging the individual approaches in accordance with their willingness and ability to 
practice impartial communication, but, as the analysis conducted by the authors of this 
account, Hayward Alker and Thomas Biersteker, demonstrated, traditionalism, behaviourism 
and radicalism were far from being equal in this regard, either in the university curriculum or 
in the international arena.
Not surprisingly, three alternative accounts followed. The first came from the pluralist 
camp. If competing approaches, or paradigms, could not be assumed to be impartial, why not 
assume them as being reasonably indifferent, so that each is just ‘passing by, to engage in a
5 Cox, ‘Social Forces’.
6 Hayward Alker and Thomas Biersteker, ‘The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for the Future 
Archeologist of International Savoir Faire\ International Studies Quarterly, 1984, 28: 121-42. Fig. 7.1 
puts together three diagrams of Alker and Biersteker. This does not alter the substance of their image of 
the discipline but highlights a particular shape of the field, to be conceptualized further in Fig. 7.4, 
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Fig. 7.1. The image o f  the discipline at the end o f  the inter-paradigm debate (Alker-Biersteker, 1984).
separate conversation with the subject-matter’? Yet, on the same account, different paradigms 
were supposed to constitute a totality of ‘discourse about choice of analytic frameworks’ 
from which all smaller ‘islands of theory’ derived their meaning.7 This relaxed attitude 
towards the standards of choice could only result in the proliferation of frameworks without 
any increase in one’s capacity for choosing the right thing, and so another response from the 
radical pole followed, stating that ‘there is no longer any clear sense of what the discipline is
7 Banks, ‘The Inter-Paradigm Debate’.
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about, what its core concepts are, what its methodology should be, what central issues and 
questions it should be addressing’.8 This response did not stop at the level of critique but 
suggested an alternative. Ideals were stated clearly and various approaches ranked 
accordingly. Their number remained the same, Wight’s ‘realism’, ‘rationalism’ and 
‘revolutionism’ were taken as a starting point for further re-arrangement, but the triangular 
image gave way to the linear, evolutionary one: ‘realism, rationalism and revolutionism (for 
which now critical international theory will be substituted...) form a sequence of 
progressively more adequate approaches to world politics’.9 A search for the diplomatic 
consensus constitutes an advance beyond a theory of the balance of material capabilities, and 
it is no longer a middle-ground but a middle-station on the way to human emancipation.
The pluralist case was restated, this time in radical terms, forming at least two distinct 
streams. One was sceptical about emancipation, insofar as it was presented as a foundation of 
a sort, and highlighted the incommensurability of different contexts.10 Another radicalized 
this position further by arguing that no framework can be sustained without coercion. 
Emancipation should be sought, but without any assurances of success, and might consist in 
exposing, through relentless questioning, the actual thinness of any claim to authority until all 
such claims were thinned out to reveal either nothing or some unsought expression of 
individuality.11 Inasmuch as this argument applied to any authority claims, it applied to both 
states and academic disciplines. That much was granted to the radicals by critical theorists 
who accepted that, ‘since states and the state system are, in themselves, systems of inclusion 
and exclusion’, no emancipation can be achieved, either in world politics or in International 
Relations, without emulating the radicals’ analysis of such systems.12 However, the radical 
argument extended further, presenting the whole of the Western tradition of political thought 
as one such system and thus denying the possibility of progressive knowledge, in any 
institutionalized form, from within this tradition.13
8 Mark Hoffman, ‘Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate’, Millennium, 1987, 2: 231.
9 Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations 
(London: Macmillan, 1990): 10.
10 Nicholas J. Rengger, ‘Going Critical? A Response to Hoffman’, Millennium, 1988, 1, 81-9.
11 Richard K. Ashley and R.B J . Walker, ‘Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the 
Question of Sovereignty in International Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, 1990, 34: 367-416.
12 Linklater, ‘The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical-Theoretical 
Perspective’, Millennium, 1992, 1: 77-98. Here Linklater begins to extend ‘critical’ towards all 
reflectivist approaches. I am following a more narrow reading of critical theory based on the 
distinctions outlined in the Hoffman-Rengger exchange. Extensive arguments in support of both 
readings can be found in Critical Theory and World Politics, ed. Richard Wyn Jones (Boulder: Lynn 
Reinner, 2001).
13 Cf.: Ashley, ‘Living on Border Lines’. What is referred to below as ‘postmodernism’ is limited to 
this, radical perspectivist, position, meaningful as an ideal characterization.
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Critical theorists argued that the postmodern case still implied universality, on the level at 
which the dialogue between various approaches was unfolding, and maintained that ‘reaching 
an understanding captures the most important respect in which critical theory, post­
modernism, feminism and also philosophical hermeneutics are involved in a common 
project’.14 There was also a somewhat different group of reflectivists who were not 
convinced by, or not interested in, the radical critique of modernity and saw the relation 
between theory and practice somewhat differently from the various ‘critics’. On this view, 
modernity still offered powerful frameworks for the analysis of the central issues of world 
politics, but the task of theory consisted not in ‘solving’ these issues, either in positivist or 
emancipatory sense, but in clarifying them ‘to the point at which... disagreements... reflect 
not confusion but differences of values and priorities’.15 This group saw its achievement in 
restating the central problems of world politics in terms offered by traditional political 
philosophy, and its members tended to accept the pluralist conception of political practices, 
more often than not accepting the state as part and parcel of this uneasy deal with 
modernity.16
Thus, by the beginning of the 1990s, there appeared to be three ‘political’ streams within 
the reflectivist movement. Postmodernists questioned both the tradition of Western political 
thought and Western political practices. Critical theorists attempted to reinvigorate the 
tradition of thought with a view to escaping from the tradition of conduct. ‘Modernists’ 
reflected on existing political practices from within the Western tradition of political thought. 
The boundaries between these approaches were never watertight, each approach hosted its 
own dissidents and its own replay of the universalism/particularism opposition. Important 
crossovers occurred in all possible directions, and one such attempt deserves a pause in view 
of what is to follow.
Heikki Patomaki examined the polemics between critical and ‘modernist’ theorists as an 
instance of a broader universalism/particularism opposition.17 While focusing on one 
particular expression of it, the opposition between state-centrism and cosmopolitanism, he 
claimed that its poles represented differently construed utopias treated in separation from the 
plurality of concrete contexts in which various practical issues may call for the exercise of
14 Linklater, ‘The Achievement of Critical Theory’, in Positivism and Beyond: 293.
15 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992 ): 183.
16 Cf.: Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New 
York: Basic Books, 1977); Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979); Mervyn Frost, Towards Normative Theory o f International 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) for the early formulations.
17 Heikki Patomaki, ‘From Normative Utopias to Political Dialectics: Beyond a Deconstruction of the 
Brown-Hoffman Debate’, Millennium, 1992, 1: 53-75.
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human judgement. At the same time, by allowing for the existence of reflective human 
agency, he distanced himself from those radical contextualists whose world consisted only of 
structures, however construed.18 Yet innovation, although not ruled out, should not jeopardize 
conditions which ensure the continuation of a dialogue within existing socially conditioned 
discourses. Arguments and counter-arguments are valid only inasmuch as they refer to 
commitments already expressed, or presupposed in a way which makes the public discussion 
of their presuppositions possible; include an account of the context in which they are 
advanced, from which they are derived, or to which they are expected to be applied.19
Thus, the new arrangement resembled both Alker-Biersteker’s and Banks’ triangles, but 
neither the complete impartiality of the former nor the relaxed indifference of the latter were 
held as ideals in which to ground the overall constellation. Rather, all three approaches 
touched upon the acceptance of incommensurability, taken not as a value-free factual 
description of a clash between different value-systems but as a paradox, itself normative 
through and through, central to political reality as construed by reflectivists with all their 
disagreements.
To sum up, the last of the theoretical moves registered by Alker and Biersteker, the 
reflectivist ‘defence of dialectics’ against the rationalist attack on both Marxism and 
traditionalism, transformed the inter-paradigm debate into the rationalist-reflectivist one by 
propelling the overall discussion into the regions of philosophy. The problem was that the 
reflectivist view of political reality was rejected by rationalists, and it was difficult, if not 
impossible, to extend any of the reflectivist conceptions of the dialogue to the whole of the 
discipline. The demise of traditionalism, under the blows from both rationalism and 
reflectivism, was symptomatic of the overall transformation of the field into yet another 
binary opposition.
What was wrong with the rationalist-reflectivist debate?
In 1989, Robert Keohane described the discipline as being divided between rationalists who 
‘believe that there is an international political reality that can be partly understood, even if it 
always remains to some extent veiled’ and reflectivists who are ‘content with interpreting 
texts’.20 As all blanket characterizations, this one did full justice to no one, but nor was it 
meant to. It focused on the bigger divide and in so doing captured at least two important 
characteristics of the new situation. First, the discipline was yet again presented in the image 
of a binary opposition. Second, this opposition testified to the failure of the holding operation
18 Ibid.: 53-5, especially note 3 on p. 54.
19 Ibid.: 71.
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initiated by Waltz’ Theory: a conception of science meant to consolidate the field fostered 
new and deeper divisions. There was a possibility of a more optimistic assessment though. 
After all, Waltz not only succeeded in facilitating important agreements among rationalists, 
but also provided a clear focal point for the reflectivist critique. Yet, even on this reading, the 
net-result was still disquieting, at least for those who, like Keohane, assumed the existence of 
a single discipline, however divided.
These two characteristics were related to each other and the relationship was not an easy 
one. If, in the absence of an undisputed subject-matter or methodology, the discipline’s 
identity was to be upheld by yet another binary opposition, the rationalist-reflectivist debate 
could not possibly perform this function because in some of its modifications reflectivism 
denied, or questioned, any separate disciplinary identity by claiming all disciplines for 
philosophy. Philosophy, again, in some of its modifications, recognized this threat posed by 
its own totalizing character and suggested that any ‘unity or synthesis can no longer be 
presupposed a priori or postulated “from on high”, but can only emerge (if at all) from the 
travail of multiple and criss-crossing particular experiences “on the ground’” .21 The 
discipline, having escaped one calamity, that of being swallowed by philosophy, faced 
another one, that of fragmentation, unless there was a criterion independent from the terms of 
the rationalist-reflectivist debate. Before stating such a criterion positively, I shall outline it 
negatively: rationalists and reflectivists were cast from the same mould, both rejected 
disciplinary history as a criterion for assessing the discipline’s achievements.
In the case of reflectivists, this was hardly surprizing. Postmodernist identification of both 
disciplines and states with the practices of coercive exclusion entailed a rejection of the 
possibility of any achievement within such practices to begin with. ‘Modernists’ objected to 
one particular kind of exclusion, the self-exclusion of International Relations from political 
theory, and held that ‘as a free-standing academic discipline international relations has not 
been able to provide an adequate account of how things hang together’.22 Critical theorists 
agreed with postmodernists that there was ‘no meaning in the history of international 
relations, at least not in the Hegelian sense of an inevitable and unilinear development of 
ideas about world politics’ but claimed that by ‘considering what different perspectives claim 
to achieve and what others accuse them of overlooking, it may be easier to understand what 
should be preserved within a more encompassing approach’, provided that this new larger
20 Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1989): 8.
21 Dallmayr, ‘Conversation Across Boundaries: Political Theory and Global Diversity. Millennium,
2001, 30: 342.
22 Brown, Normative Approaches: 77.
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whole would satisfy the practical ideal of critical theory, that of the re-ordering and 
transcendence of diversity.23
The rationalist attitude towards history was less clearly defined. On the one hand, appeals 
to ‘traditional’ theoretical lineage were routinely made. On the other, the credibility of the 
theoretical conclusions themselves was tested not against history but against ‘international 
political reality’ which was assumed to be relatively unchanging.24 This ambivalence is as 
persistent within rationalism as the disagreements among reflectivists and can.be illustrated 
by two recent examples.
Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik provided a comprehensive account of the rationalist 
field focused on the justification procedures specific to it.25 For them, the possibility of 
progressive scientific research implies a move towards multicausal explanations of long-term 
change which will coherently integrate the whole of the rationalist field which is currently 
divided into four paradigmatic domains: realism, institutionalism, liberalism, and epistemic 
theories. These reflect a more profound distinction between power, information, preferences 
and beliefs in turn corresponding to the long-standing generic concern of rationalist social 
theory with resources, institutions, tastes and beliefs. For any future synthesis to be possible, 
each individual paradigm should remain intrinsically coherent and theoretically distinct, a 
condition to be met only if each of them is driven by its own set of assumptions of which it is 
preferable to have three as a reflection of yet another long-standing and generic 
understanding of behaviour in terms of actors, agency and structural constraints. Currently 
existing paradigms do not adhere to these strict criteria and continuously infringe upon rival 
territories compromising their own coherence or distinctiveness. Since Legro and Moravcsik 
are mostly concerned with the aggressive stance of realism, they attempt to remedy this 
situation by articulating realism’s core assumptions. In accordance with the overall design, 
these are as follows: actors are rational, unitary political units in anarchy, their goals are 
fixed and uniformly conflictual, international structure is determined by the distribution of 
material capabilities.
Everyone who accepts this conception of scientific inquiry can no longer seek refuge from 
its rigour in the notion that intellectual practice is its own justification and in related appeals 
to intellectual history or traditions: ‘appeals to traditional authorities insulate traditional
23 Linklater, ‘The Next Stage’: 90.
24 The ambiguity of the rationalist, and in particular neorealist, position on this issue is outlined by 
Andreas Osiander, ‘History and International Relations Theory’, in War, Peace and World Orders in 
European History, eds Anja V. Hartmann and Beatrice Heuser (London: Routledge, 2001): 14-24.
25 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’, International Security, 1999, • 
2: 5-55
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authorities from criticism and thereby perpetuate internal contradictions within traditions’.26 
Implied in this is a much stronger claim: there is no way of not accepting this conception of 
scientific inquiry since even those who, on philosophical grounds, reject any objective 
content to paradigms, still insist on somehow identifiable content of traditions, and since 
traditions thus construed (as intrinsically coherent and distinct) are merely imperfect 
paradigms, same standards of rational justification apply.27
In fact, this is how it should be from the rationalist standpoint, for, apart from the criteria 
of coherence and distinctiveness, there is an unnamed, because taken for granted, criterion 
without which coherence and distinctiveness, when taken together, cannot be maintained, that 
is, the criterion of correspondence to ‘an international political reality’. Coherence, taken on 
its own, as a necessary condition of the truth of a system of propositions, cannot be sufficient. 
It is possible to imagine a coherent system of propositions none of which are believed to be 
true by anyone, and then the question of why this particular system is distinguished from all 
possible others cannot be settled unless coherence, as a criterion of truth, is supplemented 
either with that of correspondence to reality or that of comprehensiveness. In the latter case, 
only that system of propositions is true which is at once coherent and comprehensive, that is, 
it includes all possible propositions and refers to a single reality, unbreakable into distinct 
‘international political’, scientific, historic, or any other ‘realities’.28
The latter route is closed for Legro and Moravcsik because, if their initial question -  Is 
anyone still a realist? -  is pushed onto the metatheoretical level, where the discussion is 
actually taking place, the answer would be a plain yes, Legro and Moravcsik are, inasmuch as 
their conception of ‘rational social theory’ is underpinned by a set of assumptions identified 
by themselves as realist. Actors are rational, unified theoretical units in anarchy (paradigms), 
their goals are fixed and conflictual, the structure of such theorizing is determined by the 
distribution of ‘resources’ (power, institutions, preferences, beliefs) which can be 
unproblematically carved out of some objectively given reality. The last of these assumptions 
is of primary importance (as with materialism in the case of neorealism). The moment it is 
challenged the neat underlying distinction between resources, institutions, tastes and beliefs 
is in trouble and with it the criteria of distinctiveness and coherence. This is not to say that 
this distinction has neither meaning nor theoretical utility for rationalists themselves. 
However, when pressed on the issue of its authority, rationalists will have to concede that it
26 Peter D. Feaver, Gunther Heilman, Randall L. Schweller, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, William C. 
Wohlforth, Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Correspondence: Brother, Can You Spare a 
Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)’, International Security, 2000,1: 190.
27 Ibid.: 191-2.
28 For a detailed discussion of this point see Bertrand Russell, Philosophical Essays (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1910): 156.
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rests on little else but a long-standing intellectual tradition in no way insulated either from 
criticism or incoherence, yet this is precisely what they are not willing to admit. To put it 
differently, rationalism in theorizing, as rationalism in politics, is an intellectual tradition 
which cannot accept its own traditionalist nature. Being out of character is the major trend in 
rationalism’s character.
The second, ‘historicist’, trend in rationalist thinking is present in Richard Little’s 
investigation of the English school.29 Now comprehensiveness (under the name of 
‘pluralism’) is given priority over distinctiveness, and history over theoretical policy-making. 
Little argues that the school cannot be exclusively associated either with the notion of 
‘international society’, as opposed to ‘international system’ and ‘world society’, or post­
positivism, as a mode of inquiry appropriate to it. All of Wight’s three traditions should be 
considered together, albeit in a substantially reworked form. Once this is done, the English 
school may be seen as yielding three distinct but coexisting ontologies: international system, 
international society and world society. This broad reformed church could accommodate the 
wide range of established theoretical approaches, from international political economy and 
various positivist projects, appropriate for the study of international system, to critical theory, 
as a mode of inquiry specific to the study of world society.
The problem with this initial take is its incoherence which Little seems to take as a 
necessary trade-off for pluralism. However, pluralism is not meaningfully theorized either. 
Thus Little rejects, for example, Linklater’s rendition of the three traditions while attempting 
to retain its conclusions insofar as these refer only to one ‘ontological sector’, world society. 
What is not clear, is how what Little believes to be the best account of world society can 
operate when divorced from its universalist and evolutionist assumptions, in accordance with 
which thus coexisting ontologies are the product of distinct, and conflicting, cognitive 
interests.
Clarifications soon followed, this time in collaboration with Barry Buzan.30 Now the net is 
cast even wider and the English school is seen as a nucleus of a discipline reassessed in its 
relation to the whole of social inquiry. After painting a rather gloomy picture of International 
Relations as a failed intellectual project which, as it were, fell into the cracks between other 
social sciences, Buzan and Little attribute this failure to the natal trauma caused by a self- 
imposed Westphalian straightjacket: the discipline ‘was bom with its gaze fixed firmly
29 Richard Little, ‘Neorealism and the English School: A Methodological, Ontological and Theoretical 
Reassessment’, European Journal o f International Relations, 1995, 1: 9-34; and ‘The English School’s 
Contribution to the Study of International Relations’, European Journal o f International Relations, 
2000, 6: 395-422.
30 Buzan and Little, ‘Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to Do 
about It’, Millennium, 2001, 30: 19-39.
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forward.... This orientation towards the policy issues of the present and near future... has 
been reinforced, especially in the US, by the dominance of an economistic, natural science 
based understanding of the social world, which contained its own antihistoricist bias’.31
So after decades of sustained critical engagement with Waltzian theory, itself an epitome 
of Westphalian thinking, Buzan and Little shift their attention to Wallerstein’s theory (which 
is not to say that the concern as such is novel for them). What attracts them is not 
Wallerstein’s conclusions but the mode of analysis which blends theory with history and cuts 
through existing disciplinary boundaries. Similarly, they call for thinking ‘big and wide’ in 
order to question not just the established ontologies within the discipline but also the 
discipline’s place within the universe of social research. What is needed is not a decisive 
victory of one approach, one sector, one academic discourse over the rest but a better 
understanding of how the world composed of all of them hangs together. International 
Relations has ‘the potential, and arguably the obligation, to become a kind of meta-discipline, 
systematically linking together the macro-sides of the social sciences and history’, its role in 
the academic division of labour is ‘to build bridges and establish a common ground in ways 
that transcend disciplinary boundaries’.32 This requires theoretical pluralism, as a rejection of 
the ‘habit of assuming incommensurability’, and a revival of the ‘pluralist [pre-Waltzian] 
tradition without losing sight of the more self-conscious rigour introduced by Waltz’.33
Thus reinvigorated, the English school, as Buzan suggests in his separate contribution, 
may ‘form a complete and interlinked picture of the International Relations universe’.34 This 
universe is divided between three theoretical approaches which bear close resemblance to 
Wight’s traditions. Each has its distinct methodology, each explores its own view of the 
world, each blurs into the other two at the boundaries (Fig. 7.2).
This, and not any uncritical allegiance to ‘traditional authorities’, is what justifies the 
English school’s emphasis on having three approaches. ‘Rationalism’ is interesting not 
because it offers superior ontological or methodological insights, or provides a reasonable 
middle-way, but because its interplay with the two other approaches highlights certain 
realities of world politics which are either neglected or obscured by more rigid binary 
oppositions. Thus, concentrating on the interplay of ‘rationalism’ with both ‘realism’ and 
‘revolutionism’, one can better see the dualistic character of ‘rationalism’ itself, divided into 
pluralist and solidarist streams. The former advocates the plurality of states and their primacy 
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Fig. 7.2 Reinvigorated English school as a nucleus o f International Relations (Buzan-Little, 2001)
interaction. The latter argues for changing existing conventions so as to secure more solid 
and stable observance of the individual human rights while entrusting this task to the society 
of states rather than a single global political community. In this manner, ‘rationalism’, in both 
of its manifestations, appears to be distinct from both ‘realism’, which downplays the 
importance of the rules of interstate conduct, and ‘revolutionism’, which argues against the 
plurality of states as primary actors in world politics.
Buzan acknowledges that pluralism and solidarism, as in fact the other distinctions thus 
emphasized, may simply ‘reproduce within the rationalist “via media” a version of the 
polarization between realism and liberalism that splits IR theory more generally’, in which 
case, the distinction would lose any independent theoretical value and merge into the broader 
universalism/particularism one.35 However, he refuses to follow his own suggestion 
thoroughly. Meanwhile, if examined, as in the case of Legro and Moravcsik’s construction, 
on the metatheoretical level, Buzan and Little’s position oscillates between two not really 
compatible views of the field. On the one hand, it advocates theoretical pluralism as yielding
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‘multiple rather than competing paradigms’, on the other, it sees the virtue of such pluralism 
in that it allows examination of the question ‘how strong [these paradigms] are in relation to 
each other’.36 Contrary to their renunciation of the inter-paradigm debate, Buzan and Little 
suggest a choice between two versions of this particular mode of adjudication: a ‘leaner and 
meaner’ one of Legro and Moravcsik, and a more relaxed, but also less rigorous 
methodologically, formulation of Banks in which coexisting, and not necessarily competing, 
paradigms are passing each other by ‘to engage in a separate conversation with the subject- 
matter’.
However, on Buzan and Little’s own logic and definitions, these are just two different 
versions of ‘realism’ (power-maximizing and security-seeking). While calling for abandoning 
the Westphalian conception of international relations, Buzan and Little do not go beyond a 
rather Westphalian conception of ‘academic relations’, in fact, never really explore the 
connection between the two. Meanwhile, one of the virtues of the rationalist-reflectivist 
debate consisted in making this particular connection explicit and presenting it as being 
fostered by the rise of a single mode of rationality (as when states possess given interests and 
develop ways of pursuing them, and academic disciplines have given subjects and work out 
the best strategies for understanding them). Buzan and Little’s diversified metatheoretical 
‘realism’ may indeed possess the virtue of verging onto other approaches and thus granting 
recognition to modes of inquiry other than its own, but it does not possess the philosophical 
resources needed to comprehend them fully. The ‘unambitious optimism’ of its relaxed 
version of the inter-paradigm debate comes back when a given subject-matter, and therefore 
the separate routes leading to it, can no longer be assumed or taken for granted.37
This points towards what went wrong with the rationalist-reflectivist debate when it was 
still at the peak of its intensity. The point is best seen when Buzan-Little’s image of the 
discipline is compared to Alker-Biersteker’s. Both accounts begin with empirical observation, 
that of competing theoretical claims and counter-claims. In Alker-Biersteker’s case, it is the 
multiple lines of contention between such claims, sustained by dialectical tensions within 
themselves, that shape the discipline, providing it with its dynamic, intrinsically contested 
boundary. The character of the discipline is the outcome of inquiry, not its starting point. In 
Buzan-Little’s, what is offered is more like a snap-shot made in the present. The discipline is 
presented as a complex, self-contained system interacting with other such systems, which 
corresponds to the image of the world of empirical fact where the discipline’s subject-matter 




research, are in need of proper management, and one particular mode of management is 
explored as being particularly proper. It is recognized that the system and the modes of its 
management have histories. It is further argued that these histories matter. What is meant by 
history is a succession of discemable phases of relative stability, a succession which itself 
necessarily exhibits some comprehensible order.38 The implication of this view is that history 
supplies neither criteria for academic progress nor other justifications of existing academic or 
political practices. It merely widens the scope of data under examination, and the data in 
question is located in the world of empirical fact.
Thus, as far as the criteria for the evaluation of practices are concerned, Buzan and Little, 
their insistence on comprehensiveness and ‘historicism’ notwithstanding, are closer to 
rationalists than they are to reflectivists. This is often obscured by rationalists’ routine 
disclaimer that neither of them is ‘committed to the naive notion that reality can be 
objectively known’.39 The question, however, is not whether there is a reality that can be 
objectively known, but whether there is a reality which remains unmodified by reflection. Or 
more precisely, whether it makes sense to postulate such a reality in whatever form and for 
whatever reason. For, in a sense, such ‘external reality’ is postulated also by Alker and 
Biersteker, in the form of the ideal point of ‘complete cosmopolitanism’ or ‘perfect 
pluralism’.
The implications of this were thus stated as early as 1969:
Kant believed in Reason and Hegel believed in History, and for both this was a form of a 
belief in external reality. Modem thinkers who believe in neither, but who remain within 
[this] tradition, are left with a denuded self whose only virtues are freedom, or at best 
sincerity, or, in the case of British philosophers, an everyday reasonableness. Philosophy, 
on its other fronts, has been busy dismantling the old substantial picture of the ‘self, and 
ethics has not proved able to rethink this concept for moral purposes. The moral agent 
then is pictured as an isolated principle of will, or burrowing pinpoint of consciousness, 
inside, or beside, a lump of being which has been handed over to other disciplines, such as 
psychology or sociology.40
Further implications of such a ‘handing over’ to other ‘departments’ were, again, foreseen at
the time of this particular discipline’s birth: ‘Analytic psychology... can do little except
produce monsters; for it is attempting to produce unified individuals in a world without unity;
the social, political, and economic sciences can do little, for they are attempting to produce
the great society with an aggregation of human beings who are not units but merely bundles
37 ‘Unambitious optimism’ is Iris Murdoch’s description of what she saw as a predominant attitude of 
the Anglo-American liberal theorizing; Existentialists and Mystics: 340.
38 Although Buzan and Little’s concern with history is of long standing, they had not stated their 
methodological views on the matter until the publication of International Systems in World History: 
Remaking the Study o f International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 30-2.
39 Keohane, Essays: 8.
40 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: 338.
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of incoherent impulses and beliefs’.41 Reflectivists charged rationalists with forcing the 
discipline into precisely this dead-end. However, inasmuch as, according to reflectivists, both 
the discipline and the world were dominated by rationalism, the radical reflectivist critique 
aimed at transcending this world and this discipline and thus reinforced the same dichotomy: 
‘On the one hand a Luciferian philosophy of the adventures of the will, on the other natural 
science’.42
Thus conclusion happens to be the same as in the previous section: the rationalist- 
reflectivist debate, with its rejection of tradition, or inability to reaffirm it, manifested in the 
extinction of traditionalism, is one of the reasons why the triadic conception of the discipline, 
which at the time of Alker and Biersteker’s writing, was taken for granted by almost 
everyone, was in need of revival by the end of the 1990s. In this sense, Buzan and Little’s 
contribution was indicative, but to be really successful, it had to be stated differently.
How did it end?
In search for a third metatheoretical position, different from both rationalism and 
reflectivism, one need not go ‘beyond’ Buzan-Little’s attempt so much as ‘behind’ it, 
returning to what underpins its rejection of the inter-paradigm debate. Such underpinnings 
are to be found in Waever’s account of the rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate in which 
the notion of critical return is intimated as one possible interpretation of the reflectivist 
undertaking. In 1996, when Waever’s case was presented, this was mostly a hint. By the end 
of the decade the contours of the alternative position acquired more solid shape(s). This 
marked the end of the rationalist-reflectivist debate by suggesting a more complex, triadic, 
constellation at the heart of which was an attempt to reconsider the discipline not in terms of 
its analytic constructions but in the idiom of the history of ideas.
To appreciate the starting point of this development it is interesting to notice where Buzan 
and Little depart from Waever. Firstly, whereas they call for methodological pluralism, one of 
Waever’s main points is that already the inter-paradigm debate was not a debate on 
methodology, and the rationalist-reflectivist one was even less so. This is seen clearer once 
the whole of Waever’s argument and the corresponding image of the discipline are understood 
in terms of their own underlying dialectics.
Waever’s construction does not rest upon the opposition of universalism and particularism 
but arrives at it through what may be described as a dialectics of subject and method, the 
interplay of two kinds of overarching question that the discipline was addressing itself to in
41 Eliot, ‘Religion Without Humanism’, in. Humanism and America, ed. Norman Foerster (New York: 
Farrar and Rinehart, 1930): 112.
42 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: 338.
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the course of its first three major debates. The first was a ‘what’ debate, centred around the 
question of what was the nature of international politics. Insofar as the character of politics 
had to be carved out of the whole of human experience, and insofar as politics was believed 
to be taking place among certain entities, such as nations, for example, the debate’s major 
concerns were with politics, philosophy (as a general map of experience) and ontology, with 
neither epistemology nor methodology being at the forefront of attention. Once a certain 
consensus on this question was reached (or enforced by realism), the discipline moved into 
its second debate, a ‘how’ one, concerned mainly with methodology, epistemology and 
ontology (in this particular order). The third debate reshuffled the order of priorities again. 
Now it was ontology, politics, methodology, with politics re-entering the picture because of 
the different conceptions of it held by the advocates of different -  pluralist, realist, Marxist -  
ontologies. More importantly, this debate brought ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions into a 
qualitatively different relationship with each other. Now it was impossible to separate the 
two, not only did what one saw depend on how one looked at it, but how one looked at the 
world depended on what kind of a world of ideas one was situated in to begin with, that is, 
what fundamental philosophical assumptions shaped one’s world-view.43
This bringing of philosophy, and not just epistemology, back into the focus of attention is 
what led, according to Waever, to the gradual transformation of the inter-paradigm debate into 
the twofold fourth one, with its neo-neo and rationalist-reflectivist lines of contention. The 
difference between the two brings in the second point on which Buzan and Little differ from 
Waever, when they refer to his call for abandoning the habit of assuming incommensurability. 
Waever indeed suggests that ‘there is no reason to assume (radical) incommensurability 
(specifically) among paradigms’, but this suggestion has a proviso: this habit can be 
abandoned only by those who have deconstructed already the image of ‘walls encircling 
crowds who are forced to communicate meaningfully only within their throng, and replaced it 
by a general image of difficult, incomplete, partial “communication” which might exhibit 
variations in density and thus patterns of groupings, but no fixed, ultimate distinctions of an 
inside/outside nature’.44 To be able to abandon the assumption of incommensurability one, 
first, has to stop assuming perfect commensurability. For example, the ‘neo-neo synthesis’, a 
rapprochement between neorealists and neoliberals, became possible after Waltz 
deconstructed all previous divisions by means of a particular conception of science and only 
against the background of the acceptance of this particular conception of science by both 
neorealists and neoliberals. However, as there are limits to such acceptances so there are 
limits to such agreements.
43 Waever, ‘The Rise and Fall’: 156-7.
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The most profound of such limitations undermines both Legro-Moravcsik’s and Buzan- 
Little’s analyses. Both constructions rest on ‘heroic assumptions’ about different theories’ 
relation to reality.45 The most ‘heroic’ of these is the belief in ‘an international political 
reality’, this time not only because such a reality is assumed to be unmodified by reflection, 
but also because it is assumed as a reality whose singularity presupposes that different 
theories are competing for, or co-existing while explaining ‘the same’, however divided, or 
different sectors of this ‘same’, however arranged. Not that some sameness cannot be 
achieved or extended beyond the rationalist-reflectivist divide, but such an extension cannot 
be achieved by the sympathetic advancement of the rationalist argument into the ‘realities’ 
already cultivated by reflectivists, and still less by keeping the paradigms within the 
boundaries which can be meaningfully drawn only from the rationalist standpoint. Synthesis 
is only possible (if at all) from a reflectivist position, precisely because reflectivism is more 
prepared to accept, and in some of its modifications to celebrate, the plurality of paradigms 
and corresponding ‘realities’.46
Now the familiar interplay of universality and particularism reappears, and at this stage, 
Waever’s argument forks into two somewhat different directions. One line of it, in keeping 
with the theoretical realities of the mid-1990s, suggests the emergence of post-radical 
reflectivism which will attempt to occupy a middle-ground in-between the extremes.47 This 
option was later criticized from all possible directions, but one of the most interesting 
criticisms, presented as an extension of Waever’s argument, was advanced from a 
metatheoretical perspective informed by yet another post-positivist philosophical position, 
distinct from those mentioned so far: scientific realism.48
For the authors of this particular critique, Heikki Patomaki and Colin Wight, any middle- 
ground in-between rationalism and reflectivism is indefensible because two wrongs do not 
make a right, and what makes both rationalism and reflectivism wrong is their anti-realism: 
both positivist and post-positivist ‘realities’, understood as what is being experienced or as 
what is being expressed, are not ‘realities’ enough since both bear ‘the mark, or insignia, of 
some human artifice’.49 This anti-realism underpins both approaches’ conceptions of the 
problem-field of the discipline and the possibility for science generally. What critical realism 




47 Ibid.: 166, 174-5.
48 Patomaki and Wight, ‘After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism’, International Studies 
Quarterly, 2000,44: 213-37. Following Patomaki and Wight’s self-identification, this approach will be 
referred to henceforth as ‘critical realism’ to distinguish it from other modes of scientific realism.
49 Ibid., 217.
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either discourse or sense-data, reality which is constituted by the ‘underlying structures, 
powers, and tendencies that exist, whether or not detected or known through experience 
and/or discourse’, reality which ‘provides the conditions of possibility for actual events and 
perceived and/or experienced phenomena’. This, radically non-anthropocentric, 
understanding of reality offers a possibility for a science which is no longer content with 
describing various constant conjunctions but aims at ‘identifying and illuminating the 
structures, powers, and tendencies that structure the course of events’.50
Critical realism shares with positivism the correspondence theory of truth, where ‘truth as 
correspondence to the world is a regulative metaphor guiding scientific and other practices’. 
What it shares with post-positivism is a comprehensive view of reality as being 
‘differentiated yet interconnected’. What separates it from both is its claim that, just as facts 
are value-laden, so values are factually embedded, which introduces ‘a genuinely critical 
moment... that depends at once upon values being factually explained and facts being subject 
to evaluation’. Accordingly, Patomaki and Wight promise, on behalf of critical realism, to 
uphold the emancipatory thrust of reflectivism, but to realize it through the reinvigoration of 
the rationalist belief in the possibilities of science.51 Because critical realism’s reality is 
differentiated, it shares with both rationalism and reflectivism their commitment to inter- 
paradigmatic pluralism, but because it is also interconnected, and in a much more radical and 
complicated manner than rationalist ‘resources, institutions, tastes and beliefs’ are, the 
critical realist view of the interplay between paradigms is closer to that of Wasver than it is to 
Legro-Moravcsik’s.52
Yet, this very interconnectedness makes the critical realist position problematic once it is 
applied to a particular discipline. Scientific realism, as a philosophical position investigating 
relations between agents and structures, causes and effects writ large, may well hold a 
promise of reconciling humans with their environment while treating both as interconnected 
parts of a single ‘this world not another’.53 But how is critical realism to isolate one layer of 
such a reality, world politics, from all possible others in view of investigating it in its relation 
to the rest of ‘this world’, especially so if this layer is constituted, although perhaps not 
exhausted, by human artifice? Perhaps it is possible. Certainly this task does not need to be 
more difficult for critical realism than it is for any other approach with strong holistic 




53 The phrase is Patomaki and Wight’s and is meant to differentiate their position from those of 
positivists (with its ‘world out there’) and post-positivists (whose world is limited to whatever is ‘in 
here’, that is, expressed through discourse); Ibid., 234.
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critical realism are more difficult to fulfil. Some post-positivists may say that the fact of the 
discipline’s existence is an outcome of contingent attempts at the realization of certain values 
and leave it at that. Critical realists cannot be content with contingency and will have to 
search for the facts in which this particular set of values is embedded, and these facts will 
have to be found outside their immediate field of research.
Again, critical realists may well have a solution to this problem and will be ready to 
recognize this solution’s imperfection and conditionality. What matters, however, is the 
tendency. Critical realism’s aversion to anthropocentrism inclines it towards a conception of 
the self which fades into its natural environment (‘Old clothes upon old sticks to scare a 
bird’) just as much as postmodernism’s abhorrence of anthropomorphism draws it towards an 
agonistic self played into the mist of human artifice (‘O body swayed to music, O brightening 
glance’); and the question confronting both would be the same: ‘How can we know the 
dancer from the dance?’54 One can add to this picture a rationalist self that ‘acquires a 
“current” value in the world’ by learning ‘the latest steps in the danse macabre of wants and 
satisfactions’ (Oakeshott V 104). Still these three selves taken together would not make it 
possible to answer the question which Waever asks about all attempts to understand 
International Relations as a mere reflection of some grand philosophical or ideological 
constellations: Why this discipline then?
Waever’s own answer constitutes his second response to the rationalist-reflectivist debate. 
Its starting point is similar to Patomaki’s earlier case for political dialectics: ‘Paradigms have 
to be applied first of all as sociological concepts for discipline internal developments’, and, 
in accordance with the same se^-referential logic, within a discipline different theories or 
paradigms ‘can only be linked externally, when one theory reaches out on its own terms for 
another to exploit it, which it can then only do by grasping the inner logic of this other theory 
and its material’.55 Paradigms are bound to be cautiously ‘expansionist’, for the task of each 
consists in absorbing the ‘material’ and the logic of its neighbours. However, this logic itself 
is acceptable only on the reflectivist side of the debate. On the rationalist side, as Legro and 
Moravcsik’s account of it demonstrates, such expansionism is inadmissible. Insofar as both 
rationalism and reflectivism were locked in the same debate, in the same discipline and in the 
same problem-field, the simultaneous running of two opposing, narrowing and widening, 
logics of inquiry led to an interesting development, thus presented by Waever:
In their work to reshape themselves in scientific form, [neojrealism as well as
[neo] liberalism had to leave behind some of their traditional fields, political statesman in
the case of realism, and ethics in the case of liberalism. Reflectivists attempted to
54 All three lines are from Yeats, ‘Among School Children’, in Poems: 184-5.













Fig. 7.3 The image o f the discipline in the beginning o f the end o f the rationalist-reflectivist debate 
(Wcever, 1996).
articulate these classical issues against the two neo-schools, who have become too 
scientific for such matters.56
This double-movement intimates a critical return, and not to ontology, as in Patomaki and 
Wight, but to politics as a central concern of the first debate. The return itself is conceived 
not as a grand undoing of a centuries-long practice of anti-realism (Patomaki and Wight) or 
an even more grandiose unmasking of modernity (postmodernism), but as a much more 
modest, and yet no less subversive, reassessment of the beginnings of this discipline not 
another (Fig. 7.3).
The beginning of this movement, registered by Wasver, intimated the fall of the 
rationalist-reflectivist debate insofar as it marked the rise of a metatheoretical position 
alternative to both rationalism and reflectivism. What I want to show next, is that such 
movement actually took place and developed into an account which ties together an 
interpretation of the discipline’s history, a conception of world politics, and a comprehensive 
image of the discipline in its relation to philosophy.
56 Ibid.: 155, 165. Wasver’s diagram is slightly modified to highlight the encirclement implied in the 
‘reflectivist outflanking operation’. Also, Waever’s ‘radicalism’ is preferable to ‘revolutionism’ 
meaningful only in conjunction with Wight’s own ‘realism’ and ‘rationalism’, different from their 
namesakes elsewhere. Characteristically, Dunne, when confronted with the necessity of bringing 
together the English school and various metatheoretical approaches, reverts from ‘rationalism’ to 
‘legitimism’; ‘Sociological Investigations’. Henceforth radicalism and legitimism will be used to denote 
what in Linklater or Buzan and Little is presented as ‘revolutionism’ and ‘rationalism’.
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Neotraditionalism in International Relations
Throughout the debates discussed so far, such terms as ‘tradition’, ‘framework’ or ‘paradigm’ 
were used interchangeably or in conjunction with each other, as if one word could be 
explained by reference to the other, as in ‘paradigms or traditions’. Thus, while differences in 
the understanding of ‘paradigms or traditions’ in part constituted the rationalist-reflectivist 
divide, the difference between ‘traditions’ and ‘paradigms’ remained undertheorized. By the 
end of the 1990s, this started to change, and the authors of at least two contributions, both 
framed in the idiom of the contextualist history of ideas, offered various distinctions between 
‘tradition’ and other modes of inquiry.
Brian Schmidt draws his distinction between historical tradition, as ‘a preconstituted and 
self-constituted pattern of conventional practice through which ideas are conveyed within a 
recognizably established and specified discursive framework’, and analytical tradition, ‘a 
retrospectively created construct determined by present criteria and concerns’ which a 
community of scholars addresses by stipulating ‘certain ideas, themes, genres, or texts as 
functionally similar’.57 Once the two are disentangled, the discipline’s achievement can be 
ascertained, not in relation to some abstract intellectual construction, but against the 
background of its own evolution, understood historically. What is needed is a ‘critical 
internal discursive history’ in which the discipline would be taken on its own terms set, 
according to Schmidt, by the problematique of international anarchy articulated, not by the 
great debate of the interwar period as the ‘analytical’ reading maintains, but through the 
scholarly conversations of the mid-nineteenth century.58
Schmidt’s conclusions, however, defeat his own assumptions. The whole point of 
conducting an inquiry which is at once critical, internal and discursive is to escape the 
opposition of reflectivist and rationalist interpretations of history and identity. Admitting that 
the writing of history cannot be devoid of presentism, Schmidt maintains that it is legitimate 
to start a historical inquiry with a present practical concern, as it is understood within a 
discipline, and then trace the evolution of the theoretical attempts at elucidating it. However, 
one ought not to write history in view of fostering or unmasking identities.59 In other words, 
one has to assume a relatively stable, discursively constituted identity so as to be able to 
locate within it all the criteria needed for its critical evaluation. Yet Schmidt’s history goes 
far beyond the investigation of the discourse of anarchy and amounts to a rather radical 
redefinition of the discipline’s identity. This is hardly surprizing, for from the outset he takes
57 Brian Schmidt, The Political Discourse o f Anarchy: A Disciplinary History o f International 




this identity to be constructed ‘analytically’ and intends to supplant it with a truly ‘historical’ 
one. His history appears to be ‘critical’ to the point of emptying the ‘internal’ of almost any 
stable meaning. Paradoxically, the major reason for this lies in Schmidt’s understanding of 
the ‘discursive’, which is hardly critical enough.
Rather than claiming that there is no reality independent from the academic conversations 
he is interested in, or that this reality is sufficiently well absorbed in these conversations, 
Schmidt maintains that some ‘external context’ exists, but it is difficult to ascertain any direct 
connection between it and the discursive practices he isolates as ‘internal’. This, however, is 
merely a replay of the rationalist dualism of subject and object. Accordingly, there are 
reasons to suspect that the needs of colonial administration in the nineteenth century are 
given their due while the impact of World War I is downplayed not least because, once traced 
in this particular manner, the ‘political discourse of anarchy’ starts more or less where 
Schmidt wants it to, or at least does not start where he does not want it to, in the great debate 
of the interwar period.
In this respect, David Boucher’s approach is almost the exact opposite of Schmidt’s.60 
Whereas Schmidt’s inquiry starts by assuming a separate disciplinary identity and the 
dualism of ‘internal’ and ‘external’, Boucher’s begins with a denial of such separation and is 
rooted in a different understanding of the relationship between texts and contexts or theory 
and practice. For him, dramatic disillusionments of the interwar period reinforced the view 
“that faith in human reason for the deliverance of world peace was misplaced” thus 
contributing to the injection of ‘a new realism into perceptions of international relations’, and 
into the university curriculum, in the form of an independent discipline ‘unreceptive to 
political theory’.61 That was a false-start, for there is nothing else to place faith into rather 
than reason, only the nature of reason and its relation to events have to be understood 
properly:
Instead of the thought illuminating the events... the events illuminate the thought which is 
intended to transcend them. Thus, for a theory of the human predicament that the English 
Civil War betrays, we look not to Oliver Cromwell or Charles II but to Thomas Hobbes, 
and for the general principles of international relations to emerge out of the Thirty Years 
War and the Napoleonic Wars we look... to Pufendorf, Wolff, Vattel, and Hegel, whose 
theories extrapolate from these events the growing importance, autonomy, and integrity of 
the state as an actor, or even a personality, in international relations, and present in a 
different way the dilemma of one’s loyalty to humanity and one’s obligations to one’s 
patria.62
This is not to deny the importance of events or participants to them. Philosophical 
discourse does not exhaust the whole of experience but in it one can find everything one
60 Boucher, Political Theories.
61 Ibid.: 6-8.
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needs to know as to how to think about this or that subject. Now we are looking over the 
heads, as it were, of most of the contributors to the twentieth-century rationalism in 
International Relations, but then not all conversations incite desire to join them, and how one 
thinks about various subjects in human sciences does not change from one academic 
department to the other.
In his next move Boucher criticizes most of the reflectivist characterizations of the field 
for their excessive focus ‘upon the substantive ends, such as a specific type of order’. What is 
needed instead is a better understanding of ‘the criteria invoked to guide, justify, or 
recommend state conduct’, and these can be characterized in terms of the identifiable styles 
of thinking. In accordance with the style of their thinking, rather than their conclusions, 
individual philosophers can be grouped into distinct traditions of thought. Unlike Schmidt, 
Boucher does not claim traditions to be actual historic occurrences. They are intellectual 
abstractions coexisting in a dialectical relation to each other. He identifies three such 
traditions: Empirical Realism, Universal Moral Order and Historical Reason. For the 
exponents of the first, actors are guided by their desires and aversions. The second postulates 
a set of universal principles as the only legitimate standard for action. The third attempts to 
synthesize the first two by stating that criteria for state-conduct, independent from the 
immediate interests of states, are to be found in the historical process of inter-state relations.
This taxonomy is an abstraction, a starting point, meaningful only in its dialectical 
interplay with the investigation of a wide range of philosophers whose individual thinking 
never fits neatly into any of the three traditions but continuously questions their boundaries 
and the overall constellation. The problem lies with the limits of such questioning. While 
denying a separate identity to International Relations, Boucher assumes such an identity in 
the case of Politics. This starting point may indeed be better supported by what evidence 
obliges us to believe than Schmidt’s similar assumption of the stable identity of International 
Relations. Still, this support is also conditional. In Boucher’s case, it is conditioned by the 
evolutionist conception of human reason and a corresponding idea of human history. This has 
implications for the understanding of politics. Politics has to be either transcended by thought 
or identified with the process of historical conversion brought about by reason. In this way or 
another, the identity of the activity of politics is thrown into question while the ultimate 
criterion for its evaluation is located outside politics.
Boucher recognizes the challenge but downplays its gravity by presenting the most radical 
critics, postmodernists, as merely asking for suspension of judgement. This implies their 
acceptance of the criteria of conduct which characterize the tradition of Historical Reason
62 Ibid.: 9-10.
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despite possible misgivings as to the final destination of history. Thus Boucher’s own 
historical analysis culminates in the exposition of the political theories of international 
relations of Hegel and Marx. The postmodern critique, however, may be more damaging, 
suggesting that ‘History may be neither servitude nor freedom, but unavoidably Disney’ 
which discloses neither meaning nor reflective individual agency.63 Not that one necessarily 
has to acquiesce to this critique, but it certainly has to be addressed in an account which aims 
at comprehensiveness, however conditional.
This is how the story is told by N.J. Rengger in whose account the relation between the 
discipline and its context is even more dynamic than in Boucher’s.64 Rengger does not use the 
word ‘tradition’, still, as Schmidt, he begins by identifying a practical concern which, 
however, is not a puzzle addressed by a localized community of scholars but, as in Boucher, 
the historically evolving problem of both political theory and practice, the problem of 
political order. This he traces up to its post-Hegelian formulation by Nietzsche and Weber: 
the break-up of the ‘natural’ wholeness of the world into the ‘iron cage’ of sovereign 
associations of disenchanted instrumental reasoners. What Buzan and Little present as the 
discipline’s Westphalian straightjacket, for Rengger, is one mode of responding to the 
problem of order: by managing it. Another response consists in attempts to end the current 
order, either by transcending it through deliberate emancipation or by exposing its limits. 
These responses, as in Boucher, are two identifiable styles of understanding and conduct, but, 
as in Schmidt, they are identified through the critical internal discursive investigation of 
contemporary International Relations.
Here Rengger’s story departs from both Schmidt’s and Boucher’s since history now is not 
a solution but part of a problem: how three particular ‘things’ -  science, construed as 
instrumental problem-solving, society, built around the negative morality of rules, and 
history, which undermines them both by bringing in contingency -  hang together? 
Correspondingly, Rengger’s initial dualistic, managing/ending, conception of the discipline 
transforms into a triadic one. Rationalism, dominated by the neo-neos and characterized by 
the managing style of responding to the problem of order, and radicalism, shared between 
critical and postmodern theorists responding to the problem of order by attempting to end it, 
are joined by critically renarrated International Relations traditionalism.
The reassessment of traditionalism consists in highlighting its understanding of politics 
but also in problematizing state-sovereignty. The problem is not with any intrinsic 
unworthiness of the state but with the impossibility of judging any particular association
63 Sharratt, ‘Modernism, Postmodernism, and after’: 230. The remark, an allusion to a line in Eliot, 
itself an allusion, is a tongue-in-cheek affirmation of the ‘death of the author’.
64 Rengger, The Problem o f Order.
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independently from the particularity of the context. Rengger proposes to accept the fact of
particularity while refusing to assign any intrinsic moral value to it. One has to live both with
or within particular associations and through them, transgressing their boundaries as situation
requires. This calls for the exercise of political judgement which is cosmopolitan but not
universal, always context-specific, and ‘can never be sloughed off to anyone, friend or
family, local or ethnic community, state or international society’.65 The problem of order is
now seen not as one overarching problem but as a ‘series of multiple and overlapping
questions, which map onto the various different issues as they arise in world politics,
together with a more general question about what ends the variously complex institutions and
agents involved in these issues and questions should serve and how they should serve them’.
Political order becomes the
continuous process of ordering (and reordering) ends which are specific to particular 
situations and actors but still embedded into an overarching view of the ‘natural’ 
wholeness of human beings. And if our sense of ‘naturalness’ is different from that of 
Nietzsche and Weber we may not feel quite so ‘disenchanted’ with the world as they 
seemed to, even if we also feel that, in many respects, it is a hellish place and mostly, in 
most places, always has been.66
Ironically, here the wording gets the better of Rengger. By naming his alternative the 
‘ordering of ends’, a mirror-image of the ‘ending of order’, Rengger indicates which of the 
other two approaches, managing or ending, he considers to be the most interesting 
interlocutor. But ‘ends’ also belong to the ‘managing’ side with its ends-means rationality. 
One could play with this further, suggesting that this is how all three poles are linked 
together, but at this point clarity is more important and in more than one way.
If, however, ‘dispositions’ are substituted for Rengger’s ‘ends’, his ‘order’ can be 
provisionally described as ‘tradition’, as this was defined in the previous chapter. This 
requires further clarification, but already at this point allows for some reordering. Thus 
Schmidt’s distinction between ‘historical’ and ‘analytical’ traditions turns into that between 
practices construed and attended to historically or analytically. The former are traditions, the 
latter paradigms as understood by Legro and Moravcsik. Contrary to their understanding, 
tradition is not an imperfect paradigm, which is ideally supposed to be coherent and distinct. 
A perfect tradition ought to be coherent and comprehensive. Since comprehensiveness is an 
ideal, a ‘perfect tradition’ is a contradiction in terms. Tradition is alive insofar as it is in the 
making, aware of its incompleteness and vulnerability by virtue of being responsive to the 




No tradition is free from its own problems recognized by its own practitioners, there is 
always a possibility that ‘it is the limitations imposed by [one’s] own conceptual and 
argumentative framework which both generate... incoherencies and prevent their 
resolution’.67 If no resolution can be found within a given tradition, its inhabitants have to 
turn to its rivals for possible insights. Since such rivals are involved in the similar cultivation 
of coherent and comprehensive frameworks, any insights from them can be gained only by 
means of fluency in their conceptual language and an exercise of philosophical and practical 
imagination. If such translatability and imagination are possible, so is the adjudication 
between the claims of rival traditions.
Such adjudication would consist in attempts by the practitioners of a given tradition at 
providing a coherent and comprehensive account of their own tradition, all its known rivals, 
and their accounts of the tradition in question. This overall account would be narrated as a 
story of continuous achievement which does not have to be equated with progress and under 
certain conditions may consist in securing survival.68 If rival accounts highlight the existence 
of the phenomena recognizable from within a given tradition as relevant, these can no longer 
be excluded from consideration even if ‘traditionally’ they were. Distinctiveness remains, but 
as an unintended consequence of tradition’s internal history of recognized and remedied 
incoherencies, and not as a means for some premeditated synthesis.69
This account of tradition is compatible with Waever’s or Patomaki and Wight’s 
understanding of paradigms. Does this mean that one can still refer to conceptual frameworks 
as ‘paradigms or traditions’? Not form the traditionalist standpoint, not in the context of 
International Relations, not at this particular juncture in the discipline’s development. There 
may be situations in which emphasizing a single, ‘practical’, streak in the character of such 
activities as science or politics would be of considerable value. If, however, one is interested 
in a particular way of returning to a particular point in the history of a particular discipline, a 
point at which scientific explanation was opposed to philosophical interpretation, 
highlighting the difference between various practices may be more important. In this 
particular situation, the difference that makes a difference is that between getting one’s 
politics (Waever) or one’s science (Patomaki-Wight) right.
67 MacIntyre, ‘Moral Relativism, Truth and Justification’, in Moral Truth and Moral Tradition: Essays 
in Honour o f Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe, ed. Luke Gormally (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 
1994): 22.
68 The point is not to oppose Wight’s unconditional claim that, whereas political theory tells the story of 
the ‘good life’, international theory rehearses that of ‘survival’, in the same absolute terms, but to 
recognize its conditionality.
69 Cf.: MacIntyre, ‘Are Philosophical Problems Insoluble? The Relevance of System and History’, in 
Philosophical Imagination and Cultural Memory: Appropriating Historical Traditions, ed. Patricia 
Cook (London: Duke University Press, 1993): 65-82.
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Perhaps both politics and science rest on little more than ‘regulative metaphors’, such as 
correspondence or coherence. Still there remains a difference between the self-referential 
practices advocated by Waever (and, in fact, Patomaki in his ‘political’ contribution) and an 
outward-looking quest for ‘going beyond’ -  currently held values, currently practiced 
discourses, currently inhabited associations -  suggested by most of the reflectivists discussed 
here (including Rengger, as far as his call for an international political theory as a move 
beyond International Relations is concerned). This difference constitutes a dialectics of its 
own, that of the ‘hermeneutics of faith’ and the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’. Neither science 
nor politics would be possible without this opposition and none can be completely devoid of 
the presence of each of its poles. Yet, on the traditionalist view, the ‘hermeneutics of faith’ 
may be more appropriate for politics: ‘It is only when wilfully or negligently we forget the 
resources of understanding and initiative which belong to our tradition that, like actors who 
have forgotten their part, we are obliged to gag’, but even in times of such crises, ‘the only 
knowledge worth having about the politics of another society is the same kind of knowledge 
as we seek of our own tradition’(Oakeshott R 64).
This implies the universality of tradition as a kind of experience. This is contestable, not 
least because historicism and the resulting awareness of being ‘traditional’, do not need to be 
present in the self-understandings of all humans as members of associations which, from the 
standpoint of traditionalism, may indeed represent the diverse expressions of tradition. If one 
retreats, however, from the position of universalism to that of cosmopolitanism, as an 
aspiration for the unity of the political practice of ordering and reordering human 
associations, the matter may look different, provided one can distinguish political practices 
from the rest of what may be going on in the world.
To restate the issue in Rengger’s terms, ‘an overarching view of the “natural” wholeness 
of human beings’, as a context for the continuous ordering and reordering of dispositions for 
living well, is tradition. The procedure of ordering and reordering itself is politics, as a quest 
for such ‘naturalness’ which, of course, continuously exposes the conditionality of any 
naturalness through the deliberation of the ‘conditions of naturalness’ (another, less technical 
and more evidently paradoxical, expression for the ‘hermeneutics of faith’). Tradition, in this 
reading, is only another ‘regulative metaphor’, and the traditionalist quarrel with critical 
realists comes down to the question of whether there is, and whether there ought to be, a 
passage leading from metaphor to the idiom of ontology. But this is a meaningful quarrel, in 
the concrete context of International Relations, where, with all the endless talking about 
balancing, the balance between science and politics is so often tipped in favour of the former.
So, in its abstract function in the academic inquiry, ‘tradition’ may be similar to the 
‘discourse’ of postmodernism, the ‘reality’ of critical realism or the ‘universal pragmatics’ of
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critical theory; but only for the ‘scientific man’ of rationalism will this warrant the
conclusion that all these approaches are cast from the same mould. The rest may appreciate
the difference which International Relations, as an association with a history of its own,
makes. In this context, traditionalism becomes neotraditionalism, as an attempt at striking a
balance in the discipline’s dispositions by drawing attention to the place of politics in human
experience. If this returns the discipline to its first debate, this is not ‘to ring the bell
backward’, but to
think, again, of this place,
And of people, not wholly commendable,
Of no immediate kin or kindness,
But some of peculiar genius,
All touched by a common genius,
United in the strife which divided them;70
that is, to think about one’s immediate field of action, even if it happens to be the field of
theoretical reflection, in the manner appropriate for human associations, finding within it the
resources for learning how to live well in a disordered world of our own making.
A place for politics
So far I have deliberately abstained from associating international political theory either with 
any of the individual approaches or with International Relations as such. If the distinctiveness 
of politics is to be preserved, the study of the relations among various associations, even if 
conducted on the global scale, cannot be reduced to that of world politics. If the 
conversational character of politics is to be preserved, no single approach to world politics 
can claim the sole possession of political truth. What I want to indicate by way of conclusion, 
is a place for international political theory within contemporary International Relations, as 
this space is constituted by the conversation among various discourses.
For this the preceding argument can be summarized by means of a diagram which puts 
together the various images of the discipline into a new pattern (Fig. 7.4). At the centre of 
this new constellation is the rationalism-radicalism-legitimism triangle which represents the 
Westphalian identity of the discipline. This is transformed into a larger rationalism- 
radicalism-neotraditionalism one by different theorists exploring the dangers and the 
possibilities of the postintemationalist Frontier, ‘a new and wide political space’, where 
domestic and foreign issues converge and intermesh.71 The major lines of contention between 
all three approaches can be located on the three axes marked o, m and e (to indicate some 
affinity with the standard distinction between ontological, methodological and
70 Eliot, ‘Little Gidding’: 220.
71 James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent 
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 4-9.
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Fig. 7.4. The ‘mill race’ image o f  the discipline.
epistemological questions without pushing it too far). The way each axis runs through one 
pole and then through the line connecting two rival approaches is similar to both Alker- 
Biersteker’s and Wsever’s presentations but with some important differences. As in Alker and 
Biersteker, or Patomaki and Wight, an alternative to both radicalism and rationalism is sought 
not in the middle-ground between the two but in the independent metatheoretical position. As 
in Waever, the location of this third position and its relation to the other two is conditioned 
not by the hypothetical point of perfect impartiality or correspondence to the hypothetical 
reality but by the discursive encirclement of the field, an outcome of the concurrent historical 
enactment of two opposing tactics: the scientific ‘narrowing’ of rationalism and reflectivist
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‘widening’, facilitated by the renewal of interest in the traditionalist understanding of 
politics.
The task is to stay within the limits of the conversation while moving beyond mere 
representations of the self-images of the participants. This is met by marking on each axis the 
major objections raised against each pole by its rivals. Thus, for example, a charge levelled 
by radicals against both rationalists and neotraditionalists is ‘political conservatism’, whereas 
neotraditionalists and radicals are joined against rationalists on the interrelated issues of 
materialism, objectivism and hermeneutic sensibility. That conceptual scheme which 
provides the most comprehensive and adequate account of its rivals which includes its rivals’ 
accounts of itself thus upholds the disposition of its own inquiry. An inquiry thus ordered 
may claim conditional superiority over its rivals if it accounts for the widest possible range of 
phenomena recognized as relevant not only by itself but also by its rivals who, in their turn, 
failed to account for these phenomena comprehensively and coherently enough.
No superiority can be granted once and for all because comprehensiveness is an ideal and 
there is always a possibility of surprises. The quest for superiority is accompanied by the 
recognition of one’s vulnerability, a combination not dissimilar to the Waltzian 
understanding of states as striving for security as minimum and world-domination as 
maximum. What is missing from the Waltzian account is the historical and discursive 
dimensions of such conduct. Once this quest for security and superiority is metaphorically 
understood as an attempt to narrate the total collection of stories told by us and about 
ourselves, what emerges as a circle uniting all three poles is tradition, both as a mode of 
inquiry and a concrete instance of such inquiry.
The virtue of this encirclement is that it matches Buzan and Little’s call for a 
reinvigorated ‘classical approach’. One possible vice consists in its monistic yearnings and 
the corresponding tendency for locating the ultimate criteria of understanding and conduct 
outside International Relations, in the yet larger philosophical triangle of ‘encyclopaedia’, 
‘genealogy’ and ‘tradition’. One way of allaying this disposition is by presenting the pluralist 
image of the same conversation among rationalism, radicalism and neotraditionalism so that 
intrinsic tensions within each of these three poles are given their due (Fig. 7.5).
Now neotraditionalism, for example, is seen as constituted by the interplay of critical 
realism, philosophical hermeneutics and ‘modernist’ political theory. The last two approaches 
differ not only in their attitude towards distributionist and procedural conceptions of justice, 
but also in their receptiveness to the post-Hegelian forswearing of metaphysics. Philosophical 
hermeneutics and critical realism, while agreeing on these two points, still differ in their 
attitude towards the latter challenge: whereas the critical realist objection to it amounts to the 
affirmation of something which is always beyond any socially conditioned discourse,
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Fig. 7.5 The ‘dry-wall’ image of the discipline
philosophical hermeneutics asserts the existence of someone who can exercise his or her 
conditional freedom by endowing various social constructions with meaning. Yet, on the 
whole, this pole is more holistic in its disposition than the other two, and, as the example of 
Patomaki demonstrates, its conception of politics may be a shared one indeed.
The issue of politics draws attention to the interplay of critical theory, ‘modernist’ 
political theory and philosophical hermeneutics. Although these three approaches constitute 
the possible points of agreement between the adjacent peaks of the overall triangle, neither of 
them is a middle-ground in-between these peaks. The relation between rationalism, 
radicalism and neotraditionalism is best understood through the Oakeshottian metaphor of the 
‘dry wall’, where building blocks are joined and held together not by any premeditated 
design, but by the shapes given to the them by numerous, not always exceptionally 
cooperative or skilful, builders. The possibility of politics as a conversation among thus 
constituted discourses lies in the existence of the ineliminable chinks in the overall 
construction through which different voices speak to each other. The space constituted by 
critical theory, ‘modernist’ political theory and philosophical hermeneutics, as these were 
contingently appropriated in International Relations through various attempts at mapping 
them onto the world of human associations, represents one such possibility, better seen in yet 
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In the focus of this projection is the ongoing conversation between critical theory, 
‘modernist’ political theory and philosophical hermeneutics, which proceeds in the same 
dialectical manner as in Alker-Biersteker’s account and constitutes the field of international 
political theory. No ideal point is postulated or needed now, for international political theory 
itself constitutes an actually existing point of intersection located within, and upheld by, the 
broader field of International Relations. The latter is shaped by the concrete, historically 
contingent attempts at applying established modes of inquiry to the investigation of a 
particular subject which was neither given a priori, nor could be always found in the focus of 
attention of the modes of inquiry thus applied. In this sense, the neo-neo synthesis is the only 
point in the overall picture which belongs exclusively to International Relations due to the 
route taken by the discipline in the twentieth century. Although there is some virtue in 
dispensing of the unnecessary idiosyncrasies which, by proliferating underdefined 
‘rationalisms’, ‘realisms’ or ‘idealisms’, obscure understanding, this in itself does not make 
any of the approaches inferior or superior to others. Neither the ingenuity nor the pedigree of 
a style of theorizing ensures its successful application. What decides the matter is the 
possibility of the individual creativity in bringing together style and subject, and what 
concludes an inquiry is the expression of concrete individuality conditionally achieved in this 
unity of style and subject.
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The task of this chapter consisted in establishing the individuality of international political 
theory and locating it within contemporary International Relations as the major internal 
resource of the individuality of the discipline. This does not make International Relations and 
international political theory identical, nor does it present International Relations as evolving 
into international political theory. The distinctiveness of both is underpinned by the 
neotraditionalist understanding of politics as an activity reducible neither to the instrumental 
pursuit of premeditated ends nor to the wilful transcendence of existing social order. In turn, 
international relations are not reducible to world politics. Therefore, an ‘inside’ (that is, 
included into the orbit of international political theory) conception of politics exists within 
each of the three imperfect sectors which, as in Buzan and Little’s account, make up 
International Relations, while they host an ‘outside’ version as well: a nod towards such 
kinds of experience as economics, natural science, theology, aesthetics or, last but not least, 
war.
Perhaps some of the sectors can be turned around or opened up further to exhibit the 
location of smaller ‘islands of theory’, such as security studies, historical sociology, 
international political economy, foreign policy analysis, etc. However, the three concluding 
images, once taken together, are multi-dimensional enough to allow for such placement, 
while, from the neotraditionalist standpoint, closing the theory-metatheory gap is interesting, 
first and foremost, as an exemplar of the individual intelligence at work. Thus the three 
sectors of the final image are best represented by the individual contributions (not necessarily 
the ones listed here) which break out of the confines of particular theories and in so doing 
assert their individuality, each becoming ‘the still centre of a whirlpool of ideas which has 
drawn into itself numberless currents of thought, contemporary and historic, and by its 
centripetal force has shaped and compressed them into a momentary significance before they 
are flung off again into the future’ (Oakeshott HCA 8).
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Epilogue
The image of the discipline presented in the previous chapter may appear to be unduly self- 
contained and self-obsessed. Is it a case of drawing yet another boundary and, what is worse, 
the one which is irrelevant for the understanding of world politics, let alone for political 
activity itself? The identity of International Relations may well be the least of the public 
concerns of the theorists discussed. Some of them struggle with questions that do not belong 
to, or have little direct bearing on, any isolated discipline. Others have long abandoned 
whatever interest they once had in the meta-theoretical discussions that animated the 
disciplinary discourse throughout the 1990s, often to the detriment of empirical research, and 
concentrate instead on the specific problems of international relations. What, then, was the 
point in making an abstraction I labelled ‘neotraditionalism’ from whatever else may be going 
on in the field?
The idea was to locate an explicitly ‘political’ inquiry on the map of what constitutes today 
a broader field of inquiry, namely, philosophy. In Collingwood’s words, ‘we here claim no 
more than to be following and working out the tradition, ... anxious above all not to pose as 
repositories of a new revelation, or vendors of any new-fangled philosophical patent- 
medicine, but to say once more, in words suited to our generation, something that everybody 
has always known’ (SM 38). Since this concern with thinking about politics philosophically 
marked the point from which the exploration of Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s theorizing 
started, it may be appropriate at this point to rehearse briefly the rest of the argument.
Having identified the place of politics on the map of human activity more generally, the 
argument moved to the discussion of the possible standpoints from which the appropriation of 
politics by the modem European state could be examined critically. Politics, it was argued, is 
an activity appropriate for individuals free to make their choices for themselves while 
subscribing to the conditions of the authoritative practice of civility. Since the authority of 
such a practice cannot be unconditionally identified with the authority of the modem state, 
politics, as an activity at once acquiescent and critical, consists in the careful anatomizing of 
the existing practices of statecraft into those of civility with a view to re-assembling the latter 
into the moral practices of international society, distinguished from the transactional practices 
of international system. International society and international system are ideal 
characterizations in terms of which world order can be understood. World politics, then, is the 
deliberation of the overall conditions of such order in terms of their desirability. To be 
possible, this specific activity of ‘private’ persons has to be conducted in the sentiment 
identified as ‘traditional’ and characterized by the disposition to make sense of the world not 
merely as a world of our making but also as a world in the making, in which others besides 
ourselves, regardless of their location vis-a-vis this or that territorial boundary, are trying the 
best they can to make sense of their daily lives.
Thus another task that I set for myself in the discussion of International Relations was to 
recapture that sentiment in which the founders of the discipline were combining happily 
‘traditions and theories normally not able to relate to each other’. This was meant not to 
equate the engagement of theorists with that of the practitioners of politics, but to highlight 
that disposition which, in spite of the categorial distinctions between their vocations, makes 
both theorists and politicians inhabitants of a shared world, thus making them relevant for 
each other.
The exact nature of this relevance, however, is also subject to change. ‘The most striking
feature of international thought in the twentieth century is not so much any innovation in
content’, it has been argued recently, ‘but rather the change in intellectual context marked by
the arrival of “International Relations”... as a discrete field of academic study, perhaps even
an academic discipline’.1 What was involved in this transformation of ‘theorists’ into
‘academics’? For Oakeshott, the upsurge of interest in politics in the universities meant, first
and foremost, that those interested in the understanding of this activity in terms of its
postulates acquired not a new status but a new home and had to abide by its rules:
It is long since academics began to take an interest in the activity of governing and the 
instruments of government, and among the circumstances which in England (and perhaps 
also in America) have, in recent times, promoted this sort of interest is the fact that many 
academics, seconded during two wars to government offices, have found there a virgin 
(but not unsuspected) world and have felt the impulse to explore it.... But if every don 
were to teach undergraduates what he himself is interested in, and if every professional
1 Chris Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: International Political Theory Today (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2002): 57.
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chair were held to entail or to authorize a counterpart to itself in undergraduate education, 
there would be little in these days to distinguish a university from a mad house (R 214, n. 
6)
The rules of the academic inquiry, like those of any other human activity, receive their
character from their place in human experience more generally. Yet despite some familial
resemblance with other human activities, ‘political education’ necessarily has distinctive
characteristics of its own, derived, again, not so much from the character of its subject-matter
but rather from that of the university as the place of teaching and learning:
The characteristic gift of a university is the gift of an interval. Here is an opportunity to put 
aside the hot allegiances of youth without the necessity of at once acquiring new loyalties 
to take their place. Here is a break in the tyrannical course of irreparable events; a period 
in which to look round upon the world and upon oneself without the sense of an enemy at 
one’s back or the insistent pressure of having to make up one’s mind; a moment in which 
to taste the mystery without the necessity of at once seeking a solution. And all this... 
neither as a first step in education (for those wholly ignorant of how to behave or think) 
nor as a final education to fit a man for the day of judgement, but as a middle (V 113-4).
Like poetry in the conversation of mankind, this interval ‘is nothing so commonplace as a
pause to get one’s breath’, it is not ‘the cessation of activity, but the occasion of a unique kind
of activity’ (114). The uniqueness of the university consists not merely in the variety of voices
in which its inhabitants speak about the world but also in that they do so while learning. If the
state, according to Collingwood, is a political unit par excellence insofar as it is the only unit
the sole task of which is to establish and to maintain the order of human beings, then
university, according to Oakeshott, is exemplary in its dedication to the sole task of learning
how to participate in the conversation of mankind. This does not mean, of course, that it was
designed for this purpose. Rather, it has gradually acquired this character, also acquiring a
somewhat rickety shape:
Do we need a map, it may be plausibly asked, a map on which the relations between the 
parts of the world of learning are clearly displayed? Would not the whole thing be better 
for a little glue to hold it together? And some who feel most strongly about this are to be 
found filling in the interstices between the sciences with a sticky mess called ‘culture’, in 
the belief that they are supplying a desperate need. But both the diagnosis and the remedy 
spring from a sad misconception (109).
Nothing can save a university -  or a discipline within it -  which has fallen out of the magnetic 
field of the conversation, and no university or discipline can hope to save a conversation by 
merely imitating the patterns it once enjoyed. What matters is not forestalling the alleged 
decay or constructing ideal situations but maintaining what is the source of the conversation’s 
vitality; that is, the experience of human freedom rooted in human capacity for learning.
In other words, the relevance of the activity of politics and the understanding of politics for 
each other cannot be derived from their ability to inform or to support each other. And if there 
is a sense in which both may be seen as contributing to a single engagement, then this is the 
‘tiresome engagement’ of the conversation of mankind. The gift here is not a piece of 
valuable information, nor is it a solution of an urgent problem, but the experience of being
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‘kindled by the presence of the ideas of another order’. Thus, where science guards political 
discourse from unchecked ambiguity but makes it dangerously uniform, poetry, by bursting 
out of all routine, upholds the plurality of meaning and the possibility of playing with words 
rather than just using them, and thus ‘preserves, for science itself, an idea of truth according 
to which what is manifested is not at our disposal, is not manipulable, but remains a surprise, 
a gift’.2
This, I think, is what was involved in the traditionalist disposition to bring together
‘traditions and theories normally not able to relate to each other’. This is why to retain this
disposition is as important as to expose a sloppy argument or to attack a hidden assumption.
Recognizing this gift also requires a disposition to recognize that ideas of another order are
not necessarily located beyond this or that boundary. As Collingwood told his students:
I would say to you, when you look for shelter behind institutions or leaders, don’t look for 
help to things outside you. Look inside yourselves.... In a world where institutions have 
broken down and leaders have failed, this resource is still open to you; it is the resource 
men have always had in such times, and it has always been enough. If you can look deeply 
enough into yourselves, you will find there not only the means of living well in a 
disordered world, you will find, what you will never find elsewhere, the means of building 
a new world for your more fortunate children to inhabit (EPP 174).
All in all, to study world politics in the university is not merely to work out solutions
which others might later find useful for the betterment of mankind. It is not to defend human
freedom against the encroachments of bureaucracy or ‘politicians’. Nor is it a disinterested
inquiry into the ‘nature of things’. It is a unique way of practicing human freedom, valuable in
itself and in virtue of this value capable of contributing to the conversation of mankind:
Bureaucratized teaching and learning systems dominate the scene, but nevertheless it is 
everyone’s task to find his free space. The task of our human life in general is to find free 
spaces and learn to move therein. In research this means finding the question, the genuine 
question. You all know that as a beginner one comes to find everything questionable, for 
that is the privilege of youth to seek everywhere the novel and new possibilities. One then 
learns slowly how a large amount must be excluded in order to finally arrive at the point 
where one finds the truly open questions and therefore the possibilities that exist. Perhaps 
the most noble side of the enduring independent position of the university -  in political 
and social life -  is that we with youth and they with us learn to discover the possibilities 
and thereby possible ways of shaping our own lives. There is this chain of generations 
which pass through an institution, like the university, in which teachers and students meet 
and lose one another. Students become teachers and from the activity of the teachers grows 
a new teaching, a living universe, which is certainly more than something known, more 
than something leamable, but a place where something happens to us. I think this small 
academic universe still remains one of the few precursors of the grand universe of 
humanity, of all human beings, who must learn to create with one another new 
solidarities.3
2 Ricoeur, ‘The Power of Speech: Science and Poetry’, Philosophy Today, 1985, 29: 69,
3 Gadamer, ‘The Idea of the University -  Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow’, in Applied Hermeneutics: 
Hans Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History, eds Dieter Misgeld and Graeme Nicholson 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992): 47-59.
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